Trading in European Equity Markets: Fragmentation and Market Quality by Wagener, Martin
Trading in European Equity Markets:
Fragmentation and Market Quality
Zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines
Doktors der Wirtschaftswissenschaften
(Dr. rer. pol.)
von der Fakultät für
Wirtschaftswissenschaften
am Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT)
genehmigte
DISSERTATION
von
Dipl.-Wi.-Ing. Martin Wagener, Ingénieur INPG
Tag der mündlichen Prüfung: 8. November 2011
Referent: Prof. Dr. Ryan Riordan
Korreferent: Prof. Dr. Andreas Park
2011 Karlsruhe

Abstract
Since the beginning of the 21st century, we have witnessed substantial changes in sec-
ondary European equity markets. Exchanges and trading is becoming increasingly au-
tomated and regulations have shaken up the trading landscape in which European ex-
changes, such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Deutsche Boerse, have enjoyed
a national quasi-monopoly in trading. The European Markets in Financial Instruments
Directive (MiFID), adopted in 2007, changed the status quo by allowing alternative
trading venues to compete with traditional exchanges. This thesis studies how MiFID
impacted European equity trading and develops a number of new insights.
In my work I focus on so-called multilateral trading facilities (MTF). On these alter-
native trading venues users can trade securities as on traditional exchanges. However,
compared to established exchanges, MTFs are often considered to offer superior trad-
ing speed, lower transaction costs, and more innovative services. Yet while investors
may benefit from the greater choice of trading venues and from stronger competition
for order flow, multiple platforms also cause fragmentation of trading volume and liq-
uidity. An important question is thus whether this fragmentation caused markets to
be less transparent and trading to be more costly.
This thesis provides an empirical analysis of trading in UK-listed blue-chip stocks
for two observation periods, the first in 2009 and the second in 2010. My findings
suggest that MTFs contribute significantly to overall liquidity and price discovery. In
addition, my analysis shows that investors profit from being able to trade on multiple
platforms as they trade when and where it is least expensive to do so. I show that the
LSE and MTFs provide a liquid market and find no evidence that market fragmenta-
tion has harmed market quality. To better understand the implicit, competition driven
coordination of markets, I further analyze whether fragmentation leads to increased
violations of the law of one price and occurrence of suboptimal executions. Neither
situation would be consistent with an efficient market. The evidence suggests that
exploitable arbitrage opportunities are resolved quickly when they arise. Further, in-
vestors most often trade at the best available price across all markets. Consequently, I
conclude that competition for order flow forces disconnected trading venues to quote
integrated prices.
Altogether, the findings of this thesis suggest that under MiFID the positive effects
of increased competition for order flow outweigh the possible negative side-effects of
market fragmentation.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
The recent automation of exchanges and new regulations has significantly altered the
trading landscape. Trading no longer only takes place on a trading floor where brokers
meet face to face, it mostly takes place in the server rooms of large financial institutions.
Technology has changed how trading venues compete. Most importantly, improve-
ments in information and communication technology have facilitated the creation of
electronic trading platforms that compete for business with established exchanges and
thereby reducing the end costs for investors.
Prior to 2007, traditional exchanges in Europe (regulated markets under MiFID),
such as the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and Deutsche Boerse, enjoyed a quasi-
monopoly in trading. To keep pace with technological development and to foster com-
petition in the provision of services to investors and between trading venues, the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) adopted the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID)
that became effective in all EU member states in November of 2007.1 The new set
of rules opened traditional markets to competition from new types of trading venues,
most importantly multilateral trading facilities (MTF) such as Chi-X and BATS. Today,
the majority of trades is executed on regulated markets and MTFs that successfully cap-
tured a significant fraction of trading volume from traditional exchanges. For example,
the LSE share in exchange traded volume in UK blue-chip stocks decreased from nearly
100.0% in 2007 to less than 60.0% at the beginning of 2011.2 Chi-X is the largest MTF,
1MiFID was implemented in all 27 EU member states and in Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland.
2See, for example, http://fragmentation.fidessa.com/ for statistics on market fragmentation of
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accounting for about 25.0% of daily UK blue-chip trading volume. Similar develop-
ments can be observed across Europe. For example, the market share of Deutsche
Boerse in German blue-chip stocks fell to about 70.0% in the first quarter of 2011 with
Euronext (Paris) falling to a market share of roughly 65.0% in French blue-chip stocks
over the same period.
MiFID represents a significant overhaul of existing regulation, relying on three dif-
ferent key pillars: market access, transparency, and best execution. First, MiFID abol-
ished the option of a so-called ‘concentration rule’, meaning that retail orders had to be
executed on a national traditional exchange. Today, regulated markets (i.e. traditional
exchanges), MTFs, and investment firms can offer their services across borders. Second,
transparency obligations require regulated markets and MTFs to publish order book
information and executions on a timely basis. Third, under MiFID best execution re-
lies on different factors such as cost, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, and
order size. Intermediaries (e.g. investment firms and brokers) that execute orders on
behalf of their clients have to establish a best execution policy and the associated rules
have to be reviewed at least annually.
There is currently a debate about the advantages of increased competition in equity
markets. One consequence of competition between trading venues is that order flow
and liquidity, i.e. the ability to trade shares, is fragmented across platforms. Therefore,
investors may not always receive the best available price as MiFID does not enforce
price-time priority across markets. In addition, less integrated markets may diminish
the price discovery process and generally increase the costs of trading such as search and
connectivity costs. Proponents of MiFID, however, argue that intermarket competi-
tion has put downward pressure on explicit transaction costs, for instance, exchange
fees and brokerage commissions, and has provided trading venues with incentives to
innovate on their services (European Commission, 2010). Furthermore, increasing use
of technology may mitigate some of the potential negative side effects of market frag-
mentation. For instance, algorithmic and high-frequency traders may link platforms
by consolidating order flow.
The introduction of more nimble trading venues is not per se a new phenomenon.
Electronic communication networks (ECN) that compete for order flow in U.S. eq-
uity markets emerged on a widescale basis in the late 1990s. New U.S. regulations
European equity markets.
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enabled this development. Currently, U.S. equity trading is regulated under the Regu-
lation National Market System (RegNMS). Both MiFID and RegNMS share the goals
of enhancing competition between trading venues, ensuring best execution, and guar-
anteeing fair and orderly trading. A key differentiating factor of both regulations is the
lack of formal integration in Europe where markets are not formally linked through
networks and price-priority is not enforced across platforms. In addition, European
regulation does not establish a single data consolidator to provide comprehensive con-
solidated market information to investors.
The literature has intensively studied competition between ECNs and traditional
markets in the U.S., especially in Nasdaq-listed stocks. The evidence supports the view
that ECNs are competitive on liquidity (e.g. Barclay et al., 1999; Weston, 2000) and
contribute to price discovery (e.g. Huang, 2002; Barclay et al., 2003). However, the
market and regulatory structure is decidedly different in Europe. Therefore, the re-
search on trading venue competition in U.S. markets can only be partially transferred
to the European case. Despite the growing body of literature analyzing market frag-
mentation under MiFID, MiFID’s impact on market quality is still not clear. Four
years after MiFID considerably altered European equity trading, the time has come for
a thorough analysis. This thesis aims to determine the contribution of MTFs to overall
liquidity and price discovery in high volume stocks. In addition, it sheds light on the
question whether platforms quote closely linked prices without a formal linkage.
1.2 Research Outline
This thesis aims to explore the impact of market fragmentation on market quality un-
der MiFID.3 Liquidity and price discovery are two of the most important dimensions
3Chapter 5 is based on a joint working paper with Ryan Riordan and Andreas Storkenmaier (Rior-
dan et al., 2011). A previous version of the paper was circulated under the title “Fragmentation,
Competition and Market Quality: A Post-MiFID Analysis” and presented at the 2nd Center for Fi-
nancial Studies International Conference: The Industrial Organisation of Securities Markets: Com-
petition, Liquidity and Network Externalities, at the 2010 European Financial Management Asso-
ciation Meeting, at the Doctoral Symposium of the 3rd Erasmus Liquidity Conference, at the 17th
Annual Meeting of the German Finance Association (DGF), and at the 2011 Campus for Finance
Research Conference. Chapter 6 relies on a working paper with my co-author Andreas Storkenmaier
(Storkenmaier and Wagener, 2011). An early version was presented at the 2010 Boerse Stuttgart Re-
search Colloquium. A much more detailed version was presented at the 2011 European Financial
Management Association Meeting and accepted for presentation at the 28th International Confer-
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of market quality as they determine the level of market efficiency that is a prerequi-
site for the optimal allocation of capital. In general, the quality of a market is driven
by a set of rules and the behavior of market participants. Since investors and regula-
tors may define market quality differently depending on different types of transactions
and strategies, the concept cannot be assessed by a single measure. The literature has
summarized a number of measures that are commonly used in empirical market mi-
crostructure studies to evaluate and compare different trading venues. I apply these
measures to examine market quality in UK blue-chip stocks on different platforms, the
LSE and MTFs, and from an overall market perspective.
This thesis uses trade and quote data to empirically examine the dimensions of mar-
ket quality on the most important trading venues in terms of UK trading volume,
namely the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Competition for order flow may be
beneficial when trading venues offering more liquidity attract a substantial fraction of
investors. Therefore, this thesis analyzes liquidity on each platform and the variables
investors use to condition their order routing decisions. The decision to route an order
to one platform or another may also affect the contribution of each trading venue to
price discovery. I examine the price discovery process using trades as in Hasbrouck
(1991a,b) and quotes as in Hasbrouck (1995). In addition, to better understand the
impact of increased fragmentation on market quality, a comparison between a period
where fragmentation is considerably lower to a benchmark period is presented. Chap-
ter 5 specifically addresses the following research question:
RQ: Do MTFs contribute to liquidity and price discovery?
In contrast to U.S. equity market regulation, MiFID neither establishes a formal
linkage between trading venues nor enforces price-priority across platforms. There is
also no official European consolidated tape that allows investors to observe the best
available price across markets. This essentially creates a situation where the barriers to
competition have fallen and competition forces are left to solve integration. Chapter 6
therefore explores market coordination by analyzing arbitrage opportunities and sub-
optimal executions. Neither situation seems consistent with an economically efficient
market: arbitrage opportunities violate the law of one price and suboptimal executions
ence of the French Finance Association. Financial support from Boerse Stuttgart and the Karlsruhe
House of Young Scientists (KHYS) is gratefully acknowledged.
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indicate that an investor could have received a better price. The following research
question arises:
RQ: Does competition force competing but disconnected trading platforms to
quote prices as if they were formally linked?
Methodologically, this chapter is related to Battalio et al. (2004) who study quote and
execution quality in U.S. equity options in the absence of a formal linkage. This part of
the thesis further aims to reveal under which market conditions arbitrage opportunities
and suboptimal execution predominantly arise. Altogether, Chapter 5 and Chapter 6
provide an in-depth analysis of different market quality dimensions (liquidity, price
discovery, and market coordination) in the fragmented UK trading environment.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses European eq-
uity trading regulation, highlighting the key pillars of MiFID and drawing parallels to
U.S. regulation. It additionally provides details on competing platforms in UK equity
trading, the main market under research in this thesis. Chapter 3 reviews the related
literature. First, theoretical and empirical studies of intermarket competition and its
impact on trading behavior, liquidity, and price discovery are summarized. The dis-
cussion focuses on U.S. and European markets. Second, effects of recent technological
innovations in financial markets, such as algorithmic and high-frequency trading, are
reviewed to evaluate their impact on fragmented markets. Chapter 4 provides data
characteristics and important details on trading intensity, liquidity, and price discov-
ery measures as well as logistic regressions used in the following chapters. Chapter 5
analyzes competition between the LSE and MTFs in UK blue-chip stocks and discusses
whether MTFs contribute to market quality. Chapter 6 aims to examine whether com-
petition between disconnected trading venues forces them to quote prices as if they
were formally linked. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the key contributions and briefly
outlines promising avenues for future research in related topics.

Chapter 2
European Equity Market Structure
This chapter provides a solid background of the European equity market structure to
further empirical analyses. Section 2.1 summarizes the key pillars of European equity
trading regulation describing its main objectives and drawing parallels to the regula-
tion in the U.S. Section 2.2 provides details on the UK equity market, the market
under research in my thesis, and highlights important market developments over the
last decade.
2.1 Markets in Financial Instruments Directive
The organizational structure of a financial market is determined by its regulatory
framework and by the interaction between market participants. In this context, market
microstructure theory studies in detail “the process and outcomes of exchanging assets
under a specific set of rules” (O’Hara, 1995, p. 1). To both the suppliers and deman-
ders of liquidity as well as regulators, it is important to understand how specific rules
influence trading behavior, market quality, or the way public and private information
is incorporated into prices. Market microstructure literature has shown that details in
the trading process, reflecting order-handling costs, transparency, exchange infrastruc-
ture, and asymmetric information, can have a profound impact on the functioning of
a market.1 In contrast to technological improvements or limited regulatory changes
on single exchanges, the introduction of the Markets in Financial Instruments Direc-
tive (MiFID) significantly altered the entire secondary trading landscape across Europe.
1See Biais et al. (2005) for a detailed review on market microstructure literature.
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MiFID is a major part of the European Union’s Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP)
and came into effect in all 27 member states on November 1, 2007.2 The overall ob-
jective of MiFID is to foster competition in the provision of services to investors and
between trading venues. The set of rules is “intended to contribute to deeper, more
integrated and liquid financial markets, to drive down the cost of capital for issuers, to
deliver better and cheaper services for investors, and thus to contribute to economic
growth and job creation” (European Commission, 2010).
I. MiFID: Details and political process
MiFID consists of a framework Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC), an Implement-
ing Directive (Directive 2006/73/EC), and an Implementing Regulation (Regulation
No 1287/2006), replacing the Investment Services Directive (ISD, Council Directive
93/22/EEC) which was implemented in July 1995. MiFID broadens the scope of ISD
and further harmonizes the rules in the European Union (EU). ISD specifies minimum
standards under which investment firms can provide services or establish branches in
member states on the basis of home country authorization and supervision. Accord-
ing to Herbst (2003), there are mainly two reasons why a new regulatory framework
was necessary. First, investors became more active in financial markets and the range
of products offered grew considerably and second, ISD may have not been able to level
the playing field across the whole EU.
Table 2.1 highlights important steps towards the MiFID approval by European au-
thorities. In June 1998, the Cardiff European Council invited the European Com-
mission to prepare a ‘framework for action’ to complete the market for financial ser-
vices within the European Union, notably with the introduction of the euro in Jan-
uary 1999. The initial FSAP program was published in May 1999 (COM(1999) 232)
and outlines specific measures to be taken in order to create a single market for all
financial services among EU members. It does not merely focus on one sector such
as banking or insurance but rather consists of a set of 42 measures intended to fill gaps
and eliminate remaining cross-border barriers. Specifically, FSAP aims to create a single
wholesale market, an open and secure retail financial services market, and state-of-the-
art prudential rules and supervision.3
2Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland have also implemented MiFID.
3Philipp et al. (2003) provide a well-structured overview over European political initiatives to create a
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Table 2.1: Timeline of MiFID approval. The table highlights important steps in the political
and regulatory process from the ISD adoption to MiFID.
Date Event
May 10, 1993 Adoption of the ISD (Council Directive 93/22/EEC)
July 1, 1995 ISD came into force
June 15-16, 1998 Cardiff European Council invited European Commission
to prepare a ‘framework for action’ for financial services
May 11, 1999 European Commission published FSAP
March 23-24, 2000 Political agreement on FSAP by Lisbon European Council
November 19, 2002 European Commission completed draft on the revision
of the ISD (subsequently MiFID)
September 25, 2003 First reading by European Parliament
October 16-17, 2003 Brussels European Council endorsed MiFID
April 21, 2004 European Parliament approved MiFID framework
Directive (Directive 2004/39/EC)
2004-2005 Technical advice by CESR and consultation process on
implementing measures
August 10, 2006 European Commission passed the Implementing Directive
(Directive 2006/73/EC) and the Implementing Regulation
(Regulation No 1287/2006)
November 1, 2007 MiFID came into full effect in all member states of the EU
Legislative process. MiFID is a major part of FSAP and encompasses investment firms
and financial instruments. Its introduction followed a four-level legislative process
proposed by the Committee of Wise Men on the Regulation of European Securities
Markets chaired by Alexandre Lamfalussy (Committee of Wise Men, 2001).4 Level 1
consists of the framework Directive proposed by the European Commission and was
jointly adopted by the European Council and the European Parliament. These rules
are adopted to national law by each member state. Level 2 consists of the Implement-
ing Directive and the Implementing Regulation set by the European Commission un-
der assistance of the European Securities Committee (ESC). The Implementing Direc-
tive defines organizational requirements and operating conditions for investment firms
single market discussing FSAP in detail.
4The Committee of Wise Men was appointed by the European Council in July 2000 and recommended
changes to accelerate the passage of necessary legislation. Visscher de et al. (2008) analyze the arrange-
ments of the process and state that “the speed of the process has increased overall and that there are
fewer bottlenecks than before in the different steps leading to the adoption of legislation”.
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and the Implementing Regulation specifies record-keeping obligations for investment
firms, transaction reporting, market transparency, admission of financial instruments
to trading, and further definitions. While the latter is directly applicable in the mem-
ber states without transposition, the Implementing Directive needs to be adopted to
national law. At Level 3, the Committee of European Securities Regulators (CESR)5
has to ensure a consistent implementation of Level 1 and Level 2 across member states.
It also gives technical advice at Level 2. Level 4 refers to more effective implementation
and enforcement of EU laws. The Implementing Directive and Implementing Reg-
ulation were finally passed in August 2006 and MiFID came into full effect in all 27
member states of the EU on November 1, 2007.
Categories of trading venues. With MiFID the European authorities “establish a com-
prehensive regulatory regime [. . . ] to ensure a high quality of execution of investor
transactions and to uphold the integrity and overall efficiency of the financial system”
(Directive 2004/39/EC, Preamble). It applies to investment firms and regulated mar-
kets alike. An ‘investment firm’ is defined as “any legal person whose regular occupa-
tion or business is the provision of one or more investment services to third parties
and/or the performance of one or more investment activities on a professional basis”
(Directive 2004/39/EC, Article 4(1)) and a ‘regulated market’ is specified as “a multi-
lateral system operated and/or managed by a market operator, which brings together
[. . . ] multiple third-party buying and selling interests in financial instruments [. . . ]
in a way that results in a contract [. . . ]” (Directive 2004/39/EC, Article 4(14)). Op-
erators of regulated markets have to fulfill transparent and non-discretionary rules and
procedures that provide fair and orderly trading.
The Directive further specifies the following three categories of trading venues:
regulated markets, multilateral trading facilities (MTF), and systematic internalizer
(SI).6 While an MTF is defined in a similar fashion than a regulated market (Direc-
tive 2004/39/EC, Article 4(15)), a SI is an “investment firm which, on an organised,
frequent and systematic basis, deals on own account by executing client orders outside
5To further integrate European supervision, the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA)
replaced CESR in January 2011 (Implementing Regulation No 1095/2010). ESMA assumes all tasks
and competences of CESR and has new powers, for instance, the implementation of technical bind-
ing standards and additional responsibilities for customer protection.
6As of November 10, 2011, there are 93 regulated markets, 144 MTFs, and 14 SIs operating in the EU.
See http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/ for a complete list of all trading venues in each category.
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a regulated market or an MTF” (Directive 2004/39/EC, Article 4(7)). Hence, the con-
cept of SIs takes into account the possibility of large investment firms to internalize
clients orders. My thesis focuses on competition between regulated markets and MTFs
as both trading venue categories are the most important in terms of trading volume.
Further discussions are therefore limited to these two categories.7 In April 2011, Chi-X
is the largest MTF in Europe accounting for roughly 26.0% of daily trading volume in
FTSE 100 stocks and 18.0% in continental European equity trading, well in front of
BATS and Turquoise.8
Key pillars of MiFID. MiFID establishes a regulatory regime for each category of trad-
ing venue that relies on three different key pillars, namely market access, transparency,
and best execution.9 The next paragraphs discuss each of these factors in detail:
• Market access: MiFID abolishes the option for a so-called ‘concentration
rule’ or tax provisions given by ISD (Council Directive 93/22/EEC, Ar-
ticle 14(3)), meaning that retail orders had to be executed on a regulated
market. As a consequence, domestic exchanges enjoyed a quasi-monopoly
in nearly all member states - especially in Spain, Italy, and France (Davies
et al., 2005). Under MiFID, investors’ orders can either be executed on a
regulated market, an MTF, or a SI. Currently, MTFs offer trading in nearly
all European blue-chip stocks and have successfully captured market shares
from regulated markets. Their business models are tailored to the needs of
speed-sensitive traders offering low-latency trading infrastructure, new fee
schedules, and innovative order types. Consistent with ISD, MiFID also al-
lows investment firms to provide services and activities in any other mem-
ber state (Directive 2004/39/EC, Article 31) or to establish a branch under
authorization and supervision of the home state (Directive 2004/39/EC,
Article 32).
• Transparency: The Directive includes pre- and post-trade transparency re-
quirements for equity trading on regulated markets and MTFs (Directive
2004/39/EC, Articles 29-30 and 44-45). As the number of trading venues
7Gomber and Pierron (2010) provide further insights into SI and OTC trading.
8See http://www.ft.com/intl/trading-room/.
9Davies (2008) and Degryse (2009) also provide a well-structured overview over MiFID.
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increases, order book information becomes more fragmented. To ensure
a high level of market quality and an integrated price discovery process,
MiFID requires regulated markets and MTFs to publish best bid and ask
prices along with the number of shares quoted at these prices on a con-
tinuous basis. Post-trade requirements include the time of execution, the
execution price, and the associated trading volume.
• Best execution: The best execution obligation under MiFID applies when in-
vestment firms and brokers execute orders on behalf of clients. Article 21 of
Directive 2004/39/EC requires intermediaries to “take all reasonable steps
to obtain [. . . ] the best possible result for their clients taking into account
price, costs, speed, likelihood of execution and settlement, size, nature or
any other consideration relevant to the execution of the order”. Thus, it ap-
plies to the overall characteristics of a possible trade and it is not just based
on the best available price across trading venues. According to MiFID, in-
vestment firms have to establish an order routing policy that they review
on a regular basis.10 This is in contrast to the standard guidelines prior
to the introduction of MiFID. For example, the British Financial Service
Authority (FSA) only used LSE quotes to define best execution (Davies,
2008).
Impact of MiFID. When evaluating the impact of MiFID on European equity trad-
ing, it is important to keep in mind further developments that may had an impact
on exchange operators and investors. First, high market volatility and defaults of ma-
jor counterparties during the financial crisis influenced financial markets and second,
technological improvements in both exchange and trading infrastructure created new
trading possibilities. CESR launched a number of reports and consultation papers to
evaluate the developments post MiFID (CESR, 2008, 2009, 2010). According to the
European Commission (2010), there is evidence that
• the European market for financial services is more integrated under MiFID
than before (i.e. investment firms and regulated markets offer products on
10In some cases these rules are very simple. Deutsche Bank, for example, outlines that it executes clients’
orders in German stocks on Xetra, the electronic order book of Deutsche Boerse, assuming that the
largest platform in terms of trading volume also guarantees best prices.
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a European scale),
• competition between regulated markets and MTFs has put downward pres-
sure on explicit transaction costs, bid-ask spreads, and trading times, and
• investor protection has been considerably strengthened.
In December 2010, the European Commission started a consultation process intended
to get feedback from market participants, investors, national governments, national
competent authorities, and academics for the ongoing improvement of MiFID (Euro-
pean Commission, 2010). In this context Internal Market and Services Commissioner
Michel Barnier stated that “[. . . ] in many ways, it [MiFID] has been a success. But
the world has changed. And we all know the current framework needs improvement.
My objective is to ensure that the revision of MiFID will lead to a stronger regulatory
framework, adapted to the new trends and players on financial markets [. . . ]”.11 This
thesis contributes to the ongoing debate about MiFID by providing empirical evidence
on market quality, price discovery, and market coordination on regulated markets and
MTFs (Chapter 5 and Chapter 6).
II. Equity trading regulation in the U.S.
It is important to put European equity trading regulation into perspective by compar-
ing MiFID to U.S. regulation. MiFID comes as a set of rules influencing trading and
investor behavior on different levels at the same time. Therefore, it is difficult to isolate
effects of specific rules outlined in MiFID. Table 2.2 compares objectives and regula-
tory key pillars of MiFID and the Regulation National Market System (RegNMS),
introduced in August 2005 by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
RegNMS is a further adaption of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and includes
“new substantive rules that are designed to modernize and strengthen the regulatory
structure of the U.S. equity markets” (RegNMS, Summary). It builds upon the Na-
tional Market System (NMS) established by the U.S. Congress in 1975.
Major regulatory changes in the last century. The 1975 amendments to the Exchange
Act of 1934 had a profound impact on the way equities were traded in the U.S. First,
the new rules deregulated fixed commissions, such as brokerage rates, and second,
11See IP/10/1677, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/10/1677.
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Table 2.2: Comparison of MiFID and RegNMS. The table provides details to the European
regulatory framework on equity markets, MiFID, and the U.S. counterpart regulation, Reg-
NMS.
Category MiFID RegNMS
Regulatory framework
• Directive 2004/39/EC
• Implementing Directive, Directive
2006/73/EC
• Implementing Regulation, Regula-
tion No 1287/2006
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
51808
Came into full effect November 1, 2007 Implementation dates ranging from August
2005 to October 2007
Regulatory authorities European Commission, ESC, CESR/
ESMA, national authorities (FSA, BaFin,...)
SEC, state authorities, SROs
Objectives
• Foster competition among trading
venues by creating a single market
for investment services and activi-
ties on the basis of a level playing
field
• Promote innovation, contribute to
deeper, more integrated and liquid
markets, and protect investors
• Modernize the regulatory struc-
ture of the U.S. equity markets
• Strengthen an integrated national
market
Main measures
• Market access: Removal of concen-
tration rule, passporting
• Transpareny: Pre- and post-trade
• Best execution: Investor protec-
tion, order handling
• Order Protection Rule
• Access Rule
• Sub-Penny Rule
• Market Data Rules
Trading venue classifications
• Regulated markets
• Multilateral trading facilities
(MTF)
• Systematic internalizer (SI)
• Fast markets (automated quotes)
• Slow markets (manual quotes)
they mandated the SEC with the establishment of an integrated National Market Sys-
tem (NMS). The NMS links individual trading venues by technology to achieve a fair
and orderly market. The SEC has taken many actions to pursuant to its mandate, one
of most important ones approved the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) in 1978. ITS
is a facility which allows to display best quotes and orders to be routed between partic-
ipating trading venues. On the basis of best quotes a variety of trading venues compete
for orders in a unified system including national exchanges such as the New York Stock
Exchange (NYSE) or the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quo-
tations (Nasdaq) and regional exchanges. The key requirement is that an exchange is
not allowed to trade-through a better price currently offered for an instrument by a
competing trading venue. In the case, when another trading venue offers a better price,
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the order must be sent to this market via ITS.12 In general, ITS trade-through rules
were in place for NYSE-listed stocks unless an exception applied. For instance, small
100-share quotations and large 10,000 share or block transactions were not protected.
Trade-throughs were not prohibited in Nasdaq-listed stocks.13
The SEC also approved joint industry plans that define standards for quote dis-
semination to provide a comprehensive source of market information. For NYSE-
listed stocks consolidated trade data is distributed by the Consolidated Tape Asso-
ciation (CTA) and quote data is disseminated via the Composite Quotation Sys-
tem (CQS). The Nasdaq Unlisted Trading Privileges (UTP) plan provides consolidated
trade and quote information for Nasdaq-listed stocks. Trade reporting includes stock
symbol, time, price, and volume. Consolidated quote information comprises the Best
Bid and Offer (BBO) price, the corresponding volume, and the trading venue. Quotes
are available per trading venue and consolidated across platforms displaying the Na-
tional Best Bid and Offer (NBBO).
In the 1990s, Electronic Communication Networks (ECN), such as Instinet, in-
creased their market shares, especially in Nasdaq-listed stocks. ECNs are alternative
trading systems (ATS) and defined as “electronic trading systems that automatically
match buy and sell orders at specific prices” by the SEC.14 Initially, these trading
systems were outside the reach of private investors, mainly used by broker-dealers
and institutional investors. This created a two-tiered trading environment resulting
in high dealer rents and less competition. For instance, Christie and Schultz (1994)
document that Nasdaq market makers avoided odd-eight quotes and Huang and Stoll
(1996), among others, find evidence for higher trading costs on Nasdaq compared to
the NYSE. In January 1997, new SEC regulations increased competitive pressure on
Nasdaq market makers. Most importantly, the new order handling rules required that
best quotes offered by Nasdaq market makers on ECNs have to be included in the
12Jarrell (1984) gives an overview over the Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 and provides evidence
that the deregulation of NYSE brokerage rates broke down the broker cartel and triggered a dra-
matic growth in institutional trading. Lee (1993) analyzes execution quality on the NYSE, Nasdaq,
regional exchanges, and Instinet in 1988/1989 and finds significant price differences between loca-
tions. His results raise concerns about the adequacy of ITS.
13Despite the absence of a trade-through rule for Nasdaq-listed stocks, Nasdaq’s best execution obliga-
tion forces broker-dealers to execute orders at the best available price. However, this rule was not
strictly enforced on an order-by-order level.
14See http://www.sec.gov/answers/ecn.htm.
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Nasdaq BBO. In addition, public limit orders must be allowed to compete for order
flow, meaning that market makers have to display customers’ limit orders if they are
better priced than their own quotes.15 Facing an increase in trading volume on ECNs,
the SEC adopted Regulation ATS. This new regulation became effective in April 1999.
It required so-called proprietary trading systems, broker-dealer trading systems, and
ECNs with 5.0% or more of trading volume in a covered security in four of the last
six months to publicly disseminate their best-priced orders in that instrument. In ad-
dition, the alternative trading system had to join ITS.
Since 2001, the SEC has required that trading venues publish on a monthly basis, pre-
defined execution quality reports, so-called ‘Dash-5 statistics’ (Reg NMS, Rule 605). In
addition, Rule 606 requires intermediaries to make public on a quarterly basis, trad-
ing venues where they route investors’ orders. Investors, brokers, and regulators can
use these reports to evaluate the efficiency of order routing decisions. Boehmer et al.
(2007) provide evidence that brokers condition their order routing decision on Dash-5
statistics. Trading venues tend to lose order flow if their reported execution quality
worsens considerably relative to competitors.
RegNMS. New technologies, new types of trading venues, and the decimalization sig-
nificantly changed the U.S. trading landscape. Following a number of reviews, discus-
sions, and consultations, the SEC adopted RegNMS on June 9, 2005. It aims to reduce
the number of trade-troughs and to realign the relationship between various trading
venues. The four main rules are described below. While the Sub-Penny Rule came into
effect in January 2006, the Order Protection and the Access Rule were implemented
for different instruments between July and October 2007. The implementation date of
the Market Data Rules was in April 2007.
• Order Protection Rule (Rule 611): This rule requires trading centers to “[. . . ]
establish, maintain, and enforce written policies and procedures that are
reasonably designed to prevent trade-throughs on that trading center of
protected quotations [. . . ]” (RegNMS, Rule 611(a)). A trade-through hap-
pens if an order is executed worse than the best available price across trading
venues that is represented by immediately for automatic execution accessi-
ble quotes. Thus, this rule does not protect hidden orders or manual quotes
15A detailed description of the new regulation and its impact on market quality is offered by Barclay
et al. (1999).
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and only takes outstanding limit orders at the top of the order book into
account.16 It also covers small and large share quotations which were not
covered under ITS. Most importantly, there is a uniform regulation for all
exchange-listed stocks, no matter whether listed on the NYSE or Nasdaq.
• Access Rule (Rule 610): This rule changed existing regulation significantly.
First, it enables fair and efficient access to quotes of any trading center al-
lowing for the use of private linkages by different connectivity providers.
Second, it limits the fee for a trading center to access protected quotations.
Finally, trading venues are required to prevent their members to post quotes
that lock or cross protected quotations on any other trading venue.
• Sub-Penny Rule (Rule 612): This rule specifies that any kind of exchange
platform is not allowed to “[. . . ] display, rank, or accept from any person a
bid or offer, an order, or an indication of interest in any NMS stock priced
in an increment smaller than $0.01 if that bid or offer, order, or indication
of interest is priced equal to or greater than $1.00 per share” (RegNMS,
Rule 612(a)). Flickering quotes and loss of execution priority by a nominal
amount can distort price formation. The SEC therefore sets a minimum
threshold of price variation.
• Market Data Rules (Rule 601 and 603): These rules establish a new regime
for the functioning of the single market data consolidator. Revenues gen-
erated from market data fees are allocated on the basis of a trading venue’s
contribution to best quotes.
The U.S. equity trading landscape was always more fragmented than its European
counterpart. However, price-priority across trading venues is enforced and trading
venues are virtually integrated via ITS, private linkages, and consolidated quotation
and trade reporting systems. ECNs captured a significant market share in Nasdaq and
NYSE-listed stocks. They are organized as electronic open limit order book markets
and compete for order flow on the basis of low trading costs, trader anonymity, and
16Manual quotes are quotes entered on a ‘slow’ trading venue that does not offer automatic execution,
for example, a trading floor.
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fast executions. Chapter 3 discusses the literature on market fragmentation and ECNs
in detail.
Conclusion. Both, MiFID and RegNMS have the purpose to foster competition and
to enhance investor protection. However, a closer look reveals substantial differences:
First, MiFID does not establish formal linkages between trading centers. Investment
firms have to decide whether they connect to different trading venues or use interme-
diary connectivity. Smaller investment firms may decide to avoid high connectivity
costs and only connect to the most important markets. U.S. equity exchanges are elec-
tronically linked to facilitate an integrated national market. Second, under MiFID the
investment firm is obliged to define and implement a best execution policy. Under
RegNMS, trading venues are required to establish, maintain, and enforce best execu-
tion. Third, MiFID defines best execution on the basis of multiple factors such as
execution price, explicit trading costs, speed, and probability of execution. RegNMS
specifies that price alone matters and any order must be forwarded to the trading venue
with the best available quote for execution. Fourth, European regulation does not es-
tablish a single data consolidator. There is no public consolidated tape integrating
order book information from various trading venues.17 MiFID only requires market
operators to publish certain pre- and post-trade information as discussed above.
There is an onging debate among practitioners and academics about the impact of
differences in MiFID and RegNMS on market quality. Petrella (2010) argues that “[. . . ]
the consolidation of market data and the disclosure of execution quality information
appear to be more effective [. . . ] in strengthening competition for order flow among
trading venues” under RegNMS. Stoll (2001), however, points out that a formal linkage
may impede innovation and causes high infrastructure costs. Both studies rely on well-
founded arguments but the authors do not assess empirically the question if market
efficiency can be ensured without a formal linkage. This question is elaborated in
Chapter 6.
17There are, however, commercial products available. For example, Thomson Reuters offers a consoli-
dated data stream, see http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/
equities_derivatives/.
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2.2 Details on the UK Equity Market
This section provides a brief description of the history of the LSE and highlights im-
portant market developments in the UK after the introduction of MiFID in Novem-
ber 2007. As discussed in the previous section, MTFs, such as Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise, became serious competitors of traditional European exchanges during the
last years. The UK equity market is particularly suitable for an analysis of the impact
of MiFID on competition and market quality for at least two reasons. First, it is the
most fragmented equity market in Europe and second, the UK, especially London, has
a long tradition as a market place and 20.0% of the European equity trading volume
was still centered at the LSE in 2010.18 The Financial Times Stock Exchange index 100
(FTSE 100) is a well-known blue-chip stock market index. It is an arithmetic average,
value-weighted index of the top 100 stocks in terms of market capitalization, listed at
the LSE. To assess changes in the UK equity market structure and trading practices,
the following subsections describe the market structure on the LSE over time, report
trading volume and market share statistics in FTSE 100 constituents, and explore insti-
tutional details of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
I. Reforms and technological changes on the LSE
Table 2.3 depicts the most important developments in the history of UK equity trad-
ing. Regulated trading on the LSE started on March 3, 1801. It has a long tradition
as floor-based broker-dealer market. The following details are based on Clemons and
Weber’s (1995) article that offers a well-organized description of trading at the LSE.
Similar to the specialist system of the NYSE, ‘jobbers’ were responsible for making the
market. They hold inventory for their own accounts, selling to brokers whose cus-
tomers wanted to buy and buying from brokers with sell orders. The so-called single
capacity system prevented firms to perform both jobber and broker functions at the
same time. Specifically, jobbers acted as intermediaries between brokers.
Deregulation and introduction of SEAQ. In October 1986, the LSE switched to an
open, electronic screen-based quotation system, called the Stock Exchange Automated
Quotation system (SEAQ). Simultaneously, numerous changes occurred, including the
18See Equity Market Report 2010 of the Federation of European Exchanges (FESE),
http://www.fese.eu/.
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liberalization of broker-dealer commissions, the replacement of the single with a dual
capacity system, and the opening of dealer-ships to banks and other financial institu-
tions (Clemons and Weber, 1995). Dual capacity means that an investment firm can
act on SEAQ as an agent for its customers (broker) and be a jobber (dealer) transact-
ing its own business. These market reforms are known under the term ‘Big Bang’ and
had the purpose to encourage competition and to reduce execution costs. The market
structure under SEAQ resembles the Nasdaq market. On SEAQ, competing market
makers were obliged to enter two-way quotes for no less than the minimum quantity
in stocks for which they were registered. This minimum size was determined on the
basis of the trading volume over the previous year per stock. In the case where a mar-
ket maker displayed a larger quantity of shares than the minimum quantity, her quotes
were firm in the sense that incoming orders have to be executed against the displayed
quantity. Market markers were eligible for relief from the stamp duty, allowed to short
sell, and could use the Inter-Dealer Broker (IDB) system. Stamp duty is a form of tax
charged for each share transaction in the UK. While quote display systems were au-
tomated through SEAQ, order execution was arranged over the phone. Trades were
finally reported on SEAQ.19
Introduction of SETS. The second central market reform at the LSE was the intro-
duction of the Stock Exchange Trading System (SETS), an electronic open limit order
book, which was introduced in October 1997. However, the broker-dealer network
was retained in parallel and also today investors can choose to negotiate a trade with
a broker-dealer (‘off book’) or trade in the electronic limit order book. The LSE re-
moved the obligation of broker-dealers to provide two-way quotes on SETS. Liquidity
19There are a number of studies analyzing market quality and trading behavior on SEAQ. Abhyankar
(1995) provides evidence that equity and futures markets are more integrated after the introduction
of SEAQ. He attributes this finding to a higher level of equity market efficiency after the Big Bang
relative to the futures market. Jong de et al. (1995) compare French stocks listed on the Paris Bourse,
an order-driven market, and traded on the LSE’s SEAQ International. The London market provides
less favorable execution quality for all except the largest trade size category. Gemmill (1996) analyzes
the impact of anonymity for block trades on SEAQ between 1987 and 1992 by different publication
rules. Kleidon and Werner (1996) show that prices of UK cross-listed stocks on SEAQ and the
NYSE and American Stock Exchange (AMEX) are not integrated. See Abhyankar et al. (1997) for
an intraday analysis of quoted spreads, trading volume, and volatility on SEAQ. Reiss and Werner
(1998) find that broker-dealers use the IDB system to share inventory risk. Further, Hansch et al.
(1998) show that inter broker-dealer trading is driven by inventory changes. It appears that there is
a negative relationship between price improvements a dealer offers and trade sizes a broker submits
(Bernhardt et al., 2005).
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Table 2.3: UK equity market history. The table highlights important events that shaped the
UK equity trading landscape.
Date Event
March 3, 1801 Foundation of the LSE
October 10, 1986 Deregulation of the LSE and introduction of SEAQ (known
as ‘Big Bang’)
October 20, 1997 Introduction of SETS on the LSE
June 18, 2007 Introduction of TradElect on the LSE
June 29, 2007 Chi-X started trading in FTSE 100 constituents
November 1, 2007 MiFID came into full effect
August 15, 2008 Turquoise offered trading in FTSE 100 constituents
October 31, 2008 BATS started trading in FTSE 100 constituents
December 21, 2009 Merger between the LSE and Turquoise
February 14, 2011 Introduction of Millenium Exchange on the LSE
February 18, 2011 BATS announced to acquire Chi-X
provision through limit orders is voluntary. Limit orders are sorted by their price and,
in case of equality, by the time of their arrival (price-time priority). Initially, SETS was
only available for FTSE 100 constituents. In September 1999, FTSE 250 constituents
were transferred to SETS, too.
According to Naik and Yadav (1999) and Friederich and Payne (2007), there were
three main reasons which led to this market reform: First, it was widely agreed that
opacity and trading costs incurred by retail investors were especially high on the LSE.
Second, UK regulatory authorities removed certain quoting restrictions for broker-
dealers on domestic alternative electronic trading networks opening the market for
more competition. Third, many European exchanges moved to fully electronic limit
order trading and increased the competitive pressure on the LSE.20 To date nearly all
exchanges operate fully automated electronic limit order books. There are several ben-
efits associated with this kind of market structure. First, investors can decide to buy or
sell at specific prices (limit order) or to trade at the best available price (market order).
Limit orders give control over the execution price but execution is not certain (execu-
tion risk). Market orders provide immediacy but the execution price may vary from
20Various European exchanges introduced fully electronic trading systems in the 1990s. For example,
Euronext started trading on the Nouveau Système de Cotation (NSC) in 1988 and Deutsche Boerse
on the Integrierte Börsenhandels- und Informations-System (IBIS) in 1991. See Jain (2005) for a list
of electronic and floor-based trading systems at international exchanges.
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the last observable price (price risk). Second, investors are able to observe the entire
order book on a timely basis, evaluating trading interests of buyers and sellers. Third,
order execution costs are expected to be lower due to electronic order execution.21
Further developments. In June 2007, the LSE introduced its new trading and infor-
mation platform called TradElect to further enhance trading speed and infrastructure
efficiency.22 To strengthen its competitive position and to “[. . . ] capture a healthy
slice of the market’s growth potential”23, the LSE aggreed to merge its dark pool unit
Baikal with Turquoise on December 21, 2009. The aquisition was completed in Febru-
ary 2010 leaving the LSE with 60.0% of the new company. The existing shareholders,
international investment banks, still own 40.0% of the new company. In February
2011, the LSE switched trading from TradElect to Millennium Exchange to enhance
trading speed and infrastructure reliability. This step may attract algorithmic order
flow which is considered to be predominantly executed on MTFs.
II. Competition between the LSE and MTFs
FTSE 100 constituents are listed on the LSE. Trading is also possible on various MTFs
that differ in technology, trading costs, and execution speed. The most successful MTFs
in terms of market share in FTSE 100 constituents are Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
Under MiFID, the LSE and the three MTFs are regulated through the British Financial
Service Authority (FSA). MTFs aim to attract order flow from algorithmic and high-
frequency traders. To do so they offer fast trading platforms with high throughput
rates and low trading fees. The throughput rate is defined as the average number of
messages a trading system can process during a period. It is especially important for
automated trading strategies which rely on fast order submissions and cancellations.
21There are different studies after the introduction of SETS in 1997. Naik and Yadav (1999) analyze
spread measures of FTSE 100 and FTSE 250 constituents in 1998 and for two control periods in
1994 and 1996. They find that trading costs for retail investors decreased under SETS. Overall,
their results suggest that allowing limit orders to compete for order flow reduces the market power
of broker-dealers (see Barclay et al. (1999) for similar results on Nasdaq). Ellul et al. (2002) study
trading through SETS and broker-dealers at the open and close of a trading day. They argue that
broker-dealers provide useful additional liquidity. Intraday patterns of quoted spreads, trading vol-
ume, and volatility for SETS and SEAQ instruments are examined by Cai et al. (2004). Lai (2007)
examines the impact of SETS on trading quality in FTSE 250 constituents. Friederich and Payne
(2007) provide evidence that investors’ choice of trading on SETS or with broker-dealers depends on
order characteristics and market liquidity.
22The LSE still uses the acronym ‘SETS’ for its electronic order book.
23See http://www.tradeturquoise.com/press/4-TQ%20completion%20release-2.pdf.
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Market entry of MTFs. Chi-X, the largest MTF, started trading in German and
Dutch blue-chip stocks about six months ahead of MiFID on March 30, 2007. Eleven
FTSE 100 constituents became available on Chi-X at the end of June 2007 and the full
list of FTSE 100 constituents in August 2007. BATS began trading of ten FTSE 100
constituents by the end of October 2008. All FTSE 100 constituents were available for
trading one week later. BATS is operated by BATS Europe, a subsidiary of the U.S.
company BATS Global Markets. In February 2011, BATS agreed to combine with
Chi-X Europe.24 Previously, Chi-X Europe was owned by Instinet, a subsidiary of No-
mura Holdings, and a number a major investment banks and broker houses. Turquoise
started trading in five FTSE 100 constituents on August 15, 2008. The roll-out of the
entire universe of FTSE 100 constituents was completed by the end of the month. The
ownership structure of MTFs is an important detail. Investment firms may predomi-
nately submit orders to trading venues where they are shareholder.
MTF market shares. Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2 depict the development of trading vol-
ume in FTSE 100 constituents on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise and the cor-
responding market shares between July 2007, the month Chi-X started trading in UK
instruments, and December 2010.25 These four trading venues account for roughly
95.0% of trading volume generated on regulated markets and MTFs during the obser-
vation period. Figure 2.1 shows that the LSE lost a significant fraction of trading vol-
ume in FTSE 100 constituents between 2007 and 2010. There are mainly two reasons
for this development. First, trading volume has not yet recovered to the level before
the financial crisis and second, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise captured a considerable
fraction of trading in FTSE 100 constituents. To assess the level of competition, Fig-
ure 2.2 presents market shares for Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The LSE market share
is by construction one minus the sum of market shares across all MTFs. Chi-X was
able to capture a significant fraction of trading over the last three years, reaching about
25.0% market share in FTSE 100 constituents in the first quarter of 2010, an all-time
high. BATS steadily increased its market share to almost 10.0% in December 2010.
Turquoise reports a lower market share than BATS since October 2009. Its average
monthly market share fluctuated between 5.0% and 6.0%.
24See http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/press_releases/BATS_Chi-X_SPA_FINAL.pdf.
25Daily closing prices and number of shares traded are obtained from the Securities Industry Re-
search Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). I thank SIRCA for providing access to the Thomson Reuters
DataScope Tick History archive, http://www.sirca.org.au/.
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Figure 2.1: FTSE 100 trading volume on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The figure
shows average monthly trading volume of FTSE 100 constituents on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS,
and Turquoise from July 2007 to December 2010. First, daily market shares are obtained by
multiplying the daily closing price of an instrument on each trading venue with the correspond-
ing number of shares traded. Second, daily trading volume is averaged across instruments on a
monthly basis.
III. Institutional details
In the following three paragraphs, I outline important market features and develop-
ments that are relevant for the two observation periods in 2009 and 2010 used through-
out my thesis (see Chapter 4.1). In general, a competitive UK trading environment re-
sulted in regular trading infrastructure upgrades on all platforms and frequently chang-
ing fee schedules.
Trading mechanism. While regulated markets and MTFs compete primarily on tech-
nology and trading costs, the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise provide the same basic
market model. They all operate an electronic, fully integrated limit order book which
combines both visible and hidden liquidity.26 Iceberg orders that only display a por-
tion of their total volume are available on all four trading venues. Fully hidden limit
orders are not visible to any investor and have to meet the large in scale considerations
26See Biais et al. (1995) for a description of a generic limit order book design.
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Figure 2.2: FTSE 100 market share of Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The figure shows
average monthly market shares of FTSE 100 constituents on Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise from
July 2007 to December 2010. First, daily market shares are obtained by multiplying the daily
closing price of an instrument on each trading venue with the corresponding number of shares
traded. Second, daily market shares are averaged across instruments on a monthly basis.
of MiFID.27 In general, orders are executed according to ‘price-visibility-time priority’,
i.e. displayed orders have priority over non-displayed fractions of iceberg orders and
fully hidden orders with the same price. The LSE introduced fully hidden limit orders
on December 14, 2009.
As discussed above, the LSE trades FTSE 100 constituents on SETS. In addi-
tion, broker-dealers may provide liquidity off book.28 Continuous trading starts at
8:00 a.m. GMT on all four trading venues and lasts until 4:30 p.m. GMT. In addition
to limit orders, market orders, iceberg orders, and fully hidden orders, Chi-X, BATS,
27MiFID requires all regulated markets and MTFs to be pre-trade transparent. An exception are
orders that are large in scale compared with normal market size (Directive 2004/39/EC, Ar-
ticle 22(2)). Normal market size is provided by ESMA and reviewed on a yearly basis, see
http://mifiddatabase.esma.europa.eu/.
28According to the LSE, the majority of trades is executed ‘on book’, for example, in April 2011, 98.0%
of the total number of exchange-reported trades and 82.0% of total exchange-reported trading volume
(information obtained from the LSE per e-mail).
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and Turquoise offer pegged orders. The execution price for this type of order is de-
termined based on a reference price such as the European Best Bid and Offer (EBBO).
Executions on the three MTFs are subject to a price check. Possible trades are not
executed if the execution price is in a certain range above or below the EBBO.
Trading Speed. MTFs offer potential benefits to speed-sensitive investors such as al-
gorithmic and high-frequency traders. A delay in the time it takes to process a trade
may result in missed trading opportunities, misplaced liquidity, and higher risk expo-
sure. Technically, MTFs offer on average eight to ten times higher trading speed than
the LSE during the observation periods. For example, in May 2010, BATS reports an
average order latency of 200 microseconds.29 In October 2010, following its migration
to a new trading system, Turquoise claimed to be the world’s fastest trading platform
with an average order latency of 126 microseconds.30
Fee schemes. Algorithmic and high-frequency traders are very sensitive to explicit
trading costs. The LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise feature a maker/taker pricing
scheme, i.e. investors are charged for aggressive orders that take liquidity from the order
book and rebated for passive orders that supply liquidity. In April/May 2009, investors
pay between 0.45 bps and 0.75 bps for an aggressive order on the LSE and receive
a rebate up to 0.40 bps. Chi-X and BATS charge an aggressive order with 0.28 bps
and rebate a passive order with 0.20 bps. On Turquoise investors pay 0.28 bps for an
aggressive order and receive a rebate of 0.20 to 0.24 bps for a passive order depending
on their trading volume during the previous month.
The LSE switched back to a traditional fee schedule on September 1, 2009. Investors
are charged between 0.20 bps and 0.45 bps for both aggressive and passive orders. On
May 4, 2010, the LSE introduced two additional rates for high-volume traders that run
in parallel with the LSE’s existing fee schedule. The first new rate waives trading fees
of passive orders for firms providing a large amount of liquidity. The second new rate
charges 0.29 bps for an aggressive order. Investors have to apply to be included in the
new rate groups and have to meet specific criteria such as a high prior trading volume.
Over the second observation period in 2010, BATS charges an aggressive order with
0.28 bps and rebates a passive order with 0.18 bps. Maker/taker fees on Chi-X and
Turquoise are the same as in the first observation period.
29See http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/participant_resources/BATSEuro_Latency.pdf.
30See http://www.tradeturquoise.com/press/TQ_Latency_Press_Release.pdf.
Chapter 3
Related Work
Market microstructure literature offers a broad range of topics. For the purpose of
this thesis, I focus on theoretical and empirical studies on competition between trading
venues. Section 3.1 summarizes the findings on costs and benefits of fragmentation and
explores parallels between ECNs in the U.S. and MTFs in Europe. Section 3.2 looks
at the impact of recent innovations in information and communication technologies
on the way trading presently takes place in a fragmented trading environment. The
literature on exchange infrastructure as well as algorithmic trading provides important
implications on competition and market quality.
3.1 Intermarket Competition
A. Theoretical Literature
From a theoretical perspective, Mendelson (1987) analyzes the effect of fragmentation
on various platforms. He finds that there may be a detrimental effect of market frag-
mentation on market and trading characteristics resulting from the proliferation of
alternative trading venues. Comparing a consolidated ‘clearing house’ and fragmented
‘clearing houses’, his model demonstrates that fragmentation reduces the expected trad-
ing volume, increases price variance, and reduces expected gains from trade.1
The literature also describes the effect of network externalities on liquidity. Intu-
itively, if two markets are combined into one, trading volume concentrates on the sin-
gle market resulting in a higher probability that investors meet and that bid-ask spreads
1In the context of the paper, a ‘clearing house’ is modeled as a periodic call auction market.
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narrow. For the two market case, Pagano (1989b) shows that if trading costs are equal
in both markets, trade concentrates on one trading venue resulting in higher liquid-
ity. If trading costs are different between markets or the alternative is to search for a
transaction partner at cost, there are multiple equilibria. For both cases, the findings
suggest that investors cluster according to the quantities that they wish to trade on
each trading venue. In addition, concentration of trade is pareto-improving. However,
if concentration of trade involves some search, the model predicts that concentration
of trading may be inefficient. Pagano (1989a) further examines the impact of market
depth on asset price volatility. His model shows that an increase in depth as a result of
the market entry of investors may create a positive network externality.
Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) analyze multi-market trading of informed large in-
vestors and uniformed small liquidity traders. They show that small liquidity traders
concentrate in the equilibrium in the most liquid market. This market, in turn, also
attracts informed trading. Thus, their central result is consistent with Pagano (1989b),
trading should concentrate on one trading venue. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) explain
the fact that trading should not only concentrate geographically as discussed before
but also intertemporally. If investors have discretion over the timing of their orders,
trading tends to concentrate at particular times of the day, since at this point in time
liquidity is highest. Studying trading at the LSE, Abhyankar et al. (1997), for instance,
find some support for Admati and Pfleiderer’s (1988) hypothesis.
Although the theoretical literature emphasizes the importance of network externali-
ties, recently several new trading venues emerged. Madhavan (1995) argues that trading
volume would not fragment if trade disclosure was mandatory. In his model, dealers
benefit from fragmentation facing reduced price competition and large traders also ben-
efit by being able to hide their orders. Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) discuss the
impact of the introduction of crossing networks on an existing dealer market. They
find that cost advantages and trading volume are crucial factors for the competitive-
ness of crossing networks. As described before, a higher level of available liquidity on
crossing networks attracts more investors, enforcing the liquidity externality. How-
ever, as the level of low-liquidity preference orders exceeds a certain threshold, they
may crowd out higher-liquidity preference orders. As a consequence, increasing the
order flow on a crossing network can reduce overall welfare. Liquidity effects on the
existing dealer market are ambiguous. On the one hand, bid-ask spreads may increase
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if investors use the dealer market as a ‘market of last resort’ and on the other hand,
adverse selection may decrease on the existing dealer market if informed traders resort
to crossing networks.
Summary. Early in the literature, the presence of strong network externalities was
recognized. Mendelson (1987), Pagano (1989a), and Chowdhry and Nanda (1991) argue
in favor of consolidation on one trading venue. Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) show that
there is a strong tendency to concentrate trading intertemporally. Madhavan (1995) and
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) discuss causes that may lead to fragmentation.
B. Empirical Literature
Trading venues compete along other dimensions than just price. Alternative trading
venues offer unique trading opportunities to their clienteles, for example, fast exchange
infrastructure. In addition, most of the presented theoretical models are developed un-
der the assumption that liquidity suppliers are competitive. However, strategic behav-
ior of liquidity suppliers may lead to market fragmentation (Biais et al., 2005). The fol-
lowing section summarizes empirical evidence on competition between trading venues
and its impact on market quality. Table 3.1 gives an overview over the discussed litera-
ture.
I. Competition and market structures
Many studies compare market quality and efficiency across different market structures.
This section reviews the literature on intermarket competition between the NYSE,
Nasdaq, and regional exchanges highlighting important implications for the purpose
of this thesis.
Competition between the NYSE and regional exchanges. Hamilton (1979) is one of the
first authors who empirically addresses the trade-off between benefits of competition
and costs of a more fragmented trading environment.2 His research is based on a sample
of 315 NYSE-listed stocks from the first quarter of 1975. These stocks are also traded
on various other third market trading venues. Increased competition from regional
exchanges, brokers, and dealers “[. . . ] might stimulate the exchange [NYSE] to supply
2Other early studies are Demsetz (1968) and Tinic (1972). They suggest that increased competition for
order flow leads to smaller quoted spreads.
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better or cheaper transactions”. However, “off-board trading reduces exchange trading
volume, which would reduce exchange efficiency, if centralization has economies of
scale” (Hamilton, 1979). The picture emerges that both effects are small but the com-
petition effect compensates costs of fragmentation as quoted spreads and daily stock
price variances decrease in a more competitive setting. Lee (1993) examines the cost of
trading in 500 high volume NYSE-listed stocks on the NYSE and seven other trading
venues (regional exchanges, Nasdaq, and Instinet) in 1988 and 1989. Controlling for
trade characteristics, costs of trading vary considerably across trading venues and are
often lower on the NYSE compared to the third market. Importantly, most differences
result from trades which are executed better than the currently available NBBO. This
situation suggests that the NBBO does not always reflect available intermarket liquid-
ity. As a consequence, the market for NYSE-listed stocks is less integrated than regu-
lation suggests (NYSE-listed stocks are part of the ITS, see Section 2.1). He concludes
that his findings “[. . . ] raise questions about the adequacy of the existing intermarket
quote system (ITS), the broker’s fiduciary responsibility for ‘best execution,’ and the
propriety of order flow inducements” (Lee, 1993).
Hasbrouck (1995) analyzes price discovery of 30 stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial
Average (Dow Jones) from August through October 1993. During the observation
period, Dow Jones constituents are predominately traded on the NYSE but also on
regional exchanges. The author develops an approach to determine the trading venue’s
contribution to price discovery which became a standard measure in the market mi-
crostructure literature. The information share of a trading venue is defined as the pro-
portion of a market’s contribution to the variance in the random walk process of a
stock price.3 Price discovery seems to be concentrated on the NYSE with an aver-
age quote based information share of 91.3%. The information content of order flow
can be analyzed using prevailing quotes as in Hasbrouck (1995) or trades as in Easley
et al. (1996). The latter documents ‘cream-skimming’ of uninformed liquidity orders
for the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE) and the NYSE. During their observation
period in 1990, it is widely documented that local brokers and specialists agree to ‘pur-
chase’ uninformed retail order flow. An adverse selection problem arises leaving the
NYSE with the more informed order flow and higher adverse selection risk. This, in
turn, means that NYSE specialists may widen their spreads to recover from loses to
3Section 4.3 discusses the methodology in more detail.
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informed traders. If order purchasers promise to match the NBBO that is mainly set
by the NYSE, investors globally receive worse prices.
Competition between the NYSE and Nasdaq. There is an ongoing debate about the
merits of dealer and auction markets. While Nasdaq is historically organized as a dealer
market, the NYSE is an auction market. A host of studies examines market quality on
one of the two competing markets and others compare transaction costs and price ef-
ficiency for stocks trading in both markets. Huang and Stoll (1996) are among the
first authors who provide an in-depth analysis of differences between Nasdaq and the
NYSE.4 Their data cover all trades in 175 high volume Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks
in 1991. To allow for a clean analysis of market quality, they match one Nasdaq stock
to one NYSE stock on the basis of different criteria such as price and market capital-
ization. The evidence suggests that quoted and effective spreads are more than twice as
large for Nasdaq stocks relative to their NYSE pairs. Huang and Stoll (1996) conclude
that “[. . . ] important explanations are the internalization and preferencing of order
flow and the presence of alternative interdealer trading systems, factors that limit deal-
ers’ incentives to narrow spreads on NASDAQ”.
Bennett and Wei (2006) show for a more recent observation period that fragmen-
tation can result in less liquid and less efficient markets. Because of Nasdaq’s organi-
zation as a dealer market, order flow becomes more consolidated when stocks switch
listings from Nasdaq to the NYSE. The authors look at 39 voluntary exchange switch-
ings during January 2002 to March 2003 and find lower quoted, effective, and realized
spreads as well as reduced short-term volatility when trading on the NYSE. The im-
provement in market quality is on average stronger for smaller stocks. The evidence
strengthens the view that order flow consolidation encourages price competition be-
tween investors and enhances market quality. O’Hara and Ye (2011) argue that these
4See Biais et al. (2005) for a well-structured overview over theoretical models on dealer and auction
markets. Empirically, Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997a) confirm the results of Huang and Stoll
(1996) for a data sample of Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks in 1994. Boehmer (2005) shows that
significant differences in transaction costs between both trading venues still persist between 2001 and
2003. The international evidence is mixed. Results of Jong de et al. (1995) imply that trading costs on
the Paris Bourse, an electronic limit order book, are on average lower than on SEAQ International,
LSE’s dealer market system. Venkataraman (2001) find that execution costs on the Paris Bourse
are higher compared to the NYSE. For an observation period in 2001, Gajewski and Gresse (2007)
compare transaction costs on Euronext (Paris), the successor of Paris Bourse, to those on the LSE.
Their results suggest that market quality is higher on Euronext. Kasch-Haroutounian and Theissen
(2009) show that trading costs on Xetra are lower than on Euronext (Paris). Their observation period
spans May to July 2002.
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results may rather be driven by stock characteristics and different trading rules or cor-
porate governance requirements on Nasdaq and the NYSE than by competition effects.
They analyze market quality in 262 Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks between January
and June 2008. Their data show that U.S. equity markets feature substantial fragmen-
tation that seems to lower effective spreads and to increase execution speed. Especially,
smaller and less liquid stocks benefit from market fragmentation suggesting that frag-
mentation increases competition for order flow. O’Hara and Ye (2011) emphasize that
U.S. market participants benefit from “the development of sophisticated order routing
combined with the existence of a consolidated tape and the trade-through rule [which]
have resulted in a single virtual market with many points of entry”. In their opinion,
it is an open question to which extent investors benefit from competition in Europe or
Canada where the lack of a consolidated tape and trade-through protection may harm
overall market quality.
Entry of a new competitor. Boehmer and Boehmer (2003) document large improve-
ments in liquidity after the NYSE started trading 30 ETFs. Before the market entry
which took place in two phases in 2001 and 2002, the ETFs were already traded in par-
allel on AMEX, Nasdaq, ECNs, and regional exchanges. However, the NYSE gained
about 15.0% share in trading volume during the month of entry. Increased competi-
tion lowers quoted and effective spreads significantly and increases depth for the entire
market and on each individual trading venue. Lower realized spreads indicate smaller
profits of liquidity suppliers. The authors conclude that “[. . . ] competition for or-
der flow among market centers is beneficial for overall liquidity and does not seem to
adversely affect price discovery” (Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003). Battalio et al. (1997)
examine the effect of increased competition after the entry of a third market broker
dealer, Bernhard L. Madoff Investment Securities (Madoff), on the NYSE.5 In January
1988, Madoff started to selectively purchase and execute order of high volume NYSE
listed stocks. Applying an event study methodology, Battalio et al. (1997) show that
quoted and effective spreads in those stocks decrease. The evidence also implies that
the potential adverse selection problem may be economically insignificant and Madoff
rather competes on the basis of lower transaction costs than on information advantages.
Fontnouvelle de et al. (2003) and Battalio et al. (2004) find that cross-listing of equity
5These results are consistent with other studies on market maker competition on the Nasdaq (Wahal,
1997; Klock and McCormick, 1999).
34 Related Work
options improves market quality.6 In August 1999, several U.S. option exchanges be-
gan to trade previously exclusively listed options. One month later, 37.0% of all equity
option volume shifted from single to multiple exchange trading. Fontnouvelle de et al.
(2003) find that this event is associated with a decrease in quoted (effective) spreads
in the post event period by more than 50.0% (35.0%). The findings suggest that the
improvement in spreads is higher for low volume series of options. There is little evi-
dence that the changes result from economies of scale in market making. The authors
reach the conclusion that “[. . . ] intra-exchange competition is not a good substitute
for inter-exchange competition, evidence that fragmented order flow across competing
markets may offer important benefits to investors” (Fontnouvelle de et al., 2003). In
late 2002, the SEC imposed a formal linkage and more stringent quoting and disclo-
sure rules on U.S. option markets. Battalio et al. (2004) look at two periods prior to
the new rules, June 2000 and January 2002, where the second period was under the
threat of the SEC’s formal linkage plan. It appears that quoted and effective spreads
decline between both observation periods and also in comparison to Fontnouvelle de
et al. (2003). They find that locked and crossed market quotes and the number of trade-
throughs decrease over time. The average time an option is locked (crossed) decreases
from 15.5 minutes (93.6 seconds) per day in June 2000 to 8.8 minutes (14.4 seconds) in
January 2002. The daily trade-through rate falls from 11.1% to 3.7% between the first
and second observation period. Their results lead them to conclude that competition
between trading venues, improved technology, and the threat of increased regulation
can integrate platforms without a formal linkage.
Summary. Studies of market quality on Nasdaq and NYSE provide evidence that the
market structure of a trading venue affects the level of competition between liquid-
ity suppliers (e.g. Huang and Stoll, 1996). The presented literature demonstrates that
there are substantial benefits from increasing competition due to lower quoted and
effective spreads (Boehmer and Boehmer, 2003; Fontnouvelle de et al., 2003; Battalio
et al., 2004). However, Easley et al. (1996) show that informed trading may increase ad-
verse selection costs asymmetrically, i.e. leaving investors on one market with a higher
adverse selection risk than on another market.
6Similar results for cross-listed options are found by Mayhew (2002).
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II. Competition between Nasdaq market makers and ECNs
Increasing market share of ECNs is primarily a result of regulatory changes. In Jan-
uary 1997, the SEC began to introduce new order handling rules. The set of rules
was designed to foster competition for order flow, specifically targeted Nasdaq (see Sec-
tion 2.1). Previously, trading on Nasdaq suffered from imperfect competition (e.g.
Christie and Schultz, 1994; Huang and Stoll, 1996). The new rules were adopted
in several phases. The first group of 50 stocks switched to the new regime on Jan-
uary 20, 1997 and a second group of 50 stocks switched on February 10, 1997. By
October 13, 1997 all Nasdaq stocks fell under the new regulation. The literature dis-
cusses several possible advantages of ECNs, such as low trading costs, improved order
exposure, trader anonymity, small tick sizes, or fast executions (e.g. Barclay et al., 2003;
Goldstein et al., 2008). Trading with Nasdaq market makers, investors can benefit from
long-term internalization agreements and may receive better prices than the NBBO.
Liquidity measures. Barclay et al. (1999) examine the impact of the new order han-
dling rules and thus increased competition on market quality. Their findings support
the view that the objectives of the SEC have been met. First, quoted and effective
spreads decrease by about 30.0% under the new set of rules and second, depth at the
best bid and ask price increases. In addition, competition “[. . . ] significantly narrowed
the historical differences in trading costs for Nasdaq and New York Stock Exchange
stocks” (Barclay et al., 1999). Weston (2000) confirms these results comparing different
matched samples of Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks before and after the introduction
of the new order handling rules. Testing for changes in order processing, inventory,
and adverse selection costs as well as Nasdaq market maker profits, he provides evi-
dence for substantial improvements in market quality on Nasdaq. Still, quoted (effec-
tive) spreads on Nasdaq are still about 15.0% (25.0%) larger in comparison to NYSE
stocks. Stronger competition among dealers lead to an exit from the market for market
making on Nasdaq. However, market maker trading volume is less concentrated under
the new rules. Together, both studies suggest that competition between market makers
and ECN limit orders increases market quality.
Simaan et al. (2003) look at the quoting behavior of market participants on ECNs
and Nasdaq for a ten day period in September 1997. Analyzing the same stocks as those
included in Barclay et al. (1999), they find that odd-tick avoidance is less prevalent on
ECNs. In addition, odd-tick quotes seem to be generally more competitive than even-
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tick quotes as they are available for a much shorter period of time. It appears that
ECNs narrow spreads, since they are alone (one or more ECNs) at the best available
bid and ask in about 19.0% of time. Their findings lead them to conclude that more
opaque platforms, such as ECNs, can reduce market makers’ fear of retaliation and
thus increase aggressivness in order submission. Fink et al. (2006) study competition
between ECNs and traditional market makers on Nasdaq between January 1998 and
December 2002. Their main analysis covers 2,500 stocks on a quarterly basis. The
picture emerges that an increasing ECN market share is associated with smaller NBBO
quoted spreads, decreasing effective spreads, and larger depth at the best bid and ask.
Competition forces some traditional market makers, such as wholesale dealers, to leave
the market as it may be less profitable to purchase order flow.
Execution costs. Conrad et al. (2003) analyze the choice of institutional investors to
route orders to day and after-hours crossing systems, ECNs, and traditional brokers.
Their data span the time period between the first quarter of 1996 and the first quarter
of 1998 and cover about 780,000 orders from 59 institutions. Controlling for order
characteristics, their results offer insights into the benefits of alternative trading sys-
tems on the basis of trading costs. Relative to traditional broker-filled orders, executed
orders on day crossing systems are 30 bps cheaper, after-hours crossing systems 20 bps,
and ECNs 66 bps. However, the infusion of competition through new order handling
rules in 1997 reduced the comparative advantage of trading on ECNs relative to broker
trades.
Price discovery. Besides market liquidity, the informativeness of quotes is an impor-
tant dimension of market quality. Huang (2002) compares the quality of quotes sub-
mitted by two ECNs, Instinet and Island, and traditional Nasdaq market makers. His
analysis is based on two samples of trade and quote data of 30 high volume Nasdaq-
listed stocks in July 1998 and November 1999. The evidence suggests that both ECNs
contribute to price discovery. It appears that prices on Instinet and Island tend to ‘move
first’ relative to market maker quotes. The two trading venues also submit quotes more
frequently, have a higher fraction of quotes at the best available bid/ask, and smaller
quoted spreads than dealers. Overall, the “[. . . ] evidence suggests that the proliferation
of alternative trading venues, such as ECNs, may promote quote quality rather than
fragmenting markets” (Huang, 2002).
Barclay et al. (2003) offer further insights into the informativeness of ECN and mar-
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ket maker executed trades. They use trade and quote data of June 2000 that identify all
ECN and market maker trades for 150 Nasdaq-listed stocks. First, the authors explore
market conditions and the level of market activity under which investors rather send
their orders to an ECN than to Nasdaq market makers. Trades are more likely to be
executed on ECNs when ECNs offer better prices and lagged trading volume as well
as stock return volatility is high. Second, Barclay et al. (2003) find that ECN trades
explain more than twice the amount of efficient price variation than market maker
trades. In addition, the permanent price impact of ECN trades is at least 50.0% larger
than the permanent price impact of market maker trades. These findings lead them
to conclude that ECNs and Nasdaq market makers attract different types of investors.
Overall, ECNs seem to attract more informed traders and significantly contribute to
price discovery.
Goldstein et al. (2008) investigate the impact of anonymity and liquidity on price
discovery. Their data sample comprises all trades and quotes on Nasdaq montage and
three ECNs (Archipelago, Island, and Instinet) for 100 high volume Nasdaq stocks in
the second quarter of 2003. In contrast to Barclay et al. (2003), they show that Nasdaq
montage tends to contribute more to price discovery than ECNs in less traded stocks
while informed investors prefer trading on ECNs for the most liquid stocks. ECNs,
especially Archipelago and Instinet, are at the best bid and ask for a similar fraction
of time compared to Nasdaq. However, quotes on Nasdaq montage seem to be more
stable, i.e. less volatile. Effective spreads are lower on ECNs than on Nasdaq montage
but vary substantially between ECNs. Altogether, it appears that investors benefit
from market maker supported liquidity on Nasdaq montage in times of high market
volatility and in less actively traded stocks.
Level of competition. The empirical study of Biais et al. (2010) relies on the reduction
in tick sizes on Nasdaq from a tick of 1/16 to 1/256 in April 2001. At the same time,
there was only a modest change on Island. The ECN reduced its pricing grid to 1/1,000
of a dollar. The authors analyze changes in quoted spreads, trading strategies, and
rents of liquidity suppliers for a sample of 74 stocks between November 2000 and June
2001. In contrast to their expectations, spreads decrease on both Nasdaq and Island,
suggesting that limit order traders on Island earned excess returns prior to the tick
size change. In addition, Island limit orders undercut Nasdaq quotes more often than
they do with prices set on Island. Overall, the evidence suggests that “[. . . ] perfect
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competition cannot be taken for granted, even on a transparent open limit order books
with a very thin pricing grid” (Biais et al., 2010).
Summary. The literature on ECNs demonstrates that they have a profound impact
on U.S. equity trading, offering more choice of trading to investors and reducing over-
all transaction costs. First, competition between ECNs and Nasdaq market makers
significantly reduces quoted and effective spreads (Barclay et al., 1999; Weston, 2000;
Fink et al., 2006). Second, ECN quotes are informative and contribute to price discov-
ery (Huang, 2002; Barclay et al., 2003; Goldstein et al., 2008). However, intermarket
competition may not be perfect (Biais et al., 2010).
III. Competition between regulated markets and MTFs
There is a growing body of literature analyzing the impact of increased competition on
market quality and price discovery in European equities under MiFID. Hengelbrock
and Theissen (2009) examine the liquidity effects of Turquoise’s market entry in 14 dif-
ferent countries in September 2008. Cross-sectional regressions suggest that Turquoise
gained greater market share in stocks with a higher market capitalization, stocks with
previously high bid-ask spreads on the regulated home market, and less volatile stocks.
Results on a change in liquidity after Turquoise’s market entry are ambiguous. There
is some evidence that quoted spreads on the regulated home market decline after the
entry of Turquoise, although quoted and effective spreads generally tend to be higher
on Turquoise. Hengelbrock and Theissen (2009) conclude that the “[. . . ] new entrant
serves as a disciplinary device that reduces rents earned by the suppliers of liquidity in
the primary market”.
Under MiFID, best execution relies on multiple factors such as price, trading costs,
execution speed, and probability of execution (see Section 2.1). Hoffmann (2010) ana-
lyzes the impact of multi-dimensional best execution on liquidity supply for a sample
of 67 French and German high volume stocks traded on Chi-X and Euronext (Paris)
and Xetra, respectively. His findings are threefold: First, differences in effective spreads
between Chi-X and regulated markets are not significant for the observation period
April to May 2008. However, there is a considerable level of quote competition: Chi-X
is 26.0% of the time alone at the best available bid or ask, compared to 51.0% for the
regulated markets. Second, Hoffmann (2010) documents a high average trade-through
rate of about 50.0% across trading venues. Third, the evidence suggests a high adverse
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selection risk for liquidity suppliers on Chi-X. Overall, his findings lead to the con-
clusion that a lack of trade-through protection hampers competition under MiFID.
Foucault and Menkveld (2008) show that a higher trade-through rate discourages liq-
uidity supply. They look at the market entry of EuroSETS on the Dutch stock market
in May 2004. As predicted by their theoretical model, they find that stronger compe-
tition among liquidity suppliers leads to an increase in depth of the consolidated order
book. In addition, liquidity is negatively related to the trade-through rate.
Degryse et al. (2011) shed light on the effects of liquidity fragmentation in 52
medium and high volume Dutch stocks between 2006 and 2009. They compute a
consolidated order book based on individual order books of Euronext (Amsterdam)
and six other trading venues, such as Chi-X or BATS. It appears that depth of the con-
solidated order book increases with the level of market fragmentation. This effect is
mainly driven by depth close to the midpoint. On the regulated home market, Eu-
ronext, depth close to the midpoint reduces by about 10.0% relative to a completely
concentrated market. Their results suggest that investors who only have access to Eu-
ronext are worse off under MiFID.
Storkenmaier et al. (2010) study the effects of public information on market frag-
mentation characteristics. Their analysis is based on trade and quote data of FTSE 100
constituents traded on the LSE and Chi-X over 2009. A proxy for the aggregated daily
tone of public information is computed from Thomson Reuters news wire messages.
Consistent with Chowdhry and Nanda (1991), they show that informed traders resort
to the most liquid market, the LSE, during times with high levels of public informa-
tion.
Summary. There is a growing body of studies on European equity market quality and
intermarket competition after the introduction of MiFID. The evidence suggests that
market fragmentation increased significantly over the last couple of years. MTFs at-
tract a considerable fraction of trading volume, especially in high volume stocks (Hen-
gelbrock and Theissen, 2009), although they do not provide smaller average quoted
and effective spreads than regulated markets (Hengelbrock and Theissen, 2009; Hoff-
mann, 2010; Storkenmaier et al., 2010). Degryse et al. (2011) show that depth in the
consolidated order book across trading venues increases with the level of fragmenta-
tion. Results on price discovery are mixed. While Hoffmann (2010) finds that trades
on MTFs are more informed, Storkenmaier et al. (2010) show that informed investors
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mainly trade on the regulated market. Hoffmann (2010) also documents a high number
of trade-throughs.
3.2 Financial Market Innovation
Trading venues became increasingly automated over the last couple of decades. Stock
exchanges around the world introduced electronic limit order books, replacing their
trading floors on which brokers manually match orders using an open-outcry system.
Improvements in information and communication technologies significantly reduced
barriers to enter the market. An efficient market design and efficient trading mech-
anisms are crucial to attracting more trading volume and to winning greater market
share. As discussed in the previous section, new competitors, ECNs in the U.S. and
MTFs in Europe, have been very successful in capturing market shares from tradi-
tional exchanges. In this section, I present the literature from two related perspectives:
exchange infrastructure and algorithmic trading.
Exchange infrastructure. Besides stock characteristics and regulation, market quality
is also influenced by exchange infrastructure. Jain (2005) studies the adoption of elec-
tronic trading venues and the cost of equity for 56 countries around the world between
1969 and 2001. The picture emerges that the automation of trading improved liquid-
ity and information efficiency and thus lowered the cost of equity for listed firms.
Boehmer (2005) provides evidence that there is a negative relationship between trading
speed7 and execution costs measured by effective spreads. His data cover a large sample
of Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks between November 2001 and December 2003. In-
vestors execute large market orders considerably faster on Nasdaq than on the NYSE
but also pay higher transaction costs. For small market orders the relationship between
the NYSE and Nasdaq reverses, suggesting that institutional differences between trad-
ing venues matter.8 Garvey and Wu (2010) further analyze the relationship between
execution speed, trading costs, and geographic locations of traders. They use a pro-
prietary data set of about 3.6 million orders submitted by 2,000 stock traders from
7Trading speed or latency is commonly defined as the time required for an order to travel from the
investor system, across the network to the exchange central computer, and for confirmation of the
order to be sent back to the investor.
8Boehmer et al. (2007) find that trading venues receive more order flow when their reported execution
speed increases.
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different cities in the U.S. throughout October 1999 to August 2003. It appears that
traders located closest to the market’s central computer experience faster executions,
pay lower transaction costs, and engage in more speed-sensitive trading strategies. For
example, arbitrage strategies may become more attractive with trading speed as price
and execution risk decrease.
Hendershott and Moulton (2011) analyze the introduction of the NYSE’s Hybrid
Market at the end of 2006. The new trading system significantly increased automa-
tion and execution speed for NYSE market orders from ten to less than one second.
Using an event study approach, the authors document that this reduction in latency
increases quoted spreads but improves efficiency of prices. Riordan and Storkenmaier
(2011) study the impact of a speed-enhancing system upgrade on Xetra, the electronic
stock trading system of Deutsche Börse, in April 2007.9 In contrast to Hendershott
and Moulton (2011), they find no change in quoted spreads but significantly smaller
effective spreads after the system upgrade. In addition, a substantial fraction of price
discovery shifts from trades to quotes.
Algorithmic trading. To date, a steadily increasing fraction of orders is submitted by
computer algorithms without human intervention. Hendershott et al. (2011) define
algorithmic trading as the “[. . . ] use of computer algorithms to automatically make
certain trading decisions, submit orders, and manage those orders after submission”.
Algorithmic traders have been shown to have positive effects on liquidity supply and
the price discovery process and therefore the integration of fragmented equity mar-
kets (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009; Hendershott et al., 2011) and foreign exchange
markets (Chaboud et al., 2009).10 Hendershott and Riordan (2009) study algorithmic
trading in high volume stocks on Xetra in the first three weeks of January 2008. Their
findings suggest that algorithmic traders submit smaller orders than other market par-
ticipants and continuously monitor the market, consuming liquidity when it is cheap
and supplying liquidity when it is expensive. This pattern may level liquidity differ-
ences over time. In addition, algorithmic traders have a larger price impact than human
9Wagener et al. (2010) analyze the effect of the Xetra upgrade on the pricing gap between stock and
futures markets. Pricing discrepancies between futures prices and their theoretical values become
smaller in the post event period, suggesting that the system upgrade improves price efficiency on the
stock market.
10Due to a lack of trading venue data that clearly identify algorithmic traders, some studies use broker
data, see Engle et al. (2008) and Brogaard (2010).
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traders and also contribute more to quote based price discovery. In contrast to anecdo-
tal evidence, they find no relationship between algorithmic trading activity and market
volatility.11
Hendershott et al. (2011) are not able to directly identify algorithmic traders in their
data but use message traffic as a proxy. Message traffic is defined as the number of
order submissions, order cancellations, and trades. Studying the introduction of auto-
quoting at the NYSE in 2003, their results provide evidence that algorithmic trading
causes an improvement in market quality, lowering quoted and effective spreads. In
addition, they show that algorithmic trading reduces the informativeness of trades
by enhancing quote based price discovery. Hasbrouck and Saar (2011) identify dis-
tinct patterns in the millisecond environment to proxy for low-latency trading activity
in Nasdaq-listed stocks. Their results suggest a positive relationship between high-
frequency trading and market quality, measured by short-term volatility, spreads, and
depth in the order book. Chaboud et al. (2009) analyze algorithmic trading in the for-
eign exchange market on the electronic broking system (EBS) over the years 2006 and
2007. In line with Hendershott and Riordan (2009), they do not find any strong causal
relationship between algorithmic trading activity and volatility.
Jovanovic and Menkveld (2010) directly address automated trading in a fragmented
trading environment. They look at 14 high volume Dutch stocks on Euronext (Am-
sterdam) and Chi-X, a high-frequency trader friendly environment. During their ob-
servation period, January to April 2008, average liquidity on Euronext is higher than
on Chi-X. However, investors benefit from trading in both markets as the consolidated
quoted spread is about 20.0% smaller than on Euronext. To determine the impact of
high-frequency trading, they analyze a second time period in 2007 (trading is concen-
trated on Euronext) and use Belgian stocks to control for market-wide changes over
time (Chi-X started trading Belgian stocks after the main observation period). Their
data sets allow to identify one large high-frequency trader that participates in trading
on Euronext and Chi-X in 2008. She is more often on the passive side of an execution
and present in roughly every third trade on Chi-X and in every twelfth trade on Eu-
ronext. The evidence suggests that she acts as intermediary (‘middlemen’). Overall,
she has a positive impact on liquidity in the consolidated order book but a detrimental
effect on trading volume. There is a sharp decrease in liquidity for the control sample
11See, for example, www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3f57311e-c246-11dd-a350-000077b07658.html.
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of Belgian stocks but quoted spreads do not change for Dutch stocks. However, trading
volume of Dutch stocks declines by 13.0%. Menkveld (2011) uses the same data set and
provides further evidence that “[. . . ] the success of a new market, Chi-X, critically
depended on the participation of a large HFT who acts as a modern market-maker”.
A changing market environment. Only few papers study implications of highly auto-
mated and fragmented markets for trading strategies. For example, Shkilko et al. (2008)
discuss reasons why non-positive NBBO spreads may naturally arise in a fragmented
trading environment. They look at 100 Nasdaq-listed and 100 NYSE-listed firms and
find that non-positive NBBO spreads emerge on average about 10.0% of the trading
day on Nasdaq and 4.0% on the NYSE during the last quarter of 2003. These market
situations occur frequently but they are resolved within seconds. The authors argue
that it may be reasonable for investors to ignore outstanding limit orders and to lock
or cross stale quotes of slower trading venues or quotes with small associated volume.
Overall, they summarize that “[. . . ] although non-positive NBBO periods often dis-
rupt electronic executions and irritate market makers and SEC regulators, they should
be viewed as natural phenomena in fast-moving segmented markets” (Shkilko et al.,
2008).
Hasbrouck and Saar (2009) analyze 100 Nasdaq stocks traded on INET, an ECN, in
October 2004. Limit orders are canceled very quickly and the picture emerges that they
do not conform to the classical definition of patient liquidity supply. As a consequence,
the fill rate of limit orders that are canceled within 2 seconds, so-called ‘fleeting orders’,
is less than than 8.0%. Their empirical analyses confirm the following three hypothe-
ses: First, traders cancel and resubmit an order if the market moves away from the
original price of the limit order. They pursuit an aggressive strategy to obtain price-
priority (‘chase hypothesis’). Second, limit orders are converted to market orders as
the cost of immediacy drops (‘cost-of-immediacy hypothesis’). Third, submitted limit
orders search for hidden liquidity in the order book. If an order is not executed im-
mediately, it is canceled (‘search hypothesis). According to Hasbrouck and Saar (2009),
fleeting orders are a relatively new phenomenon. Factors such as automated trading,
new active trading practices, coordination in a fragmented trading landscape, and hid-
den liquidity promote the trend towards fleeting orders.
Summary. Recent technological innovations revolutionized the way assets are traded.
Trading speed became an important component of market quality (Garvey and Wu,
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2010; Riordan and Storkenmaier, 2011). To date, algorithmic traders generate more
than half of the trading volume in blue-chip stocks, submitting smaller orders at a
higher frequency than human traders. The literature suggests that algorithmic traders
lower spreads (Hendershott et al., 2011), increase depth (Hasbrouck and Saar, 2011),
enhance the quote based price discovery (Hendershott and Riordan, 2009), and may
integrate fragmented markets (Menkveld, 2011). Altogether, interrelated effects, such
as automation of exchange infrastructure, algorithmic trading, and market fragmen-
tation changed the market environment, resulting in new dynamic order submission
strategies (Shkilko et al., 2008; Hasbrouck and Saar, 2009).
Chapter 4
Data and Methodology
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.1 discusses data characteristics and cat-
egories of filters applied to the data sets. Section 4.2 presents trading intensity and
liquidity measures. Section 4.3 provides details on the computation of price discovery
measures and Section 4.4 discusses logistical regressions.
4.1 Data Selection
To study trading in fragmented markets after the introduction of MiFID, I analyze
FTSE 100 constituents traded on the primary market, the LSE, and other alternative
trading venues. FTSE 100 constituents are the most fragmented stocks in Europe (see
Section 2.2), making them especially suitable to evaluate the presented research ques-
tions. In my empirical analyses, I focus on the regulated market, the LSE, and the
three largest MTFs, namely Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Since the introduction of
MiFID, systematically less than 5.0% of daily trading volume in non-OTC trades is
not executed on one of these four trading venues.1
Observation periods. Empirical analyses are based on the following two observation
periods: April 20 to May 29, 2009 and April 19 to May 28, 2010. The first observa-
tion period is determined by the availability of a stable market structure. There are
no market microstructure, fee, or trading system changes on any of the four trading
venues. I choose the second time period in April/May 2010 to study effects of compe-
tition and regulation on quote and execution quality over time. In addition, this choice
1Due to a lack of data, I do not include trades executed by SIs or OTC.
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reduces seasonal effects that may distort results. Markets are closed on UK bank holi-
days, May 4 and May 25, 2009 and May 3, 2010. I further exclude May 1, 2009 due to
a considerably smaller UK trading volume.2 The final sample covers 27 trading days in
2009 and 29 trading days in 2010.3
Data characteristics. My empirical analysis of the British stock market relies on trade
and quote data retrieved from the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History archive
through SIRCA.4 I obtain order book information for each trading venue, the LSE,
Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. FTSE 100 constituents are identified using Thomson
Reuters Instrument Codes (RIC), a unique instrument identifier. Specifically, I retrieve
trade prices, volumes, best bid and ask including associated volumes, and order book
information up to three levels behind best prices for both observation periods. Specific
data qualifiers are further used to delete cross-reported trades on the LSE. Trades and
quotes are reported in British pence and they are time-stamped to the millisecond.
Appendix A presents both a raw data sample of trade and quote data and a raw depth
data sample for the LSE. Data formats do not differ for Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise.
However, specific entries can change. For example, Chi-X data comprise different trade
and quote data qualifiers than the LSE.
Filter criteria. The sample selection criteria apply on both the trade and quote data
and the FTSE 100 constituents finally included into my data sets:
Tick data level: (1): To avoid biases associated with the market opening and closing
procedures and to accommodate lagged variables, analyses are restricted to continuous
trading, meaning that the first and last fifteen minutes of a trading day are excluded. As
a result, my data span the period between 8:15 a.m. and 4:15 p.m. GMT. (2): A single
market order trading against more than one limit order produces multiple data entries
in the raw data. Thus, I combine all buys (sells) that are recorded in the same millisec-
ond in a FTSE 100 constituent on one trading venue. (3): Prior to the introduction of
hidden orders on the LSE in December 2009, trades on the LSE are either executed at
the best bid and ask or at multiple prices in the order book. In cases where the raw data
records inside the spread executions, I assume technical irregularities and eliminate the
2Most European countries celebrate May Day and the markets are closed.
3A previous version of Chapter 5 is based on 19 trading days in May 2009. The results do not differ
and are therefore not presented.
4I thank SIRCA for providing access to the Thomson Reuters DataScope Tick History archive,
http://www.sirca.org.au/.
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trade from the data set. Such trades account for only 0.9% of all LSE trades and for
1.4% of LSE trading volume over April/May 2009.
Firm level: I apply the following three filters on FTSE 100 constituents in both sam-
ple periods. (1): I require all stocks to have more than ten trades per trading day on the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise throughout the observation period. (2): Stocks with
missing trade and quote data are excluded.5 (3): I eliminate firms with corporate actions
(e.g. stock splits) during the observation period.6
These filters result in 74 stocks for the observation period in April/May 2009 and
I obtain 98 stocks for April/May 2010. Table 4.1 reports the FTSE 100 constituents
affected by the above presented firm level filter criteria. To highlight developments
over time, I also analyze a subsample of 70 firms which are traded in both observa-
tion periods.7 In the observation period in 2009, a considerably higher amount of
stocks is affected by the ‘ten trade rule’, since some stocks are infrequently traded
on BATS and Turquoise. Appendix A reports the final sample firms including ex-
change ticker symbols, average daily trading volume, and average daily market capi-
talization.8 In the 2009 observation period, HSBC HOLDINGS is traded most, with
an average daily trading volume of 290,973 million GBP. The company with the low-
est daily trading volume is STANDARD LIFE with 9,349 million GBP. For the 2010
observation period, the most and least traded stock is BP (477,807 million GBP) and
CABLE & WIRELESS (6,740 million GBP), respectively.
To analyze price discovery and the level of market integration, it is necessary
to merge individual order books of each trading venue into one consolidated order
book per stock. I use single order book information of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise, the four most important trading venues in terms of trading volume and
quote activity. Based on RICs and timestamps, I compute the European Best Bid (EBB),
the highest bid across all trading venues, and the lowest ask price, the European Best
Offer (EBO). In addition, the associated quoted volume across trading venues is iden-
tified (see Figure 4.1 for an example). Thomson Reuters also delivers a consolidated
FTSE 100 data feed including the best bid and ask published on all order book driven
trading venues. However, the data do not reveal the trading venues that quote the
5BATS trade and quote data is missing on SIRCA for stocks affected by this filter.
6Corporate actions are obtained through Thomson Reuters.
7See Section 5.5 for a more detailed description of this subsample.
8Daily market capitalization is retrieved from Bloomberg.
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Order Book LSE
Price Size
125.40 600
125.35 300
125.25 500
125.20 100
Order Book Chi-X
Price Size
125.40 150
125.35 100
125.20 150
125.15 200
Order Book BATS
Price Size
125.45 50
125.40 300
125.30 50
125.25 400
Order Book TQ
Price Size
125.50 50
125.45 50
125.25 100
125.15 150
Consolidated 
Order Book
Price Size
125.40 1,050
125.35 400
125.30 50
125.25 1,000
Figure 4.1: Consolidated order book. The figure shows an example of how individual order
books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise are merged into one consolidated order book.
best available prices. To properly assess trading venue differences, I therefore need to
compute my own consolidated order book.9
4.2 Trading Intensity and Liquidity Measures
In this section, I provide details on the computation of trading intensity and liquidity
measures. All variables are computed for each price and volume update on the LSE,
Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Obtained values are equally weighted and aggregated per
day and per stock for each trading venue. This approach captures intraday dynamics
but avoids some of the noise associated with a higher sampling frequency. Trading
intensity measures are trading venue market share, corresponding daily trading volume
9As a robustness check, I compare my consolidated order book including the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise with the Thomson Reuters consolidated European data feed using
the xbo-RIC (see http://thomsonreuters.com/products_services/financial/financial_products/a-
z/regulatory_compliance_mifid/ for a brief discussion of the data characteristics). First, I compute
prevailing midpoint differences on a tick-by-tick basis between both data streams. Then, daily aver-
age values per instrument are obtained. The data show a small average midpoint difference of 0.001
pence (0.001 pence) between both data streams for the 2009 (2010) observation period. In light of
an average tick size of 0.508 pence (0.559 pence) over the observation period April/May 2009 (2010),
my robustness check is evidence for the high quality of my consolidated order book (the presented
numbers are obtained for a subsample of 70 stocks, see Section 5.5 for a more detailed description of
the data set).
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in British Pounds, daily number of trades, average trade size in British Pounds, and
price changes in the order book per minute.
The market microstructure literature offers several proxies for liquidity. The most
common measure is the quoted spread. The wider the quoted spread, the less liquid is
an instrument. However, this variable only captures liquidity for relatively small order
sizes. Quoted spreads are calculated as a proxy of trading costs for each trading venue
on a individual order book level and for the consolidated order book. Let ai ,t be the
ask price for an instrument i at time t and bi ,t the respective bid price. mi ,t denotes the
mid quote, then the relative quoted half spread (qspreadi ,t ) in basis points is calculated
as follows:
qspreadi ,t = (ai ,t − bi ,t )/(mi ,t × 2)× 10,000 (4.1)
This measure is based on a quote-to-quote process that is characterized by each price
and volume update and each trade during the trading day. Then, quoted spreads are
aggregated on daily per stock basis and averaged per trading venue. To avoid some of
the noise of tick-by-tick data, all liquidity measures are winsorized at the 1.0% level and
the 99.0% level. Another liquidity measure, quoted spread at trades, captures liquidity
represented through the best bid and ask at the time of trade execution.
The effective spread is the spread that is actually paid when an incoming market
order trades against a limit order. I use the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm
to estimate trade direction as proposed by Bessembinder (2003). Using the variables
from above and let pi ,t be the execution price, then the effective half spread (espreadi ,t )
in basis points is defined as:
espreadi ,t = Di ,t × ((pi ,t −mi ,t )/mi ,t )× 10,000 (4.2)
where Di ,t denotes the trade direction with −1 for market sell and +1 for market buy
orders. Effective spreads also capture institutional features of trading venues such as
hidden liquidity and market depth. For example, iceberg orders that only display a
fraction of total trading volume and completely hidden limit orders are available on
the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Effective spreads are usually equal to or larger
than the second liquidity measure, quoted spreads at trades. However, they may be
smaller if trading venues feature hidden liquidity and there is thus a reasonable number
of trades executed inside the spread.
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I further decompose the spread along its different components (Glosten, 1987). A
smaller effective spread may mean less revenue for liquidity providers (realized spread),
smaller gross losses due to informed liquidity demanders (price impact), or both. The
relationship between the effective spread, the realized spread, and the price impact
(adverse selection component) can be formalized for instrument i at time t as follows:
espreadi ,t = rspreadi ,t + pimpacti ,t (4.3)
To capture liquidity provider revenues, I compute 5 and 15-minute realized spreads
and assume that liquidity providers are able to close their position at the quote mid-
point 5 and 15 minutes after the trade, respectively. Let mi ,t+x denote the mid quote
with x = {5,15} minutes, then the realized half spread (rspreadx,i ,t ) in basis points is
defined as follows:
rspreadx,i ,t = Di ,t × ((pi ,t −mi ,t+x)/mi ,t )× 10,000 (4.4)
The price impact captures costs for liquidity demanders that arise in the presence
of asymmetric information. A trader with superior information about an instrument
may try to buy or sell a large quantity to realize a profit. To compensate for this loss,
liquidity suppliers charge a fee on every transaction. Using the same variables, 5 and
15-minute adverse selection components of the spread (pimpactx,i ,t ) in basis points are
calculated analogously as follows:
pimpactx,i ,t = Di ,t × ((mi ,t+x −mi ,t )/mi ,t )× 10,000 (4.5)
There are more robust measures to capture the information content of a trade that do
not dependent on the spread decomposition. These measures are introduced in the
next section.
Finally, depth data is used to compute the quoted volume at different order book
levels in both individual order books and the consolidated book. The quoted half
depth (depthx,i ,t ) in British Pounds is computed as follows:
depthx,i ,t =
X∑
x=1
(Bx,i ,t +Ax,i ,t )/(2× 100) (4.6)
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where Bi ,t is the corresponding volume at the bid and Ai ,t at the ask. X = {1,3}
characterizes different order book levels. depth1,i ,t is the average half quoted volume at
the best bid and ask and depth3,i ,t incorporates the depth up to three ticks behind best
prices.
4.3 Price Discovery
In this section, I present measures to determine where the price discovery takes place in
a fragmented market. Price discovery can be measured using trades or quotes. First, I
introduce Hasbrouck (1995) information shares as one measure to analyze each trading
venue’s contribution to quote based price discovery. Following Hasbrouck (1991a) and
Hasbrouck (1991b), I further separate changes in the efficient price into quote and trade
correlated components. Presented equations are tailored to my data sets.
A. Information Shares
Information shares are a relative measure to allocate price discovery across markets
(Hasbrouck, 1995). The model attempts to determine which trading venue ‘moves
first’ in revealing information through quote updates. Huang (2002) emphasizes this
dimension of market quality, “[. . . ] price leadership, or price discovery, which is ac-
complished by timely submission of informative quotes”. Price leadership of a market
may signal an efficient price discovery process through the interaction of buyers and
sellers on this platform. This measure has been used in a number of studies with the
same interpretation (Goldstein et al., 2008; Hendershott and Riordan, 2009).
The approach relies on co-integration. Although prices pt are individually nonsta-
tionary, a linear combination of prices for the same underlying instrument traded on
multiple trading venues may be stationary. If all prices follow a random walk, they
are integrated of order one and ∆pt is a stationary process. Prevailing midpoints of
the consolidated order book mt are used to characterize this implicit efficient price. I
define the following price vector pt = [p
LSE
t , p
C hiX
t , p
BAT S
t , p
TQ
t ]
′ where each p jt refers
to the same instrument:
pt = mt +[ε
LSE
t ,ε
C hiX
t ,ε
BAT S
t ,ε
TQ
t ]
′
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and mt is supposed to follow a random walk:
mt = mt−1+ ut , (4.7)
where ut follows a white noise process with E(ut ) = 0, E(u
2
t ) = σ
2
u , and E(ut us ) = 0
for t 6= s . The moving average representation for the price vector ∆pt may be written
using a vector moving average (VMA) model:
∆pt = εt +
∑
i
ψiεt−i (4.8)
εt = [ε
LSE
t ,ε
C hiX
t ,ε
BAT S
t ,ε
TQ
t ]
′ is a (4× 1) vector innovation process with E(εt ) = 0
and a variance matrix Var (εt ) = Ω. The εt components reflect the new information
incorporated into the corresponding market and the εt−i are (4 × 4) matrices. The
εt has the interpretation that its (i , j )-element measures an one-unit increase in this
component upon∆pt .
As shown, the observed prices can be decomposed into a random walk and a
covariance-stationary error. The variance of the random walk component is then:
σ2u =ΨΩΨ
′ (4.9)
where Ω is the (n × n) covariance matrix of the innovations and Ψ is a polynomial in
the lag operator. Then, the random walk variance reflects contributions from all four
markets as follows:
σ2u =A

σ2LSE σLSE ,C hiX σLSE ,BAT S σLSE ,TQ
σC hiX ,LSE σ
2
C hiX σC hiX ,BAT S σC hiX ,TQ
σBAT S,LSE σBAT S,C hiX σ
2
BAT S σBAT S,TQ
σTQ,LSE σTQ,C hiX σTQ,BAT S σ
2
TQ
A
′
(4.10)
where A = [ΨLSE ,ΨC hiX ,ΨBAT S ,ΨTQ]. If the covariance matrix is diagonal (that is,
when σ2i , j = 0) for i = j the contribution of each trading venue to the price dis-
covery process can be clearly identified. The relative size of these contributions in-
dicates the importance of the markets. Hasbrouck (1995) defines the information share
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(infoShare j ) of the j th market as:
infoShare j :=
Ψ2jΩ j j
ΨΩΨ′
(4.11)
where j ∈ {LSE, ChiX, BATS, Turquoise}. Ψ2jΩ j j represents the contribution of market
j to price discovery and ΨΩΨ′ is the variance of the random-walk component of stock
prices representing the total price discovery. As the contemporaneous midpoint of the
different trading venues can be equal, there may be correlation between the midpoints.
In consequence, Ω is not diagonal. I follow Hasbrouck (1995) to determine upper and
lower bounds that minimize or maximize the contribution of each market in the price
discovery process. Information shares are calculated for each trading venue per day
and per stock. To determine the contribution of each trading venue, the mean of the
upper and lower bounds is computed and compared across the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise. Information shares sum up to 100.0% by construction.
B. Trade and Quote Correlated Information
Following Hasbrouck (1991a,b), I separate changes in the efficient price into quote
and trade correlated components differentiating between trades executed on j ∈ {LSE,
ChiX, BATS, Turquoise}. This results in a five-way vector autoregressive (VAR) model.
Let x jt−i be the trade direction (-1 sell, 1 buy) for trades on LSE, Chi-X, BATS, or
Turquoise, respectively, and 0 if the trade is not executed on the specific trading venue.
rt−i denotes the quote midpoint changes in the consolidated order book. The full
model is as follows:
rt =
10∑
i=1
αrt−i rt−i+
10∑
i=0
αLSEi x
LSE
t−i +
10∑
i=0
αC hiXi x
C hiX
t−i +
10∑
i=0
αBAT Si x
BAT S
t−i +
10∑
i=0
αTQi x
TQ
t−i + u1,t
xLSEt =
10∑
i=1
βri rt−i+
10∑
i=1
βLSEi x
LSE
t−i +
10∑
i=1
βC hiXi x
C hiX
t−i +
10∑
i=1
βBAT Si x
BAT S
t−i +
10∑
i=1
βTQi x
TQ
t−i + u2,t
xC hiXt =
10∑
i=1
γ ri rt−i+
10∑
i=1
γ LSEi x
LSE
t−i +
10∑
i=1
γC hiXi x
C hiX
t−i +
10∑
i=1
γ BAT Si x
BAT S
t−i +
10∑
i=1
γTQi x
TQ
t−i + u3,t
xBAT St =
10∑
i=1
δ ri rt−i+
10∑
i=1
δLSEi x
LSE
t−i +
10∑
i=1
δC hiXi x
C hiX
t−i +
10∑
i=1
δBAT Si x
BAT S
t−i +
10∑
i=1
δTQi x
TQ
t−i + u4,t
xTQt =
10∑
i=1
εri rt−i+
10∑
i=1
εLSEi x
LSE
t−i +
10∑
i=1
εC hiXi x
C hiX
t−i +
10∑
i=1
εBAT Si x
BAT S
t−i +
10∑
i=1
εTQi x
TQ
t−i + u5,t
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The estimation is restarted for each trading day and stock in the sample. Then, I invert
the above VAR model to get the VMA representation:
rt
xLSEt
xC hiXt
xBAT St
xTQt

=

a r (L) aLSE (L) aC hiX (L) aBAT S(L) aTQ(L)
b r (L) b LSE (L) bC hiX (L) b BAT S(L) bTQ(L)
c r (L) cLSE (L) cC hiX (L) cBAT S(L) cTQ(L)
d r (L) d LSE (L) dC hiX (L) dBAT S(L) dTQ(L)
e r (L) eLSE (L) eC hiX (L) eBAT S(L) eTQ(L)


u1,t
u2,t
u3,t
u4,t
u5,t

(4.12)
where L are polynomial lag operators. Following Hasbrouck (1991b) the sums of∑∞
t=0 a
LSE ,
∑∞
t=0 a
C hiX ,
∑∞
t=0 a
BAT S , and
∑∞
t=0 a
TQ are used to obtain the cumulative
impulse response functions (CIRF) for each of the four trading venues. The CIRF is
the permanent price impact of a trade and is generally interpreted as the private in-
formation content of a trade. It represents the unexpected part of a trade, the trade
innovation, and has been used in a number of other studies with the same interpreta-
tion (Barclay and Hendershott, 2003; Madhavan, 2000).
Using the VMA representation from above, information can be decomposed into a
trade correlated part for each trading venue and quote correlated portions (Hasbrouck,
1991b). The variance decomposition is as follows:
σ2v =
 ∞∑
i=0
a ri
!2
σ2r +
 ∞∑
i=0
aLSEi
!2
σ2
xLSE
+
 ∞∑
i=0
aC hiXi
!2
σ2
xC hiX
+ ∞∑
i=0
aBAT Si
!2
σ2
xBAT S
+
 ∞∑
i=0
aTQi
!2
σ2
xTQ
(4.13)
The first term represents the information content of quotes. The trade correlated por-
tions are represented through the second term for the LSE, through the third for Chi-X,
the fourth for BATS, and through the fifth for Turquoise. All lags are summed to get
the total trade correlated contribution of each market to price discovery. The results
are reported in basis points for the CIRF and in percent for the information content of
quotes.
C. Total Contribution to Price Discovery
To assess the total contribution of a trading venue to price discovery, I combine infor-
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mation shares (infoShare j
i ,d
) and the fraction of quote based information (quoteInfoi ,d )
to obtain a variable that describes total quote based price discovery relative to trade
based price discovery (tradeInfo j
i ,d
). The total contribution to price discovery (total-
Info j
i ,d
) of trading venue j for instrument i on day d emerges as follows:
totalInfo j
i ,d
= infoShare j
i ,d
× quoteInfoi ,d + tradeInfo ji ,d (4.14)
4.4 Logistic Regressions
This section briefly presents the concept of logistic regressions that have generally
the same objective as ordinary least square regressions (OLS): A dependent variable
is modeled in terms of one or more independent variables. In contrast to OLS, logistic
regressions describe the relationship between dichotomous variables and continuous
or dichotomous explanatory variables. The dependent variable may have two cate-
gories (‘event’/‘non-event’) or more than two categories (‘event1’/‘event2’/‘event3’).
The former is used in a bivariate logistic regression and the latter in the multinomial
case. However, the illustration in this section is limited to the case where the depen-
dent variable has two categories only. Events and non-events are commonly classified
by one/zero coding. For example, an event can be the decision of an investor to rather
route an order to either Chi-X (event=1) or to the LSE (event=0).
In logistic regressions, the model transforms the dependent variable and uses the nat-
ural logarithm of the odds ratio of being in a particular category for each combination
of independent variables. For the order routing decision mentioned above, an odds
ratio of 2-1 indicates that it is 2 times more likely that an investor routes her order to
Chi-X than to the LSE. For the case of one independent variable, the logistic model
has the following form:
pi(x) =
eβ0+β1x
1+ eβ0+β1x
(4.15)
where pi is the probability that an event Y occurs (odds ratio) given certain values of x,
pi(x) = E(Y |x). β0 is the intercept and β1 the regression coefficient. The odds ratios
describe the increase or decrease in probability that the event occurs for a unit change
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in the dependent variable. Taking the log of Equation (4.15) yields:
g (x) = ln

Pr(event|x)
Pr(non-event|x)

= ln

pi(x)
1−pi(x)

=β0+β1x (4.16)
This step is called logit transformation and makes the logit g(x) of a dichotomous de-
pendent variable and the independent variable linear. The estimate of β1 determines
the direction of the relationship between values of x and the logit of an event Y. Val-
ues of β1 greater (smaller) than zero are associated with larger (smaller) logits of Y,
meaning that the event is more (less) likely to occur with higher values of x. Within
the framework of inferential statistics, the null hypothesis (H0) states that β1 equals
zero. If H0 is rejected there is evidence for a linear relationship between x and the logit
of Y. I generally model bivariate logistic regressions in the spirit of Equation (4.16) and
estimate the coefficients by the maximum likelihood method that attempts to find the
smallest possible deviance between the observed and predicted values.
In order to evaluate my models, I rely on standard test statistics. First, I look at the
overall fit of each model by comparing it to an intercept-only model, i.e. likelihood
ratio tests are used to evaluate the proposed model over the baseline intercept-only
model. Second, estimated coefficients are tested for statistical significance using Wald
chi-square statistics. Third, I validate to which degree estimated odds ratios, the pre-
dicted probabilities, agree with the observed outcomes in my data sets.
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Table 4.1: Sample selection: Excluded FTSE 100 constituents. This table reports elimi-
nated sample firms from the universe of FTSE 100 constituents for the observation periods
April/May 2009 (Panel A) and April/May 2010 (Panel B). Firms are excluded if they have less
than ten trades per trading day either on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, or Turquoise (Trade-Rule),
trade and quote data is not available on SIRCA (Missing Data) not for every trading day, or
stocks have a corporate action during the observation period (Corp. Action).
Firm Ticker Trade Rule Missing Data Corp. Action
Panel A: April/May 2009
ADMIRAL GROUP ADM X
ALLIANCE TRUST ATST X
AMEC AMEC X
AMLIN AML X
BALFOUR BEATTY BALF X
COBHAM COB X
FOREIGN & COL. INVEST. TRUST FRCL X
FRESNILLO FRES X
FRIENDS PROVIDENT HOLDINGS FP X
G4S GFS X
INTERTEK GROUP ITRK X
LAND SECURITIES GROUP LAND X
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP LGEN X
LIBERTY INTERNATIONAL LII X
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY X
LONMIN LMI X
MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP MKS X
MORRISON (WM) SUPERMARKETS MRW X
NATIONAL GRID NG X
NEXT NXT X
OLD MUTUAL OML X
PEARSON PSON X
PENNON GROUP PNN X
PETROFAC PFC X
PRUDENTIAL PRU X
ROLLS-ROYCE GROUP RR X
SCHRODERS SDR X
SCHRODERS N/V SDRC X
Panel B: April/May 2010
ALLIANCE TRUST ATST X
CAPITAL SHOP. CENTRES GROUP CSCG X
NATIONAL GRID NG X
SCHRODERS N/V SDRC X

Chapter 5
Liquidity and Price Discovery
5.1 Introduction
The introduction of MiFID opened regulated markets to competition from MTFs such
as Chi-X and BATS. The rapid increase in MTFs’ shares of trading volume is a testa-
ment to their success. For example, the LSE used to trade close to 100.0% of total daily
trading volume in UK stocks. Presently, it captures less than 60.0% of total exchange
traded volume. Whether or not MTFs contribute to liquidity and the price discovery
process is an open question, since an increase in fragmentation may lead to a deteriora-
tion in overall market quality. Liquidity and price discovery are two important dimen-
sions of market quality. For instance, liquidity in the form of quoted spreads reflects
the costs of immediancy for an investor and impacts her expected returns (Amihud
and Mendelson, 1986). Price discovery through the interaction of buy and sell orders
is one of the main functions of a market as market efficiency is a prerequisite for the
optimal allocation of capital. It is in general interest of all investors that this process
works efficiently and asset prices adjust quickly to changes in supply and demand.
This chapter provides new insights into trading venue competition under MiFID and
its effects on market quality. It examines liquidity in FTSE 100 constituents traded on
the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in April/May 2010 and the variables investors
use to condition trading decisions. In addition, it also quantifies the contribution to
price discovery by each trading venue. Finally, to better understand the impact of
increased fragmentation, I compare market quality in the sample period to April/May
2009, a period when MTF market share was 38.0% lower and market liquidity was thus
less fragmented.
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There are a number of studies which examine the competition between ECNs and
traditional exchanges. For example, Barclay et al. (2003) and Goldstein et al. (2008)
study Nasdaq market makers under U.S. Regulation ATS. The SEC adopted Regula-
tion ATS in 1998 to integrate ECNs into the NMS (see Section 2.1). The new set of
rules provided investors with access to the NBBO including prices posted on ECNs
that were previously excluded. Prices of ECNs and exchanges are thus formally linked
via the NMS. In Europe, the market and regulatory structure is decidedly different.
Most importantly, MiFID does not impose a formal linkage and the competition is
not between a human market maker market and electronically organized markets but
between several centralized limit order markets. In addition, algorithmic and high-
frequency traders are considered to be more active today than in previous studies of
multi-market trading (Jovanovic and Menkveld, 2010; Hendershott et al., 2011). This
development may mitigate problems associated with the lack of formal linkages. Us-
ing these trading technologies traders may intermediate in markets informally, thereby
integrating price processes and increasing liquidity.
In a first step I analyze liquidity measures. In 2010, quoted spreads are significantly
lower on Chi-X than on any other platform. However, quoted spreads only measure
liquidity costs for small trades. Effective spreads proxy for the transaction costs that
are actually paid by liquidity demanders. On average effective spreads are tightest on
Turquoise, even after controlling for market conditions at the time of trade. However,
this finding may be attributed to orders that are executed against stale limit orders
on Turquoise. Supposing that liquidity providers on Turquoise react slower to price
movements than traders on other platforms, favorable prices for liquidity demanders
arise. Regressions further show that trades are more likely to occur on MTFs when
their spreads are tighter and their order books are deeper relative to the LSE. The
evidence suggests that investors monitor multiple platforms and trade when and where
it is relatively inexpensive.
To analyze the contribution of each trading venue to price discovery, I decompose
the stock price variance into its trade and quote correlated components (Hasbrouck,
1991a). Trading on the LSE explains roughly 40.0% of trade based price discovery, on
Chi-X 35.0%, on BATS 14.0%, and on Turquoise 11.0%. The permanent price impact
of trades (Hasbrouck, 1991b) is larger on the LSE than on any other trading venue.
Hasbrouck (1995) information shares indicate that more quote based information is
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impounded into prices on Chi-X. Compared to the observation period in 2009, it ap-
pears that liquidity on each trading venue is higher in 2010, despite a more fragmented
market. The results suggest that MTFs, especially Chi-X, contribute significantly to
liquidity and price discovery and do not seem to be piggy-backing off of the LSE price
discovery process.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 5.2 describes the data
and provides some descriptive statistics. Section 5.3 presents results on liquidity mea-
sures for the LSE and MTFs and examines investors’ order routing decisions. Sec-
tion 5.4 analyzes the roles played in price discovery by each trading venue. Section 5.5
explores changes in market quality between 2009 and 2010. Section 5.6 summarizes
and concludes.
5.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
This chapter focuses on FTSE 100 constituents that are traded on the regulated mar-
ket, the LSE, and the three largest MTFs, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. Filter cat-
egories result in 98 stocks included into the final data set that spans 29 trading days
from April 19 to May 28, 2010 (see Section 4.1). I analyze both the individual order
books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise and the consolidated order book of
the four trading venues. To obtain the consolidated order book, the four individual
order books are merged per millisecond for each stock. The consolidated data consist
of roughly 19 million trades for a total of 202 billion British Pounds with an additional
448 million quotes.
Table 5.1 reports descriptive statistics for the consolidated order book and for indi-
vidual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise per day and per stock in
April/May 2010. Markets are fragmented as seen in the 51.8% market share of trading
volume for the LSE. However, LSE market shares are slightly higher in low volume
stocks. Chi-X is with 30.8% of trading volume the largest of the MTFs. Trade sizes
are largest on the LSE. Quote updates are most frequent on Chi-X and BATS. There
are about 22.0 price changes per minute on either MTF compared to 16.3 on the LSE
and 13.9 on Turquoise. This result may be evidence of clientele effects that play a role
in order routing decisions. For instance, algorithmic traders may prefer to trade on
Chi-X and BATS and submit, edit, and delete orders at high frequencies.
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Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics: Trading intensity and liquidity measures. The sample con-
sists of 98 stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange and in the FTSE 100. The observation
period contains all trading days from April 19 to May 28, 2010. Descriptive statistics for the
consolidated order book (Cons.) and for individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and
Turquoise are reported per day and per stock. Market shares are based on daily trading vol-
ume (Volume) in British Pounds (GBP). Trade Count is the average daily number of trades and
Trade Size the average order size. Price Change is the average number of bid and ask changes
per minute. Spread measures are reported in basis points. The Quoted Spread is calculated
on a tick-by-tick basis per stock, the Quoted Spread Trade is calculated trade-by-trade. Real-
ized Spread and Price Impact are reported for both 5 and 15 minute benchmarks relative to the
midpoint of the consolidated order book. Depth1 is half the quoted depth at the best bid and
ask. Depth3 includes the total quoted volume three ticks behind best prices. Mean differences
between the LSE and each MTF are tested for statistical significance using Thompson (2011)
standard errors with ‘a’ denoting statistical significance at the 1% level and ‘b’ at the 5% level.
Cons. LSE Chi-X BATS TQ
Market Shares 100.00% 51.82% 30.81%a 11.59%a 5.78%a
(0.00%) (7.95%) (5.33%) (4.09%) (2.26%)
Volume (1,000 GBP) 70,916 36,634 23,064a 7,739a 3,479a
(105,556) (56,185) (36,651) (10,373) (4,377)
Trade Count 6,971 2,766 2,502a 1,163a 539a
(7,414) (2,995) (2,870) (1,174) (502)
Trade Size (GBP) 8,238 10,713 7,391a 5,567a 5,487a
(3,652) (4,877) (3,578) (2,812) (2,459)
Price Change (#/min) 21.22 16.27 22.95a 22.10a 13.94a
(32.50) (28.61) (37.80) (30.66) (18.55)
Quoted Spread 3.874 5.718 4.983a 6.059b 9.118a
(1.422) (1.895) (1.841) (2.750) (4.931)
Quoted Spread Trade 2.847 3.860 3.697a 4.285a 5.804a
(1.058) (1.280) (1.300) (1.754) (3.214)
Effective Spread 3.108 3.138 3.232a 3.103 2.470a
(1.093) (1.130) (1.106) (1.133) (1.022)
Realized Spread 5 -0.077 -0.229 -0.008a 0.280a -0.439a
(0.982) (1.274) (1.032) (1.375) (1.375)
Realized Spread 15 0.145 0.049 0.211a 0.379a -0.127
(1.462) (1.953) (1.570) (2.303) (3.195)
Price Impact 5 3.189 3.383 3.243a 2.822a 2.879a
(1.414) (1.666) (1.481) (1.552) (2.110)
Price Impact 15 2.968 3.106 3.024 2.722a 2.568a
(1.708) (2.162) (1.829) (2.361) (3.319)
Depth1 (GBP) 74,547 40,300 31,905a 21,782a 12,342a
(72,525) (27,720) (28,256) (20,204) (8,625)
Depth3 (GBP) 450,484 211,633 158,213a 98,924a 44,053a
(419,704) (174,363) (133,547) (88,903) (39,227)
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Quoted spreads are calculated for each price and volume update in the order book
and quoted spreads at trade time and effective spreads are computed trade-by-trade. I
adapt the Bessembinder and Kaufman (1997b) spread calculation in combination with
the Bessembinder (2003) adjustment of the Lee and Ready (1991) standard algorithm
to estimate trade direction. Section 4.2 provides more details on the calculation of all
reported liquidity measures.
Average daily quoted spreads are narrow in all individual order books, ranging from
4.98 bps on Chi-X to 9.12 bps on Turquoise. Quoted spreads at time of execution
are consistently narrower than during periods without trades. This result shows that
investors trade only when and where it is relatively inexpensive to do so. There is no
single trading venue that always offers the best price and smaller spread measures for
the consolidated order book show that investors can benefit from trading on multiple
markets. For example, the average daily inside quoted spread of the consolidated order
book is 3.87 bps, 32.2% smaller than the quoted spread on the LSE, 22.3% than on
Chi-X, 36.1% than on BATS, and 57.5% than on Turquoise.
I use the midpoint of the EBBO to compute effective spreads per day and per stock.1
The effective spread is the spread that is actually paid by liquidity demanders. It ap-
pears that the average effective spread on Turquoise is significantly smaller than on any
other platform. However, the large difference between quoted spreads at trade time
and effective spreads on Turquoise may be an indication that the results are driven by
the small number of trades on Turquoise or overall market conditions at the time of
execution. Section 5.3.1 reports effective spreads for different trade size categories and
estimation results.
The spread is further decomposed into its individual components (Glosten, 1987).
Realized spreads are a measure for liquidity suppliers’ revenues and price impacts ap-
proximate gross losses due to informed trading. I compute both measures for 5 and
15 minutes. Results on realized spreads are ambiguous. At 5 minutes, they are negative
for all trading venues except BATS. At 15 minutes, they are positive for the LSE, Chi-X
and BATS, indicating that it may be profitable to supply liquidity on these platforms
if one is willing to wait longer than 5 minutes for prices to revert to their equilibrium
levels. Adverse selection risk appears to be higher on the LSE and Chi-X than on BATS
1Related studies of intermarket competition also use the midpoint of best prices as reference price
(e.g. Barclay et al., 2003; Battalio et al., 2004; Goldstein et al., 2008).
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and Turquoise.
Depth1 is the available half depth at the best bid and ask and Depth3 captures depth
up to three ticks behind best prices. The results on depth show that it is significantly
larger on the LSE than on any MTF. However, I likely underestimate depth due to
iceberg orders or fully hidden orders. Depth measures in the consolidated order book
are considerably smaller than the sum of quoted volume in individual order books.
This finding provides some evidence for a competitive environment in which not every
trading venue is at the best available price.
5.3 Liquidity
Section 5.3.1 studies whether MTFs are competitive in terms of liquidity. I use effective
spreads to proxy for the cost of liquidity and study these costs while controlling for
trade sizes, the reference price, and market conditions. Section 5.3.2 reports the results
of the impact of liquidity conditions on order routing decisions.
5.3.1 Effective Spreads
Panel A of Table 5.2 reports the daily number of trades per stock and per trading
venue for different trade size categories.2 The statistics show that a significantly higher
fraction of trades is executed on the LSE than on MTFs for all trade size categories,
except for the two smallest categories, less than 499 shares traded and 500 to 1,999
shares traded, for Chi-X. Overall, the results confirm the tendency towards larger trade
sizes on the LSE as reported in Table 5.1.
Descriptive statistics on effective spreads are broken down by trade size categories in
Table 5.2, Panel B for each trading venue per day and per stock. The midpoint of the
EBBO is used as the reference price to compute these variables. Effective spreads are
quite small across trade size categories and trading venues, averaging between 2.09 bps
and 4.09 bps. This is evidence of the strong competition between the four trading
venues and between participants on each platform. Effective spreads are smallest for
trades for less than 500 shares and increase along with trade size categories for all trading
venues except Turquoise. Effective spreads on Turquoise are strictly lower for all trade
2Trade size categories are based on the SEC classification, see RegNMS, Rule 600.
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics: Number of trades and effective spreads by trade size
categories. The sample consists of 98 stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange and in
the FTSE 100. The observation period contains all trading days from April 19 to May 28,
2010. The average number of trades (Panel A) and average effective spreads for the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise are reported per day and per stock in basis points. Spreads are calculated
for each trading venue separately and for the consolidated order book (Cons.) across trading
venues. I use the midpoint of the consolidated order book (Panel B) and midpoints of single
order books (Panel C) as the reference price. The standard deviation is given in parentheses.
Trade size categories are the SEC trade size classifications. Mean differences between the LSE
and each MTF are tested for statistical significance using Thompson (2011) standard errors with
‘a’ denoting statistical significance at the 1% level and ‘b’ at the 5% level.
Cons. LSE Chi-X BATS TQ
Panel A: Trade Count
≤ 499 2,790 953 1,014b 560a 263a
(3,463) (1,222) (1,399) (646) (275)
500 - 1,999 2,417 940 904 395a 178a
(2,731) (1,048) (1,141) (470) (183)
2,000 - 4,999 1,004 458 347a 134a 64a
(1,538) (632) (613) (233) (104)
5,000 - 9,999 407 210 130a 47a 20a
(951) (444) (345) (138) (55)
≥ 10,000 353 204 106a 28a 14a
(1,505) (812) (513) (132) (72)
Panel B: Effective Spreads - Consolidated Order Book
≤ 499 2.939 2.980 3.035a 2.966 2.423a
(1.087) (1.139) (1.100) (1.127) (1.031)
500 - 1,999 3.164 3.144 3.318a 3.230a 2.525a
(1.148) (1.190) (1.188) (1.242) (1.125)
2,000 - 4,999 3.438 3.369 3.728a 3.387 2.547a
(1.319) (1.322) (1.496) (1.728) (1.607)
5,000 - 9,999 3.709 3.625 4.018a 3.319 2.335a
(1.786) (1.801) (2.004) (2.039) (1.718)
≥ 10,000 4.086 4.087 4.052 3.461 2.091a
(2.397) (2.440) (2.271) (2.344) (1.921)
Panel C: Effective Spreads - Single Order Books
≤ 499 2.939 3.686 3.479a 4.146a 5.142a
(1.087) (1.259) (1.274) (1.797) (3.032)
500 - 1,999 3.164 3.886 3.736a 4.427a 5.210a
(1.148) (1.336) (1.310) (1.728) (2.916)
2,000 - 4,999 3.438 4.170 4.069b 4.800a 5.361a
(1.319) (1.490) (1.539) (2.355) (3.528)
5,000 - 9,999 3.709 4.549 4.315 4.906a 5.220a
(1.786) (1.993) (1.975) (2.875) (4.245)
≥ 10,000 4.086 5.165 4.369a 5.191a 5.103
(2.397) (2.701) (2.253) (3.547) (4.902)
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Figure 5.1: Effective spreads by trade size categories. The figure shows average daily effective
spreads on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in FTSE 100 constituents over both observa-
tion periods, April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. Effective spreads are the relative difference
between the trade price and (1) the midpoint of the consolidated order book across trading
venues (upper figure) or (2) midpoints of the single order books of each trading venue (lower
figure) per day and per stock.
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size categories compared to the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS. One would typically interpret
this as evidence that transaction costs are lower on Turquoise than on any of the other
three trading venues. However, market shares of Turquoise are very low despite these
favorable prices for liquidity demanders. Differences in effective spreads between the
LSE, Chi-X, and BATS are economically insignificant for the two smallest trade size
categories, ranging between 0.02 bps and 0.17 bps. For larger trade size categories,
effective spreads tend to be smaller on BATS compared to the LSE and Chi-X.
Figure 5.1 depicts average effective spreads per day and per stock calculated (1) with
the midpoint of the EBBO as in Table 5.2, Panel A (upper figure) and (2) with mid-
points of individual order books of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise as in Ta-
ble 5.2, Panel B (lower figure). Overall, effective spreads that are based on the midpoint
of consolidated order books are considerably smaller than single order book effective
spreads, on average 19.7% for the LSE, 9.3% for Chi-X, 30.1% for BATS, and 45.8% for
Turquoise. This result reflects the fact that trading venues do not always quote prices at
the EBBO. The large difference for Turquoise possibly means that marketable orders
are executed at stale prices in the limit order book. This result is in line with the find-
ings of Chapter 6, providing some evidence that liquidity providers on Turquoise react
slower to market movements.
To control for market conditions at the time of execution, I estimate pairwise re-
gressions comparing effective spreads on the LSE and Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise
separately as in Barclay et al. (2003). The general model is defined as follows:
espreadi ,t = αi +
5∑
x=1
βx mkti ,t × sizei ,t ,x +
5∑
x=2
γx sizei ,t ,x +δ1 qspreadi ,t +
δ2 depthi ,t +δ3 vol15i ,t +δ4 rv15i ,t + εi ,t
(5.1)
where espreadi ,t is the effective spread in stock i per trade t. Again, the midpoint of
the EBBO is used as reference price. Trade size dummy variables that take the value
one for trade sizes between 1 to 499 shares, 500 to 1,999 shares, 2,000 to 4,999 shares,
5,000 to 9,999 shares, and more than 10,000 shares are size1, size2, size3, size4, and size5,
respectively. mkt takes the value one for a trade on Chi-X, BATS, or Turquoise, re-
spectively and zero for a trade on the LSE. The variables of interest are the trade size
dummy variables interacted with the trading venue dummy variables (mkt × size1 to
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mkt × size5). The coefficients represent the average difference in basis points between
similarly sized trades on the LSE and Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise, respectively. size1 is
omitted. Therefore, the coefficients on other size dummy variables measure differences
from trade sizes between 1 to 499 shares. Control variables are the quoted spread in the
market of execution (qspread) and the depth in the order book on the side of the trade
(depth). vol15 is the trading volume in British Pounds/109 of the previous 15 minutes.
The realized volatility rv15 over all markets is calculated from the average midpoint
return of the previous 15 minutes to the 15 minutes before. To control for stock and
time period characteristics, I include firm dummy variables and dummy variables for
each half-hour during a trading day.
Table 5.3 reports the pairwise regression results for the LSE compared to Chi-X,
BATS or Turquoise. Estimation results show a negative sign on all interaction variables
(mkt × sizex ) for BATS and Turquoise, meaning that effective spreads are on average
smaller on these platforms controlling for market conditions at time of trade. Effec-
tive spreads are larger on Chi-X than on the LSE for all trade size categories. While
the estimates are mostly economically insignificant for a comparison between the LSE
and BATS (-0.11 bps to -0.25 bps), I find remarkable differences between the LSE and
Turquoise. Implicit trading costs on Turquoise are 1.25 bps lower for the smallest trade
size category and 1.81 bps for the largest. These findings confirm the descriptive statis-
tics. Trading size variables (sizex ) show the intuitive result that as trade sizes increase
so do effective spreads, regardless of the trading venue.
5.3.2 Order Routing Decisions
This section examines the impact that liquidity measures have on the order routing
decision. In a perfectly competitive market, traders should prefer to execute at better
prices holding other factors, such as available depth, constant. Multinomial logistic
regressions are used to predict trading venue choices based on liquidity measures. Sec-
tion 4.4 provides details on bivariate logistic regressions which are characterized by
dependent variables with two categories. The presented model can be modified to han-
dle the case where the dependent variable is nominal with more than two variables.
This modification is necessary as investors can choose between the LSE, Chi-X, BATS,
and Turquoise, resulting in four different dependent variables (coded 0, 1, 2, and 3).
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A suitable approach to model investors’ decisions are multinomial logistic regressions
that generate n-1 sets of parameter estimates, comparing different categories of the de-
pendent variable to a reference category.3 To distinguish executions on the regulated
market and MTFs, I use the LSE as the reference category.
Results are obtained for the entire sample and for different trading volume categories.
The trading volume categories are obtained by ranking the firms in the sample by
their total trading volume in April/May 2010. The first category contains the first 33
firms with the highest trading volume (high), the second the next 33 firms (medium),
and the third category 32 low volume firms (low). The dependent variable is equal
to one for trades on Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise and zero for trades on the LSE.
Therefore, positive coefficients indicate an increase in the likelihood of an MTF trade.
The parameters of the model are estimated by maximum likelihood:
ln

pi j
piLSE

=β1 qspreadDiff +β2 rDepth +
β3 shareVolume+β4 vol15+β5 rv15
(5.2)
where pi is the modeled response probability and j ∈ {ChiX, BATS, Turquoise}. The
first coefficient, qspreadDiff, is the most important in terms of market quality. It is
defined for a buy order in stock i at time t as follows:
qspreadDiff i ,t = (EBOi ,t − pricei ,t )/mi ,t (5.3)
where EBOi ,t is the best ask across trading venues, pricei ,t the trade price, and mi ,t the
midpoint of the consolidated order book. If an order is executed at multiple levels in
the order book, the trade price used in the regressions is equivalent to the price of the
first order execution level. For a sell order the variable is defined similarly as follows:
qspreadDiff i ,t = (pricei ,t −EBBi ,t )/mi ,t (5.4)
where EBBi ,t is the best bid across trading venues. I estimate separate regressions for
the following two depth variables: rDepth1 is the depth at the bid (ask) for sell (buy)
3Hosmer and Lemeshow (2000) provide an in-depth overview of multinomial logistic regressions (p. 31-
43).
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orders on the platform of execution relative to the average depth across trading venues.
rDepth3 is defined analogously but incorporates depth up to three ticks behind best
prices and may better model routing decisions for large institutional orders. The num-
ber of shares traded is shareVolume. vol15 and rv15 are defined as in Equation 5.1.
I further include firm dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half-
hour.
Table 5.4 presents the regression estimates for the entire sample and trading volume
categories. The sign on qspreadDiff is negative for all estimations, except for the entire
sample and the high volume category of Chi-X. This result indicates, as one would
expect, that platforms are less likely to attract an order as the difference between posted
prices and the EBB (EBO) increases.4 All coefficients for Chi-X are small and capture
the fact that Chi-X prices are very competitive and qspreadDiff is often close to zero. In
fact, for the entire sample, the odds of a trade on an MTF increase by a multiple of 1.02
for Chi-X, 1.04 for BATS, and 1.12 for Turquoise relative to the LSE when qspreadDiff
increases by 1 bps, holding all other variables constant. Positive coefficients on rDepth1
and rDepth3 reveal that trading venues offering more liquidity relative to other trading
venues are more likely to attract an order. It appears that investors condition their
trading decision not only on prices but also on available depth. In particular, for the
entire sample estimation the picture emerges that an 1.0% increase in rDepth1 on the
platform of execution compared to the LSE increases the likelihood of a trade on Chi-X
by 1.02, on BATS by 1.05 and on Turquoise by 1.07. Mostly negative coefficients on
vol15 show that the likelihood of an MTF trade decreases when past volume is high.
Results on rv15 show distinct patterns. While there is a tendency that investors resort
to the LSE in times of high volatility for high volume stocks, the opposite is true for
medium and low volume stocks.
4The results are confirmed for different variable specifications. A dummy variable, indicating whether
a platform posts the EBB (EBO) alone, and absolute depth variables also suggest that MTFs offering
more liquidity are more likely to attract an order.
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Table 5.3: Regressions of effective spreads. The sample consists of 98 stocks listed on the
London Stock Exchange and in the FTSE 100. The observation period contains all trading days
from April 19 to May 28, 2010. I regress effective spreads on dummy variables that capture
trading venue, trade size, and market conditions at the time of trade. The midpoint of the
consolidated order book is used as reference price to calculate effective spreads. Trade size
dummy variables take the value one for trade sizes between 1 to 499 shares, 500 to 1,999 shares,
2,000 to 4,999 shares, 5,000 to 9,999 shares, and more than 10,000 shares are size1, size2, size3,
size4, and size5, respectively. I interact trade size dummy variables with trading venue dummy
variables (mkt × size1 to mkt × size5). qspread is the quoted spread and depth the quoted depth
in the direction of the trade. vol15 is the trading volume in GBP/109 over the previous 15
minutes. The realized volatility rv15 over all markets is calculated from the average midpoint
return from time t to time t-15 minutes. Firm dummy variables and dummy variables for each
half-hour are not reported. I use Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors. ‘a’ denotes
significance at the 1% level and ‘b’ at the 5% level.
LSE vs. Chi-X LSE vs. BATS LSE vs. TQ
Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat. Estimate t-stat.
Observations 14,225,679 10,611,072 8,926,552
R2 53.88% 46.56% 32.42%
mkt × size1 0.227 178.97a -0.161 -85.09a -1.254 -283.65a
mkt × size2 0.272 190.44a -0.113 -50.26a -1.272 -253.28a
mkt × size3 0.370 168.14a -0.105 -27.66a -1.353 -164.80a
mkt × size4 0.421 115.32a -0.159 -21.98a -1.495 -87.16a
mkt × size5 0.481 104.06a -0.253 -23.73a -1.810 -59.03a
size2 0.049 36.25
a 0.039 27.25a 0.059 38.88a
size3 0.090 47.86
a 0.073 36.16a 0.103 46.84a
size4 0.124 45.39
a 0.107 36.99a 0.141 44.20a
size5 0.171 50.68
a 0.180 48.92a 0.223 52.39a
qspread 0.741 1,128.88a 0.680 528.21a 0.548 287.51a
depth/106 0.000 41.37a 0.000 72.51a 0.000 76.76a
vol15/109 -0.004 -6.41a -0.009 -11.36a 0.009 8.10a
rv15 0.029 1.27 0.147 4.85a 0.797 20.40a
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Studying competition in Nasdaq-listed stocks, Barclay et al. (2003) provide evidence
that investors are more likely to route orders to ECNs when these platforms offer bet-
ter prices than Nasdaq market makers. I find similar results for MTFs, although there
is no official European consolidated tape that allows investors to observe prices across
platforms. It appears that investors use technology such as smart order routing (SOR)
systems. SOR systems are designed to automate the selection process of an execution
venue and thus may help to execute orders optimally in the fragmented European trad-
ing landscape (Foucault and Menkveld, 2008).
5.4 Price Discovery
An important component of market quality is price discovery. To characterize trade
based price discovery, I perform analyses presented in Hasbrouck (1991a) and Has-
brouck (1991b) and extend the typically used vector autoregressions (VAR) to differen-
tiate between different trading venues as in Barclay et al. (2003) and in Hendershott and
Jones (2005). In the estimation I separate trades executed on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS,
and Turquoise and thus their individual impact on the consolidated midpoint process
across trading venues. The results of the VAR analysis are the average cumulative re-
sponse functions for different trading venues over 10 trades estimated separately per
day and per stock. The permanent price impact of a trade, the trade innovation, is
typically interpreted as representing the private information of investors (Hasbrouck,
1991a). To measure the contribution to quote based price discovery of each trading
venue, I follow Hasbrouck (1995) who suggests that the contribution to price discov-
ery of a market can be measured as the proportional contribution of trading venue
innovations to innovations in the common efficient price. Section 4.3 provides an in-
depth explanation of the methodology that I use in this section.
Table 5.5 presents the results on different dimensions of price discovery per day
and per stock. LSE trades impound 22.4% of the total information into stock prices
(% Trade Based) in April/May 2010. Trade based information on Chi-X is with 19.6%
marginally lower than on the LSE. On both BATS and Turquiose the relative contribu-
tion is statistically and economically significantly lower at 7.7% and 6.1%, respectively.5
5I also test differences between the LSE and each MTF for all stocks separately. Trade based informa-
tion is higher at the 5.0% signifiance level for 42 stocks out of 98 stocks on the LSE compared to
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Table 5.5: Trade and quoted based price discovery. The sample consists of 98 stocks listed on
the London Stock Exchange and in the FTSE 100. The observation period contains all trading
days from April 19 to May 28, 2010. I present trade based measures, average daily information
content of trades Hasbrouck (1991b) and daily permanent price impacts Hasbrouck (1991a).
Average daily information content of quotes Hasbrouck (1991b) and information shares Has-
brouck (1995) are reported as quote based measures. Information shares are the mean of lower
and upper bounds. I sum information shares and trade correlated and quote correlated infor-
mation to arrive at total price discovery. Standard deviations are given in parentheses below
the daily means. Mean differences between the LSE and each MTF are tested for statistical sig-
nificance using Thompson (2011) standard errors with ‘a’ denoting statistical significance at the
1% level and ‘b’ at the 5% level.
Overall
Value LSE Chi-X BATS TQ
Trade Based Price Discovery
% Trade Based 22.42% 19.57%a 7.74%a 6.08%a
(6.12%) (6.04%) (4.30%) (4.34%)
Trade Innovation 1.254 1.144a 0.718a 0.641a
(0.598) (0.515) (0.404) (0.417)
Quote Based Price Discovery
% Quote Based 44.18%
(10.08%)
Inform. Shares 27.63% 56.77%a 11.66%a 3.94%a
(10.50%) (12.57%) (7.54%) (4.78%)
Total Contribution to Price Discovery
Fraction of PD 34.63% 44.62%a 12.91%a 7.84%a
(8.07%) (9.19%) (4.95%) (4.56)
The permanent price impact of a trade on the LSE is on average 1.25 bps, 1.14 bps on
Chi-X, 0.72 bps on BATS, and 0.64 bps on Turquoise.6
Quote based contribution to price discovery averages 44.2% using the Hasbrouck
(1991b) variance decomposition technique. In contrast to the trade based measures, I
find that Chi-X contributes considerably more to quote based price discovery. Infor-
mation shares of the LSE are 27.6%, of Chi-X 56.8%, of BATS 11,7%, and of Turquoise
3.9%.7
Chi-X. The opposite relationship is found for 12 stocks. For all stocks significantly more informa-
tion is impounded into prices on the LSE relative to BATS and Turquoise.
6Trades in 41 stocks on the LSE contain on average more information than on Chi-X. The opposite
is true for 12 stocks. Trade innovation is higher for 97 (98) stocks on the LSE relative to BATS
(Turquoise).
7Mean information shares are significantly higher at the 5.0% level for 96 out of 98 stocks on Chi-X
compared to the LSE. This is true for 83 (98) stocks for a comparison between the LSE and BATS
(Turquoise).
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To assess the total contribution of a trading venue to price discovery, I combine
information shares and the fraction of quote based information to obtain a variable
that describes total quote based price discovery relative to trade based price discovery
as shown in Equation (4.14). The results are reported in the last row of Table 5.5,
labeled ‘Fraction of PD’. I find that the LSE contributes 34.6% to total price discovery
in April/May 2010. Surprisingly, Chi-X contributes 10.0% more to price discovery
(44.6%) than the LSE. This result is in contrast to the common concern that MTFs
may piggy-back on the prices determined in regulated markets. Most importantly, the
prices posted on Chi-X are more efficient, in that they ‘move first’, compared to any
other market. BATS and Turquoise participate significantly less in total price discovery
than the LSE and Chi-X, 12.9% and 7.8% and may in fact be simply piggy-backing off
of prices determined elsewhere. The results also indicate that a higher fraction of price
discovery is not simply generated by higher trading activity. For example, the LSE’s
market share is about 17.0% higher than its contribution to total price discovery. The
divergence between total trading volume and information shares is also documented
by Barclay et al. (2003) and in Hendershott and Jones (2005). In the cross-section,
LSE’s total contribution to price discovery increases from an average of 30.3% for high
volume stocks to 38.8% for low volume stocks.8
Some regulators and practitioners are concerned that MTFs free-ride off price dis-
covery delivered by regulated markets. The results presented in this section indicate
that MTFs, especially Chi-X, contribute considerably to price discovery. However,
it is important to emphasize that these results are characteristic of a ‘normal’ trading
environment, i.e. the regulated market is fully operational. MTFs may not be able to
provide a similar level of overall market quality when the regulated market has to stop
trading as documented for the LSE outage on November 9 and November 26, 2009.9
The literature studies in detail competition between Nasdaq market makers and
ECNs and shows that the latter significantly contribute to price discovery. Huang
(2002) and Barclay et al. (2003) find that informed traders prefer to trade on anony-
mous ECNs instead with Nasdaq market makers. In this context, Goldstein et al.
(2008) study the trade-off between anonymity and liquidity. It appears that informed
8Trading volume categories are obtained as described in Section 5.3.2.
9See http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/49b9fc9e-ea6e-11de-a9f5-00144feab49a.html#axzz1LbS299Yr/ for
an overview of LSE outages.
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trading gravitates towards the most liquid platform in order to ensure fast executions.
This chapter differs to the extent that both the LSE and MTFs are organized as elec-
tronic limit order books, i.e. they are anonymous. My results suggest that the highest
fraction of informed trading takes place on the most liquid trading venues, the LSE and
Chi-X.
5.5 Changes Over Time
Since their introduction in 2007, MTFs have gained considerably in market share (see
Section 2.2), raising the question whether an increase in MTF total market share and
therefore an increase in fragmentation, corresponds to a higher contribution of MTFs
to market quality. This section therefore presents results of a comparison between the
period analyzed in the previous sections, April 19 to May 28, 2010, and April 20 to
May 29, 2009. I select these two periods because they leave enough time for develop-
ments and mitigate seasonal effects that may affect the analysis.
Equivalent to the first observation period in April/May 2010 (see Section 4.1), I
retrieve trade and quote data for the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise from Thom-
son Reuters DataScope Tick History for April/May 2009. I apply the same filters on
FTSE 100 constituents as for the first observation period and obtain 74 stocks. To
assure a clean comparison, I restrict the analysis to 70 stock pairs contained in both
samples.10 Compared to the data set consisting of 98 sample firms used in the previous
sections, the 70 selected stocks are more actively traded and are generally more liquid.
However, results on liquidity and price discovery are very similar, i.e. Chi-X is the
most liquid trading venue and contributes significantly more to price discovery than
any other platform. The selected sample also confirms the widely observed tendency
that trading was more concentrated on the LSE in April/May 2009 with a market share
of 70.2% compared to only 51.8% in April/May 2010.11
Figure 5.2 and Figure 5.3 present the development of average daily effective spreads
and total contribution to price discovery of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise
10CABLE & WIRELESS (CW), CADBURY (CBRY), DRAX GROUP (DRX), and THOMSON
REUTERS (TRIL) are removed from the April/May 2009 data set containing 74 sample firms (see
Appendix B).
11In Chapter 6 the 70 stock pairs are analyzed from a different perspective, see Table 6.1 for details on
descriptive statistics in April/May 2009 and April/May 2010.
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Figure 5.2: Effective spreads over time. The figure shows average daily effective spreads on
the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in FTSE 100 constituents over both observation periods,
April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. Effective spreads are the relative difference between the
trade price and the midpoint of the consolidated order book across trading venues per day and
per stock.
for both observation periods. Average effective spreads are substantially lower in
April/May 2010 compared to April/May 2009. In addition, differences between the
LSE, Chi-X, and BATS seem to be smaller in the second observation period. Effective
spreads are clearly lower on Turquoise than on any other trading venue, especially in
2010. Figure 5.3 depicts that Chi-X takes the leadership in total price discovery from
the LSE for April/May 2010. BATS also increases its contribution to the price discov-
ery process relative to the observation period in 2009.
To control for differences in market conditions between both observation periods, I
use a regression model similar to Hendershott and Moulton (2011):
measurei ,t = αi +βi ,t yeari ,t + γi ,t
∑
controlsi ,t + εi ,t (5.5)
where the dependent variables are various trading intensity, liquidity, and price dis-
covery measures as defined in the previous sections. The main variable of interest,
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Figure 5.3: Total price discovery over time. The figure shows the average daily contribution
to total price discovery of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise in FTSE 100 constituents
over both observation periods, April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. To arrive at total price
discovery, I sum information shares and trade correlated and quote correlated information per
day and per stock as defined in Equation 4.14.
yeari ,t , captures the differences between the observation period in April/May 2009 and
April/May 2010. It takes the value one for a trading day in the 2010 observation period
and is zero otherwise. I further include the logarithm of daily market capitalization,
the average daily realized volatility, the logarithm of average trade prices across trading
venues, and firm dummy variables. Robust Thompson (2011) clustered standard errors
are reported. In Table 5.6, the first columns for each trading venue (2010-2009) reports
coefficients on yeari ,t , the difference in dependent variables between April/May 2009
and April/May 2010. The second columns, with the exception of the LSE, report the
difference to the LSE (Venue-LSE) and reveals whether or not a platform is improving
over time relative to the LSE.
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The market activity results in Table 5.6, Panel A show that trading volume and the
number of trades significantly increase between April/May 2009 and April/May 2010
for Chi-X and BATS whereas they do not change for the LSE and Turquoise. A higher
number of price updates suggests that order submission strategies are more responsive
to market conditions on these trading venues. An important question is whether or
not liquidity is also increasing with activity. I find the expected negative coefficients
on the dummy variable yeari ,t for quoted spreads, quote spreads at trade time, and
effective spreads, indicating that liquidity has improved over time despite increased
fragmentation. The latter falls over time by -0.88 bps on the LSE, -0.86 bps on Chi-X,
-0.66 bps on BATS, and -1.24 bps on Turquoise (see Figure 5.2). I also find that for
Chi-X and BATS that quoted spreads and quoted spreads at trade time fall significantly
compared to the LSE spreads.
Panel B of Table 5.6 reports regression results for price discovery variables. These
results show a clear increase in the relative contributions to price discovery of MTFs
over time and compared to the LSE. While trade based information falls on the LSE by
-11.4% between April/May 2009 and April/May 2010, it increases by 4.3% on Chi-X,
4.7% on BATS, and 1.7% on Turquoise. Overall trades become less informed but trade
innovation increases significantly on all MTFs relative to the LSE. The contribution to
quote based price discovery of the LSE and Turquoise falls between both oberservation
periods by -13.0% and -1.4%, respectivley, whereas information shares raise by 8.9% for
Chi-X and by 5.5% for BATS. In 2009, the LSE contributes on average more to total
price discovery than any MTF, about 52.0%. The regression results provide empirical
support for a sharp increase in total contribution to price discovery of Chi-X and BATS
(see Figure 5.3). Chi-X leads total price discovery in the 2010 observation period as
discussed in the previous section.
The data do not allow for direct tests of the impact of different competitive actions
such as trading fee changes, exchange system updates, and the impact of algorithmic and
high-frequency traders. However, the picture emerges that market quality on MTFs
as “high-frequency trader friendly environment” (Menkveld, 2011) improves between
April/May 2009 and April/May 2010 relative to the LSE. In addition, the data do not
support the claim that fragmentation harms overall market quality. It appears that
both the LSE and MTFs become more liquid in terms of quoted and effective spreads.
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5.6 Conclusion
MiFID ended the quasi-monopoly of national exchanges across Europe and new alter-
native trading platforms have emerged. These competitive market dynamics in combi-
nation with recent technological improvements, such as low-latency trading infrastruc-
ture or algorithmic and high-frequency trading, significantly transformed European
equities trading. The question arises whether MTFs are competitive on liquidity and
contribute to overall market quality in a fragmented trading landscape.
There is currently a debate about the impact of market fragmentation. Some authors
argue in favor of order flow consolidation on one single platform (e.g. Easley et al.,
1996; Bennett and Wei, 2006). Other studies emphasize that competition for order flow
may improve overall market quality (e.g. Barclay et al., 2003; Goldstein et al., 2008,
O’Hara and Ye, 2011). There is a growing body of literature that analyzes European
equities trading post MiFID (e.g. Degryse et al., 2011; Menkveld, 2011), under a set
of rules which differs considerably from U.S. regulation. This chapter contributions
to this line of literature, offering new insights on liquidity, investors’ order routing
decisions, and price discovery.
It appears that Chi-X, an MTF, is the most liquid platform for FTSE 100 constituents
in terms of quoted spreads during the observation period, April/May 2010. Effective
spreads are significantly smaller on Turquoise than on the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS.
However, this finding may be driven by executions against stale limit orders in the
order book of Turquoise. The time a trading venue spend at the European Best Bid
and Offer (EBBO) varies and investors can profit, in terms of better transaction prices,
from trading on multiple platforms. Logistic regression results imply that investors
condition their trading decisions on general liquidity factors, i.e. orders are more likely
to be routed to MTFs when these platforms offer better prices relative to the LSE.
The evidence suggests that the most liquid trading venues Chi-X and the LSE lead
in trade and quote based price discovery. In April/May 2010, on Chi-X 44.6% of to-
tal information is impounded into prices compared to 34.6% on the LSE, 12.9% on
BATS, and 7.8% on Turquoise. I further compare trading intensity, liquidity, and price
discovery measures between April/May 2010 and April/May 2009. Market quality im-
proves on each trading venue over time in the level of market fragmentation and price
discovery shifts towards MTFs.
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There is a widespread concern among regulators, practitioners, and academics that
MiFID, in contrast to U.S. RegNMS, may fail to integrate the various trading venues.
O’Hara and Ye (2011), for instance, argue that “it is hard to see how a single virtual
market can emerge in Europe” without consolidated trade and quote information and
a lack of trade-through protection. For high volume stocks, this chapter provides some
evidence that competitive forces within the MiFID framework ensure a high level of
market quality and that MTFs, despite the concerns, contribute significantly to equity
market quality. To further examine the level of market coordination, the next chapter
analyzes apparent arbitrage opportunities and suboptimal executions.
Chapter 6
Arbitrage and Suboptimal Executions
6.1 Introduction
The automation of exchanges and newly introduced regulations have significantly al-
tered the trading landscape during the last decade. These changes have facilitated new
trading venues and allowed their entry into the market for exchange business. One
consequence of competition between trading venues is that liquidity, i.e. the ability to
trade a certain number of shares at a given price, is fragmented across different trading
venues. This fragmentation imposes increased search costs on investors. In the U.S.,
different trading venues are linked by the NMS so that investors can observe the best
available price. In Europe, there is no such link. Since it is in the investors interest to
trade at best prices, it is an open question whether competition ensures an integrated
market in the absence of a formal linkage.
Comparing European equity trading regulation under MiFID and its U.S. counter-
part, RegNMS, reveals substantial differences (see Section 2.1). In Europe, there is
no trade-through protection or consolidated trade and quote information. RegNMS
requires trading venues to establish, maintain, and enforce procedures to prevent trade-
throughs (Rule 611), i.e. orders that are executed at worse prices than the best available
price across trading venues. For this purpose trading venues are electronically linked
via the ITS and private linkages. In the U.S., comprehensive consolidated market in-
formation is available to provide price information to the public. The data comprise
the NBBO for a stock, the corresponding volume, and the trading venue. European
regulation does not establish a single data consolidator. However, firms, such as Thom-
son Reuters and Dow Jones, offer consolidated data streams on a commercial basis to
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investors.
There is an ongoing debate among practitioners and academics about the impact of
differences in MiFID and RegNMS on market quality. MiFID allows the market entry
of new platforms but it does not impose formal linkage requirements. For instance,
O’Hara and Ye (2011) highlight that European equity markets lack consolidated trade
and quote information and trade-through protections. In their opinion, it is therefore
unlikely that one virtual market can emerge. Stoll (2001), however, points out that a
formal linkage may impede innovation and cause high infrastructure costs. Battalio
et al. (2004) study the U.S. option market in the absence of a formal linkage and con-
clude that the costs of a formal linkage may be avoided in the case of fierce intermarket
competition, sophisticated investor technology, and the threat of increased regulation.
Following Battalio et al. (2004), this chapter uses different order book scenarios to
evaluate the coordination of quotes across trading venues as depicted in Figure 6.1.
Scenario 1 characterizes a ‘normal’ trading environment with a positive inside spread
(EBB<EBO). Quotes are locked if the best posted bid across trading venues (EBB)
equals the best ask (EBO, Scenario 2) and crossed if the best bid exceeds the best posted
ask (EBB>EBO, Scenario 3). Crossed quotes represent apparent arbitrage opportu-
nities and thus are inconsistent with the law of one price. In addition, this chapter
characterizes suboptimal executions, i.e. trades which are executed worse than the best
available price across trading venues (Scenario 4).
This chapter studies FTSE 100 constituents traded on the LSE and the three largest
MTFs, namely Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The analysis is based on two observation
periods: April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. Initially, I examine spread and quote
measures as a proxy for competition. While the LSE posts on average the smallest
quoted spreads and is most often at the best available price in the consolidated order
book over the observation period in 2009, Chi-X is more liquid in 2010. Locks and
crosses offer insights into market coordination. In April/May 2009, I find that markets
are locked (crossed) for 24.5 minutes (16.0 minutes) of each trading day per stock. Over
the observation period in 2010, the average time of locks (crosses) decreases to 6.4 min-
utes (19.8 seconds), representing an 74.0% (97.6%) decline. Quotes of Turquoise are
considerably more often locked and crossed than quotes of any other trading venue.
Potential revenues from arbitrage activities during crossed market periods are partic-
ularly interesting. I identify overall revenues of 614,217 GBP before transaction costs
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Venue A
Ask
Bid
Venue B Positive
EBB<EBO
Inside Spread>0
Scenario 1
Ask
Bid
Ask
Bid
Venue A
Ask
Bid
Venue B Locked
Scenario 2
Ask
Bid
Ask
Bid
EBB=EBO
Inside Spread=0
Venue A
Ask
Bid
Venue B Crossed
Scenario 3
Ask
Bid
Ask
Bid
EBB>EBO
Inside Spread<0
Venue A
Ask
Bid
Venue B Trade-Through
Scenario 4
Ask
Bid
Trade executed worse than the best 
available price across trading 
venues (EBB for a sell order/EBO 
for a buy order) 
Figure 6.1: Order book scenarios: Locks, crosses, and trade-troughs. The figure illustrates
four order book scenarios used to examine market conditions. In Scenario 1, trading venue A
posts the inside bid and trading venue B is at the inside ask (EBB<EBO). In Scenario 2, trading
venue A’s bid equals trading venue B’s ask and the market is locked (EBB=EBO). In Scenario 3,
the market is crossed (EBB>EBO) and trading venue A’s bid is higher than trading venue B’s
ask. Scenario 4 illustrates a buy at trading venue A’s ask which is higher than trading venue B’s
ask, i.e. the best available price across trading venues is traded-through.
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across stocks over the 2009 observation period and 404,700 GBP in 2010, representing
a 34,1% decline. However, not every arbitrage opportunity is exploitable after transac-
tion costs.
Trade-through rates are a common statistic to evaluate price-priority violations. The
fraction of trade-throughs as a percentage of the total number of trades per day and per
stock ranges from 5.2% to 8.7% across trading venues in the 2009 observation period
and from 4.7% to 6.9% in 2010. Taking the available depth at the EBBO into account,
investors strictly executing at the best available price can realize potential savings of
2,095 GBP per day and per stock in April/May 2009 and 1,569 GBP in April/May
2010. Economic intuition suggests that investors may evaluate execution speed over
best prices in times of high intermarket activity. To proxy for intermarket activity, I
use inside quoted spreads. Smaller spreads may be accociated with a higher demand
of speedy executions. The regression results confirm my expectations, the likelihood
of trade-throughs increases in the demand of speedy executions. This pattern implies
that investors trade off liquidity and search costs. Overall, my results suggest that
disconnected trading venues behave as if they were formally linked, indicating a high
level of market integration in FTSE 100 constituents.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 6.2 describes the sam-
ple selection and presents descriptive statistics. Section 6.3 examines the quote process,
discussing apparent arbitrage opportunities in detail. Section 6.4 analyzes trade execu-
tions across trading venues. Section 6.5 summarizes and concludes.
6.2 Sample Selection and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analyses in this chapter are based on FTSE 100 constituents during the
following two observation periods: April 20 to May 29, 2009 and April 19 to May 28,
2010. The first observation period was selected because of the lack of structural market
changes. There are no market microstructure, fee, or trading system changes on the
LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. I choose the second time period in April/May 2010
to study effects of competition on quote and execution quality over time. In addition,
this choice reduces seasonal effects that can distort results. The final sample covers 27
trading days in 2009 and 29 trading days in 2010.
The filter criteria as presented in Section 4.1 result in 74 stocks for the first observa-
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Figure 6.2: Market shares of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The figure shows market
shares for FTSE 100 constituents traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The sample
consists of 70 stocks pairs traded during both observation periods: April 20 to May 29, 2009
and April 19 to May 28, 2010. Market shares are based on trading volume in British Pounds per
day and per stock.
tion period, April/May 2009, and in 98 stocks for April/May 2010. To analyze differ-
ences over time, I restrict the sample to 70 firms which are traded in both observation
periods. To analyze the level of market integration, it is necessary to merge single or-
der books from each trading venue into one consolidated order book per stock. Based
on RICs and timestamps, I compute the EBB, the highest bid, across the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise, and the lowest ask price, the EBO. The data set is also used in
Section 5.5 which studies trading intensity, liquidity, and price discovery over time.
Figure 6.2 illustrates the average daily share in trading volume of the LSE, Chi-X,
BATS, and Turquoise for the observation periods in 2009 and 2010. Over the 2009
observation period the LSE attracts on average 70.2% of daily trading volume. As
expected, I find a significantly smaller LSE market share of 51.8% in 2010. Chi-X, the
largest MTF, attracts about 20.3% of daily trading volume over the 2009 observation
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period and 30.8% in April/May 2010. BATS more than triples its market share between
both observation periods to 11.6% in 2010. The market share of Turquoise reaches
6.0% of daily trading volume over both observation periods. Hence, the descriptive
statistics show that trading in FTSE 100 constituents became more fragmented whereas
liquidity is still to be analyzed.
Table 6.1 reports trading activity and liquidity measures for both observation pe-
riods computed per day and per stock. In line with expectations, the data show a
significantly higher daily trading volume for all trading venues over the 2010 obser-
vation period than in 2009.1 Interestingly, the average trade size increases across all
trading venues. In both sample periods average trade sizes on the LSE are statistically
and economically significantly larger than on any MTF.
Quoted spreads are calculated for each price and volume update in the order book
whereas quoted spreads at trades and effective spreads are computed trade-by-trade.
Spreads are calculated as described in Section 4.2, meaning that I adapt the Bessem-
binder and Kaufman (1997b) spread calculation in combination with the Bessembinder
(2003) adjustment of the standard Lee and Ready (1991) algorithm to estimate the trade
direction. In April/May 2009, the average daily quoted spread ranges from 6.27 bps for
the LSE to 14.00 bps for Turquoise. All trading venues have smaller quoted spreads
at trades than during periods without trades. This result is evidence that investors
actively monitor multiple order books and trade when it is relatively inexpensive to
do so. Effective spreads are calculated on an individual order book level and are not
considerably different from quoted spreads at trades, indicating that most trades are ex-
ecuted at the inside bid or ask. These findings also suggest that a considerable number
of trades are executed against hidden orders on Turquoise, since the average effective
spread is considerably smaller than the quoted spread at trades.2 Order book depth is
another dimension of liquidity and is significantly larger on the LSE and Chi-X than
on BATS and Turquoise over the observation period in 2009.
1According to the European Equity Market Report of the Federation of European Securities Exchanges
(FESE), average daily trading volume on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise increases by about
54.0% between the first half of 2009 and 2010, see http://www.fese.eu/.
2A high number of inside the spread executions on Turquoise supports this result. In April/May
2009, on average about 0.1% of all trades on Chi-X and BATS and 3.0% on Turquoise are executed
inside the individual order book’s bid-ask spread. The corresponding values are 0.8% for the LSE in
April/May 2010, 1.9% for Chi-X, 2.3% for BATS, and 10.9% for Turquoise.
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In 2010, the average daily number of trades is 3,105 per stock on the LSE and 2,874
on Chi-X. However, the average trading volume is still considerably higher on the
LSE. The average LSE trade size is roughly 3,500 GBP larger than on Chi-X. This
result is consistent with Goldstein et al. (2008) who find smaller trade sizes on ECNs
compared to Nasdaq montage. Quoted spreads on the LSE decrease between the 2009
observation period and 2010 by 0.89 bps, on Chi-X by 2.02 bps, on BATS by 2.51 bps,
and on Turquoise by 6.00 bps. The descriptive statistics provide first evidence of strong
competition for liquidity supply and additionally for a market where overall liquidity
increases over time.3
6.3 Quote Quality
This section focuses on quote quality. Quotes are determined by traders who submit
limit orders. It is possible that traders systematically ignore competing quotes on other
platforms, so that arbitrage opportunities arise. Section 6.3.1 describes how long each
market is at the inside spread in the sense that it quotes the highest bid (EBB) and the
lowest ask across trading venues (EBO). Section 6.3.2 investigates the prevalence of
locked (EBB=EBO) and crossed markets (EBB>EBO). Section 6.3.3 provides details
on determinants of non-positive spread initiations and terminations per platform.
6.3.1 Quote Competition
Transaction costs comprise explicit and implicit trading costs. Explicit costs include,
for instance, transaction fees and taxes, implicit costs are associated with costs for im-
mediacy, market risk, and market impact. Assuming equal explicit costs and sufficient
market depth across trading venues, investors can realize best execution by selling (buy-
ing) in the market with the highest bid (lowest ask). As a consequence, the attractive-
ness of a trading venue to liquidity takers may be characterized by the platform’s par-
ticipation rate in the inside spread. I provide four measures of quote competitiveness
(Goldstein et al., 2008): (1): presence at the EBBO (inside bid and/or ask) (2): presence
at the EBB and EBO (3): alone at the EBBO (inside bid and/or ask) (4): alone at the
EBB and EBO.
3In general, the results are in line with the evidence found in Section 5.5.
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Table 6.2 reports results on each measure as a percentage of the total trading day
(Panel A) and as percentage of daily executed trades (Panel B) per stock during the
observation periods. Over the 2009 observation period, the LSE quotes either the EBB
or EBO or both for 85.0% of the trading day, Chi-X for 76.9%, BATS for 60.6%, and
Turquoise for 52.9%. The participation rate of BATS and Turquoise is statistically and
economically significantly lower than that of the LSE and Chi-X. The contribution of
all trading venues to quote competition falls significantly when analyzing presence at
both sides of the inside spread. This measure ranges between 73.5% for the LSE and
30.1% for Turquoise. The LSE quotes the EBBO alone for 12.0% of the trading day.
The patterns are confirmed by the fraction of trade executions on the different trading
venues (Table 6.2, Panel B). There is a high number of trades when one trading venue
posts the EBBO alone. This suggests that investors actively monitor multiple markets
seeking best execution.
Over the observation period in 2010, Chi-X is the most active quoting platform for
FTSE 100 constituents, i.e. it is the highest fraction of time at the EBBO (Table 6.2,
Panel B). The LSE is at the EBBO only in 78.2% of the trading day compared to 87.2%
for Chi-X. Quote contribution is lower on BATS and Turquoise. The LSE still provides
competitive quotes, however, Chi-X and also BATS significantly increase their quote
quality between 2009 and 2010.
Figure 6.3 provides insight into the fraction of the trading day that a trading venue is
not at the EBBO (ticks away>0). In this case, all trading venues provide quotes close to
the EBBO for both observation periods. In April/May 2009, prevalence at the EBBO,
one tick away, or two ticks away averages about 94.0% of time and 96.0% in April/May
2010. In line with the results on quoted spreads, Turquoise seems to be a significantly
higher fraction of time further away from the EBBO than any other market. Overall,
my findings are in line with Goldstein et al. (2008) who find similar results for quote
competition between Nasdaq’s Super Montage and three ECNs, Archipelago, Island,
and Instinet. Their findings show that the largest trading venue, Nasdaq’s Super Mon-
tage, contributes more to the inside spread than the three ECNs.
I further analyze time priority of best quotes (Table 6.2, Panel C). A quote is consid-
ered to have time priority either if it is at the best bid or ask alone or if it is at the best
bid or ask and additionally has been submitted earlier than quotes at the same price
(Goldstein et al., 2008). Time priority is averaged for the bid and ask side of the order
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Figure 6.3: Quotations relative to the EBBO. The figures depict the fraction of a trading day
a trading venue spends at the EBBO (ticks away=0) and at different levels away from the EBBO
per day and per stock. Results for the observation period April/May 2009 are presented in the
upper figure and for April/May 2010 in the lower figure.
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book per day and per stock. This measure varies between 29.9% for Chi-X, 9.7% for
BATS, and 15.0% for Turquoise over the observation period in 2009. LSE quotes have
time priority in 44.5% in 2009 and in 38.8% in 2010. However, Chi-X increases time
priority of its quotes by 7.8% between the two observation periods. In comparison to
the LSE and Chi-X, time priority of BATS and Turquoise is smaller indicating more
frequent quote changes. This phenomenon may cause some regulatory concerns, since
flickering quotes may reduce transparency, discourage liquidity provision, and compli-
cate best execution.
6.3.2 Locked and Crossed Markets
This section follows Battalio et al. (2004) and identifies locks and crosses in the consoli-
dated order book. A stock is considered locked if the best bid equals the best ask on an-
other trading venue (EBB=EBO, inside spread is zero) and it is crossed if the highest bid
across trading venues is greater than the lowest ask across trading venues (EBB>EBO,
inside spread is negative). Battalio et al. (2004) argue that “locked and crossed quotes
represent foregone trading opportunities” and are not in the investor’s best interest,
assuming that investors want to trade instead of quoting. Under RegNMS, the SEC
requires trading venues to establish, maintain, and enforce rules which prevent traders
to lock or cross protected quotations (Rule 610), assuming that non-positive spreads
are inconsistent with fair and orderly markets. MiFID does not address this concern.
Further important details of RegNMS and MiFID are discussed in Section 2.1.
Table 6.3 reports locks and crosses as percentage of quotes, as percentage of the trad-
ing day, and as percentage of trades. By construction, the percentage of positive inside
spreads, locks, and crosses sum to 100.0%. In April/May 2009, the consolidated order
book across trading venues has a non-positive spread in 8.5% (5.1% + 3.4%) of the trad-
ing day compared to 1.4% (1.3% + 0.1%) in 2010. On average, the percentage of quotes
forming locked (crossed) quotes decreases from 11.1% (3.9%) to 5.5% (0.7%). Further
the average duration of a lock (cross) decreases from 2.51 sec (10.83 sec) to 0.86 sec
(0.41 sec). This trend represents a 65.8% (96.2%) reduction. These findings support the
view that competition for order flow may force participants on all trading venues to
quote closely linked prices.
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Table 6.3: Locked and crossed market statistics. The sample consists of 70 stocks listed on the
London Stock Exchange and in the FTSE 100. The selected stocks are traded in both observa-
tion periods: April 20 to May 29, 2009 and April 19 to May 28, 2010. The table presents statis-
tics on locks and crosses per day and per stock. A positive inside spread characterizes a ‘normal’
market regime with a positive inside spread (EBB<EBO). A stock is locked if the best posted
bid across all trading venues equals the best ask (EBB=EBO). If markets are crossed, a trading
venue’s inside bid is greater than another markets ask (EBB>EBO). Mean differences between
the two observation periods are tested for statistical significance using Thompson (2011) clus-
tered standard errors with with ‘a’ denoting statistical significance at the 1% level and ‘b’ at the
5% level.
April/May 2009 April/May 2010
Positive Locked Crossed Positive Locked Crossed
% of quotes 84.99% 11.12% 3.89% 93.80%a 5.50%a 0.65%a
(9.22%) (4.23%) (6.96%) (2.75%) (2.57%) (0.60%)
% of trading day 91.53% 5.11% 3.35% 98.60%a 1.33%a 0.08%a
(10.92%) (3.40%) (6.57%) (1.07%) (0.94%) (0.11%)
% of trades 74.57% 20.11% 5.30% 84.78%a 13.69%a 1.52%a
(9.34%) (5.02%) (7.28%) (3.57%) (3.54%) (1.32%)
Time of trading day, min 439.35 24.49 15.99 473.23a 6.36a 0.33a
(52.42) (16.33) (31.53) (5.13) (4.49) (0.54)
Average duration, sec 48.00 2.51 10.83 72.59a 0.86a 0.41a
(31.86) (3.22) (24.94) (61.23) (1.25) (6.13)
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Crossed quotes provide potential arbitrage opportunities and thus are particularly
interesting. Assuming that one trading venue quotes a higher bid than the lowest ask
across the other platforms (EBB>EBO), an arbitrageur may buy shares and immedi-
ately sell them to realize a profit. To explore arbitrage activity, I look at the duration of
crosses along with trading activity when a stock is crossed. I establish seven duration
of cross categories: 1 to 9 milliseconds, 10 to 19 milliseconds, 20 to 49 milliseconds,
50 to 99 milliseconds, 100 to 999 milliseconds, 1,000 to 4,999 milliseconds, and equal
to or greater than 5 seconds. Table 6.4 reports the number of crosses, the percentage
of crosses with at least one trade, the tick size, and the value of a cross per category on
a daily stock basis. Overall, differences in the number of crosses do not differ signifi-
cantly between both observation periods. However, I find a strong tendency towards a
shorter average duration of crosses. For example, the average number of daily crosses
that lasts more than 5 seconds decreases from roughly 10 over the 2009 observation
period to less than 1 in 2010. The average tick size and the value of a cross reveals that
a high number of crosses are initiated by a difference of one tick between the EBB and
the EBO. Trading activity may be one proxy for arbitrage activity. While there is at
least one trade for crossed market periods that last less than 10 milliseconds in 63.9% of
time in April/May 2009, the corresponding faction is 79.6% in April/May 2010. The
data show that trading activity increases along with duration of cross categories. For
example, the trading activity is considerably higher for crosses with a duration of more
than 5 seconds compared to all other duration of cross categories. In this category I
find at least one trade in 88.3% of time in 2009 and in 87.2% in 2010.4
The data allow to estimate revenues from apparent arbitrage opportunities. I obtain
the number of outstanding shares a trader can arbitrage for each cross and use the value
of a cross to calculate associated revenues. Supposing that a high-frequency trader is
able to submit a pair of orders to arbitrage crossed quotes within 1 millisecond, such a
trader can earn on average 323 GBP per day and per stock in 2009 and 209 GBP in 2010
(see Table 6.4), representing a 35,3% decline. Altogether, total potential revenues are
614,217 GBP for 70 FTSE 100 constituents during 27 trading days in April/May 2009
4Table 6.1 shows a significant increase in daily number of trades between the observation period in 2009
and 2010. As a consequence, trades during crosses may become more likely by construction. How-
ever, I argue that arbitrageurs actively take advantage of price differences. This assumption seems rea-
sonable, since, for example, BATS reports an average order latency of 200 microseconds in May 2010
(see http://www.batstrading.co.uk/resources/participant_resources/BATSEuro_Latency.pdf).
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Figure 6.4: Potential arbitrage revenues after transaction costs. The figure depicts potential
arbitrage revenues by arbitrable depth in British Pounds and the value of a cross in pence. To
resolve a crossed market, the transaction costs for a pair of active trades are assumed to be two
times 0.28 bps of arbitrable depth, the minimum threshold across markets.
and 404,700 GBP during 29 trading days in April/May 2010.
Transaction costs may be one reason why these arbitrage opportunities exist. The
data show an average arbitrable depth of 5,093 GBP during a cross in 2009 and
5,956 GBP in 2010, significantly smaller than the average daily depth across all trad-
ing venues (see Table 6.1). Minimum transaction costs are 0.28 bps of trading value
for active orders (see Section 2.2). The associated transaction costs therefore average
1,103 GBP in 2009 and 1,477 GBP in 2010 per day and per stock and thus are consid-
erably larger than potential arbitrage revenues. Figure 6.4 depicts potential arbitrage
revenues as a function of arbitrable depth and the value of a cross. It appears that -
given the minimum transaction costs from above - crossed quotes are economically not
exploitable under 0.56 pence as a value of a cross. This number roughly equals the
average value of a cross, 0.59 pence in April/May 2009 and 0.56 pence in April/May
2010, I find on average in the data (see Table 6.1). Hence, the data support the view
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that not all arbitrage opportunities are economically exploitable.
6.3.3 Determinants of Locked and Crossed Markets
This section examines initiations and terminations of locks and crosses for each trading
venue separately. While I analyze the aggregated market in the previous sections, I now
aim to identify differences in initiations and terminations of locks and crosses between
platforms. Logistic regressions further test for several factors that potentially affect
investors decisions to submit locking or crossing quotes.
Table 6.5 provides descriptive statistics on active, passive, and simultaneous locks
and crosses for the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise per day and per stock. Accord-
ing to Shkilko et al. (2008), active initiations of locks (crosses) are characterized by
an outstanding quote which is actively locked (crossed) and which stands in the order
book for a minimum duration before being locked (crossed), here 250 milliseconds.5
Active terminations of locks and crosses are defined accordingly. A simultaneous lock
(cross) happens if an investor submits a limit order that locks (crosses) a quote which
was posted less than 250 milliseconds before. Passive locks occur when a trading venue
comes out of a cross. Assuming a crossed market, an investor may send an order to
a trading venue which potentially locks a quote. Then, if the cross is resolved, the
passive quote becomes active and locks the stock. By construction, the percentages of
active, simultaneous, and passive locks sum to 100.0%. I average bid and ask-initiated
and terminated locks and crosses and report the main statistics of interest, active locks
and crosses, for each trading venue separately.
In April/May 2009, I find that active locks (crosses) represent on average 78.1%
(85.1%) of all initiated locks (crosses), simultaneous locks (crosses) 14.8% (14.9%), and
passive locks 7.0% (Table 6.5, Panel A). Traders on Chi-X and the LSE enter signifi-
cantly more locking quotes than traders on the other two MTFs, 36.0% and 31.2% of all
5I also perform the analysis with a time limit of 1 second and find the expected significant increase in
simultaneous locks and crosses. Because of faster trading compared to Shkilko et al. (2008), I reduce
the time limit for simultaneous initiations and terminations to 250 milliseconds. However, similar
patterns of active lock and cross initiations and terminations between trading venues and over time
are found for the 1 second case and are not reported for brevity.
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actively posted locks. 44.5% of all crosses are actively initiated by the LSE, 32.7%
by Chi-X, 5.0% by BATS, and 3.0% by Turquoise. Quotes of all four trading venues
are quite often locked, the percentage varies between 22.9% for the LSE and 15.8%
for Chi-X. BATS and Turquoise are most affected by active crosses with a fraction of
28.7% and 40.3% during the 2009 observation period. The LSE and Chi-X appear to
terminate locks and crosses most actively.
The analyses show a significantly higher percentage of simultaneously submitted
quotes during the observation period in 2010 compared to 2009, indicating a higher
trading speed (Table 6.5, Panel B). As a consequence, percentages of almost every cate-
gory of active cross and lock initiations and terminations decrease significantly between
both observation periods. Chi-X and the LSE still submit the highest fraction of active
locks and crosses and BATS and Turquoise are still most often actively crossed. Com-
pared to the observation period in 2009, a similar pattern is found for locked quotes,
unlocks, and uncrosses in 2010. This may provide evidence that investors use each
trading venue for similar trading strategies during both observation periods.
However, the number of quote updates that each trading venue posts has to be taken
into account. As a percentage of the total number of submitted EBBO quotes, Chi-X
provides a daily average fraction of 36.2% and 42.0% over the observation periods in
2009 and 2010, respectively. The LSE also enters a considerable number of quotes that
form the inside spread, 32.0% and 26.4%. The average daily fraction of BATS remains
relatively stable at roughly 24.0% and well ahead of Turqouise with less than 8.0%.
Comparable to Shkilko et al. (2008), I further examine active locked and crossed market
initiations and terminations as percentages of EBBO updates (Table 6.5, Panel A & B).
Overall, I do not find significant differences for lock and cross initiations across trading
venues ranging from 0.03% to 0.70% of all posted quotes per market over the observa-
tion period in 2009. All corresponding statistics are significantly smaller over the 2010
observation period. The results do not provide evidence that one trading venue causes
a substantially higher fraction of locks and crosses relative to its number of EBBO
updates. A different pattern can be seen for inside quotes being locked and crossed.
Turquoise quotes are significantly more often locked and crossed over both observation
periods. However, Turquoise also shows the highest number of unlocks and uncrosses.
Chapter 5 analyzes the contribution of the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise to price
formation in FTSE 100 constituents in April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. It ap-
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pears that Turquoise contributes significantly less to quote based price discovery than
the three other trading venues. Taken together, the evidence suggests that Turquoise is
more often locked and crossed as a result of stale quotes.
There are several reasons why locks and crosses can arise. Investors may want to
avoid trading against an outdated quote or against a limit order with a small associated
volume. To directly test these arguments, I estimate bivariate logistic regressions for
each of the observation periods. Logistic regressions allow the estimation of the impact
of changes in different explanatory variables on the probability of locks and crosses (see
Section 4.4). Separate regressions for bid-initiated (ask-initiated) locks and crosses are
presented.6 The general model is defined as follows:
ln
 pi j
piQuot e
=β1 InsideSpreadLag+β2 TimeLSE+β3 TimeChiX+
β4 TimeBATS+β5 TimeTQ+β6 vol1+β7 rv1
(6.1)
where the dependent variable equals one for bid-initiated (ask-initiated) non-positive
inside spreads with j ∈ {Lock, Cross} and is zero otherwise. pi is the modeled re-
sponse probability, InsideSpreadLag the inside quoted spread before a lock or cross is
initiated, and TimeLSE, TimeChiX, TimeBATS and TimeTQ represent the outstanding
quote time on each of the four trading venues in seconds. The variables vol1 and rv1 are
control variables representing lagged one minute trading volume in British Pounds/106
and lagged one minute realized volatility in basis points preceding a price change.7 I
further include firm dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half-hour
of the trading day.
Times of high trading activity may be an indication that traders disagree on public
information or have different private information. The resulting demand for speedy
executions can increase the probability of locks and crosses. According to Shkilko
et al. (2008), I expect locks and crosses to become more likely when inside spreads are
narrow. In line with these expectations, I obtain significantly negative coefficients on
6I exclude quote updates that do not change the EBB (EBO) from the regressions.
7Given the average duration of positive inside spreads (about 48 sec over the 2009 observation period
and 73 sec in 2010, see Table 6.3), lagged one minute variables seem to be a reasonable choice. How-
ever, I rerun all regressions with lagged three minute control variables. The results do not change
and are therefore not reported.
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InsideSpreadLag for all regression models (see Table 6.6). In fact, the odds of locking
(crossing) decrease by a multiple of 0.95 (0.89) in April/May 2009 and by 0.80 (0.66) in
April/May 2010 when the inside spread increases by 1 bps, holding all other variables
constant. To validate the predicted probabilities, two measures are presented, Somers’s
D statistic and the c statistic. Somers’s D indicates that between 16.0% and 26.0% in
2009 and between 41.0% to 64.0% in 2010 fewer errors would be made in predicting
locks and crosses by using the proposed model than by chance alone. The c statistics
confirm this pattern. The model correctly assigned higher probabilities to between
58.0% and 62.0% of locks and crosses in 2009 and to between 70.0% and 82.0% in 2010
than to non-event outcomes.
In their study of locks and crosses in Nasdaq and NYSE-listed stocks, Shkilko et al.
(2008) find a positive coefficient on outstanding quote time, indicating that some ex-
changes are often slow with quote updates. Over the observation period in 2009, the
data only indicate that the outstanding quote time increases the likelihood of a lock
on the LSE. BATS and Turquoise show a significant positive coefficient on TimeBATS
and TimeTQ over the 2010 observation period. However, the effect seems to be small.
Lagged volatility and trading volume may also indicate a period of high liquidity and
varying trading interests. Although, I would expect locks and crosses to become more
likely with an increasing value of rv1 and vol1, I only find significant positive coeffi-
cients for the more recent observation period in 2010.
MiFID’s main objective is to create greater competition for order flow across Eu-
rope and to contribute to more integrated financial markets. The evidence on quote
competition suggests that inside quotes change frequently. In addition, the results sup-
ports the view that cross and lock initiations and terminations are not caused by one
specific trading venue. Due to interrelated effects of intermarket competition, such as
lower explicit trading fees, faster exchange infrastructure (Riordan and Storkenmaier,
2011), an increasing use of co-location services (Garvey and Wu, 2010), and more so-
phisticated high-frequency trading strategies (Menkveld, 2011), traders may be able to
quickly resolve arbitrage opportunities. My results suggest that locks and crosses are
more likely in fast-moving market periods and are correlated with investor’s demand
for speedy executions.
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6.4 Trade-Throughs
In the fragmented UK trading environment, investors sometimes execute worse than
the best available price, i.e. the best available price is traded-through. Trade-throughs
represent a violation of price-priority and “[. . . ] are indicative of economically ineffi-
cient trades because investors should receive better prices” (Battalio et al., 2004). Sec-
tion 6.4.1 examines the question whether investors do execute at the best available price
and Section 6.4.2 analyzes determinants of trade-throughs using logistic regressions.
6.4.1 Trade-Through Statistics
Table 6.7 reports trade-through rates as percentages of the daily number of trades
(Panel A) and as percentage of daily trading volume (Panel B) per stock over both ob-
servation periods.8 I further differentiate between five trade sizes categories measured
by shares traded: 0-499 shares, 500-1,999 shares, 2,000-4,999 shares, 5,000-9,999 shares,
and trades with 10,000 shares or more.9 The data show a decrease in the percentage of
trade-throughs for the LSE and Chi-X and the expected negative sign for the other two
MTFs between the observation periods in 2009 and 2010. The fraction varies across
trading venues between 5.2% and 8.7% for the 2009 observation period and between
4.7% and 6.9% for 2010.10 Overall, Turquoise attracts over both periods the lowest
number of trade-throughs. The fraction of trade-throughs does not differ consider-
ably between the LSE, Chi-X, and BATS. In addition, an increasing trade-through rate
in trade-sizes provides some evidence that investors trade off best prices and available
depth. Large orders may execute against multiple limit orders at different levels in the
order book. A higher trade-through rate for large orders may therefore indicate that in-
vestors rather optimize the average volume-weighted trade price than executing simply
at the best price. Furthermore, it appears that trade-throughs are much more prevalent
in volume terms (Table 6.7, Panel B).
So far, the presented statistics on trade-throughs do not incorporate the available
8Orders may execute against hidden orders in the order book that are not visible to any investor. To
allow a clean analysis of trade-through determinants, I do not include those types of trades.
9Trade size categories are the SEC trade size classifications, see RegNMS, Rule 600.
10In their May 2010 report, Equiduct Trading provides an average trade-through rate of 8.6% for
FTSE 100 constituents traded on the LSE, Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise that is slightly higher than
the fraction I find in my data sets, see http://www.equiduct.com/.
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depth at the EBBO. However, this dimension is seemingly important, since there may
not always be sufficient depth available to execute the entire order strictly at the best
price. Table 6.7, Panel C therefore presents the fraction of trade-throughs which can
be filled entirely at the EBBO for different trade size categories. It is important to
recognize that the underlying order routing strategy may, in the case that more than
one trading venue is at the EBBO, involve order splitting across platforms. In line
with economic intuition, the variable decreases in trade size categories for all trading
venues, i.e. large trade-throughs are less likely to be filled entirely at the EBBO. In
April/May 2009, on average 42.0% of trade-throughs on the LSE, 55.7% on Chi-X,
60.7% on BATS, and 68.8% on Turquoise may entirely be executed at a strictly better
price. The percentages differ by 3.7% for the LSE, 0.3% for Chi-X, -2.2% for BATS and
4.9% for Turquoise in April/May 2010 compared to the first observation period.
Figure 6.5 depicts the fraction of trades for different order execution levels relative
to the EBBO. On average, about 92.3% of all trades across platforms are executed at
the EBBO (order execution level=0) in 2009 and 94.0% in 2010. It appears that a high
fraction of trade-throughs is executed one (order execution level=1) or two ticks (order
execution level=2) away from the EBBO during both observation periods. This find-
ing impacts potential savings of avoiding trade-throughs that the data allow to estimate,
since the benefits of searching for better prices are likely to increase in the number of
ticks away from the EBBO. As discussed above, it is, however, important to emphasize
that there is not always sufficient depth available at the EBBO to execute the entire or-
der strictly at the best price. Under the assumption that a trade-through executes at the
available EBBO volume, investors would have been able to save on average 1,451 GBP
per day and stock on the LSE, 474 GBP on Chi-X, 84 GBP on BATS, and 87 GBP
on Turquoise in 2009. In 2010, the corresponding statistics are 761 GBP for the LSE,
530 GBP for Chi-X, 210 GBP for BATS, and 68 GBP for Turquoise. The increase in
potential savings on Chi-X and BATS between both observation periods is driven by
a higher absolute number of trade-throughs. Altogether, I obtain potential savings of
roughly 4,0 million GBP for the sample of 70 FTSE 100 constituents during 27 trad-
ing days in April/May 2009 and 3,2 million GBP during 29 trading days in April/May
2010.11
11If I assume that sufficient depth at the EBBO for each order size is available, I obtain total potential
savings of roughly 15,4 million GBP in 2009 and 14,2 million GBP in 2010.
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Overall, this chapter reports a dramatically lower trade-through rate than Foucault
and Menkveld (2008) who study competition on the Dutch stock market after the mar-
ket entry of EuroSETS in May 2004. They find an average trade-through rate of over
73.0%. Since 2004, computer algorithms advanced and smart order routing (SOR)
systems that split large orders seeking best execution for investors became more so-
phisticated. The smaller trade-through ratio may provide some evidence that on the
one hand trading venues post more aligned quotes and that on the other hand liquidity
takers make more use of SOR systems.
6.4.2 Determinants of Trade-Throughs
To better understand the factors that lead to a trade-through, I estimate bivariate logis-
tic regressions on trade-throughs for each of the two observation periods. The depen-
dent variable takes the value one for a trade-through and is zero otherwise. The general
model is defined as follows:
ln

piT rad eT h r ou g h
piT rad e

=β1 InsideSpread+β2 AvgDepth1+
β3 ShareVolume+β4 vol1+β5 rv1
(6.2)
where pi is the modeled response probability, InsideSpread the inside spread in basis
points at trade time, and AvgDepth1 the average quoted volume of the individual order
books. ShareVolume is the number of shares traded divided by 1,000. The variables vol1
and rv1 are control variables and defined as in Equation (6.1).12 I further include firm
dummy variables and intraday dummy variables for each half-hour during the trading
day. Table 6.8 provides the regression estimates for all trading venues combined and
each trading venue separately over both observation periods.
12Changing the lag length to three minutes does not affect the results.
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Figure 6.5: Order execution levels relative to the EBBO. The figures depict the fraction of
trades as a percentage of the total number of trades for different order execution levels relative
to the EBBO per day and per stock. Trades executed at the best available price are zero ticks
away from the EBBO. Results for the observation period April/May 2009 are presented in the
upper figure and for April/May 2010 in the lower figure.
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In line with the results on locks and crosses, I expect trades-throughs to become
more likely with smaller inside spreads. Narrow spreads may be a sign of high trad-
ing activity and the demand for speedy executions (Shkilko et al., 2008). In addition,
when spreads are narrow the benefits to search for better terms of trade are likely to
fall. The results confirm my expectations. The coefficients on InsideSpread are negative
and highly significant for all regressions, except for Turquoise over the 2010 observa-
tion period. The corresponding odds ratios indicate that the likelihood of a trade-
through falls for an 1 bps increase in InsideSpread by a value of 0.84 for the entire
sample in April/May 2009, 0.86 for the LSE, 0.81 for Chi-X, 0.80 for BATS, and 0.86
for Turquoise, holding all other factors constant. In April/May 2010, I obtain the fol-
lowing odds ratios: 0.77 for the entire sample, 0.90 for the LSE, 0.63 for Chi-X, 0.69
for BATS, and 1.01 for Turquoise. Somers’s D and the c statistic are generally high for
all estimations, indicating that high (low) predicted probabilities are indeed associated
with an event (non-event).
The average quoted depth across trading venues can be an additional explanatory
variable for investors’ order routing decisions. The coefficients on AvgDepth1 are sig-
nificantly negative, indicating that trade-throughs become less likely with an increasing
average depth at best prices in the consolidated order book. The results are confirmed
when I replace AvgDepth1 with average depth up to three ticks behind best prices. This
result may be evidence that depth as a decision factor becomes less important for in-
vestors along with a high level of consolidated depth. Investors are rather concerned
to trade at the best available price across trading venues. These findings are mirrored
in the results on ShareVolume, which has a positive coefficient in all regressions and
confirms the descriptive statistics (Table 6.7), i.e. the probability of a trade-through
increases in trade size. Increasing lagged trading volume (vol1) and lagged volatility
(rv1) have a significantly positive effect on trade-throughs across all trading venues. In
times of high market activity, liquidity in the order books should be high. Investors
may want to trade promptly and trade off searching costs, liquidity, and speed of ex-
ecution. In summary, the regression models indicate that investors condition their
decision to trade-through the best available price on different market variables such as
bid-ask spreads and available depth.
Best execution under MiFID relies on multiple factors. MiFID explicitly allows fi-
nancial service providers to include multiple factors such as price, trading costs, speed,
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probability of execution, or probability of settlement in their best execution policy.
In contrast, RegNMS requires to link fragmented trading venues by technology and
enforces price-priority across platforms. Prior to the linkage of U.S. equity option
markets, Battalio et al. (2004) find an average trade-through rate of 11.1% in June 2000
and 3.7% in January 2002. Compared to their second observation period, my data re-
veal on average a higher trade-through rate for FTSE 100 constituents. However, the
evidence suggests that investors base their trading decisions on best prices and other
variables such as available depth.
6.5 Conclusion
One of the main objectives of MiFID is to promote competition among trading venues.
Since its introduction in November 2007, established exchanges have been challenged
by MTFs that gained significant market share in nearly all European equity markets.
In contrast to U.S. equity market’s regulation, RegNMS, MiFID neither imposes a
formal linkage between trading venues nor does it establish a single data consolidator
for pre and post-trade information. Further, intermediaries, such as investment firms
or brokers, acting on behalf of their clients have to ensure best execution and trading
venues are required to publish quote and trade information. In this chapter, I study
whether competition for order flow of disconnected platforms forces a single virtual
market to emerge.
I use order book data of FTSE 100 constituents traded on the LSE and the three
largest MTFs, namely Chi-X, BATS, and Turquoise. The analysis is based on two
observation periods in April/May 2009 and April/May 2010. Between both observa-
tion periods, the LSE market share in FTSE 100 constituents decreases from 70.2%
to 51.8%. While the LSE posts on average the narrowest quoted spread over the first
observation period, Chi-X is the most liquid platform in April/May 2010. To exam-
ine market coordination, I analyze arbitrage opportunities and suboptimal executions.
Quotes are locked if the best bid across trading venues equals the best ask (EBB=EBO)
and crossed if the best bid exceeds the best posted ask (EBB>EBO). Neither situation
seems consistent with an efficient market: Locked quotes suggest that traders who
could trade on a consolidated market do not and crossed quotes are arbitrage oppor-
tunities in the simple form as they violate the law of one price. The picture emerges
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that markets are locked (crossed) in 24.5 minutes (16.0 minutes) of a trading day during
the 2009 observation period. In April/May 2010, I find locks (crosses) in 6.4 minutes
(19.8 seconds) per trading day. This result represents a 83.5% decline in non-positive
spreads. In addition, potential arbitrage revenues before transaction costs seemingly fall
by 35,3% between both observation periods per day and per stock. Hence, it appears
that competition for order flow forces disconnected trading venues to quote closely
aligned prices.
Best execution under MiFID is multi-dimensional on factors such as price, trading
costs, speed, size, probability of execution, and other factors. This policy is in con-
trast to U.S. regulation which enforces price-priority across trading venues. I examine
trade-throughs, i.e. trades that are executed worse than the best available price across
platforms. The data show that the average trade-through rate decreases from 7.7% over
the first observation period to 6.0% in April/May 2010. The findings support the
view that an increasing number of investors use SOR systems. Regressions show that
trade-throughs become more likely in times of narrow inside spreads, suggesting that
investors trade off liquidity and search costs during fast-moving market periods.
Regulatory authorities, practitioners, and academics are concerned that MiFID re-
sults in a fragmented European trading landscape, but leaves it to the market to solve
integration. This chapter provides some evidence that competitive forces may be able
to integrate disconnected platforms and that infrastructure costs of a formal linkage
can be avoided.
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 Summary
The structure of European equity markets has significantly changed over the past
decade. Most importantly, the introduction of MiFID in November 2007 ended
the quasi-monopoly of traditional exchanges and opened regulated markets for com-
petition from alternative trading systems, in particular multilateral trading facili-
ties (MTF). On the one hand, investors may benefit from a greater choice of execution
venues and from competition for order flow that put downward pressure on transac-
tion fees. On the other hand, increased fragmentation of trading volume and liquidity
may finally lead to less transparent financial markets and more costly trading. The re-
sults of this thesis suggest that the positive effects of increased competition for order
flow under MiFID outweigh the negative side-effects.
To better understand the impact of a highly competitive trading environment on
market quality and its dynamics over time, this thesis focuses on UK blue-chip stocks
that are analyzed for two observation periods, one in 2009 and a second in 2010. The
market for these stocks is the most fragmented in Europe and therefore well-suited to
examine the impact of fragmentation on market quality. Chapter 5 studies whether
MTFs are competitive on liquidity and price discovery. It appears that MTFs compete
successfully for order flow, especially in high volume stocks, with an increasing share
in trading volume over time. The evidence suggests that Chi-X and the LSE are the
most liquid trading venues in terms of quoted spreads during both observation periods.
While quoted spreads on the LSE are slightly smaller than on Chi-X in 2009, the inverse
relationship is true in 2010. Transaction costs measured by effective spreads are the
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lowest on Turquoise during both observation periods, even after controlling for trade
characteristics. However, these favorable prices to liquidity demanders possibly arise
due to stale quotes on Turquoise. Regressions further reveal that investors tend to
submit orders to MTFs when liquidity is higher on them relative to the LSE. This
result suggests that investors actively monitor multiple platforms and trade when and
where it is relatively cheap to do so.
Price discovery is an important dimension of market quality. Chapter 5 provides
evidence that trade and quote based price discovery mainly takes place on the most
liquid trading venues, the LSE and Chi-X. In 2010, 44.6% of total information is im-
pounded into prices on Chi-X compared to 34.6% on the LSE, 12.9% on BATS, and
7.8% on Turquoise. This result is mainly due to the fact that a high fraction of quote
based price discovery takes place on Chi-X, on average 56.8%. Comparing 2009 and
2010, total contribution to price discovery tends to shift towards Chi-X and BATS in
the second observation period. Altogether, the results of Chapter 5 show that MTFs
significantly contribute to overall liquidity and that Chi-X and BATS do not seem to
be piggy-backing off of the LSE price discovery process.
From a regulatory perspective, it is important to ask the question whether competi-
tion for order flow forces trading venues to quote closely linked prices. Alternatively,
an European National Market System (NMS) comparable to U.S. regulation may en-
sure that a virtual single market emerges. Chapter 6 elaborates on this question by
studying arbitrage opportunities. Crossed market periods (EBB>EBO) that represent
arbitrage opportunities fall from 16.0 minutes per day and per stock in 2009 to 19.8 sec-
onds in 2010, a 97.6% decline. Further analyses imply that few arbitrage opportuni-
ties are profitable after transaction costs in both observation periods. In a second step,
trade-through rates are used to evaluate suboptimal executions, i.e. an investor does not
receive the best available price across markets. The fraction of trade-throughs is rela-
tively small for both observation periods and decreases from on average 7.7% across
platforms in 2009 to 6.0% in 2010. Other estimations show that investors prefer to
optimize the volume-weighted average trade price rather than to execute at the EBBO.
Overall, the results, presented in Chapter 6, provide evidence for a high level of market
integration under MiFID and therefore imply that the costs for a formal linkage as in
the U.S. (e.g. infrastructure, maintenance, latency) can be avoided.
This thesis contributes to the growing body of literature that examines intermar-
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ket competition and order flow fragmentation post MiFID. Specifically, it offers an
in-depth analysis of market quality, i.e. liquidity, price discovery, and market coordina-
tion, in high volume stocks. To understand the underlying dynamics of market quality
is of general importance, since the quality of a market has been shown to impact trans-
action costs for investors and the cost of capital for issuers alike. Highlighting recent
trends in European equity trading, two different observation periods are analyzed that
leave enough time for developments. However, this approach does not allow me to dis-
tinguish between increasing fragmentation over time and other changes, for example,
faster exchange infrastructure and a higher fraction of algorithmic trading, which may
also impact market quality.
It is further important to address the fact that this work is based on specific data
sets. First of all, the presented analysis focuses on UK high volume stocks. Although,
this market segment was chosen for well-founded arguments (e.g. the high level of UK
market fragmentation) and there is no reason to assume that trading strategies in these
stocks differ considerably from other European high volume stocks, there may be still
unknown differences. In addition, the results are based on frequently traded stocks for
which algorithmic and high-frequency traders are considered to be more active than for
less frequently traded stocks. Therefore, the results may differ for low volume stocks.
Finally, it is important to emphasize that this thesis examines market quality from an
overall perspective, i.e. it does neither incorporate unique transaction fees that retail
investors face trading through their broker nor individual investor trading data.
7.2 Outlook
While important questions on the impact of MiFID on European equity trading have
been addressed in this thesis, there are still open questions that may provide future
research directions. The following briefly discusses the most promising avenues.
122 Conclusion
Liquidity and price discovery in different European markets
This thesis offers important implications and a guideline to study market quality in fur-
ther European markets post MiFID. Studying different markets seem to be important,
since the level of intermarket competition and the characteristics of market participants
possibly impact market quality. In this context, two promising approaches arise. First,
future research may consider to study countries where trading volume is more concen-
trated on the regulated market, such as Italy and Spain, and second, less actively traded
stocks may be analyzed. It seems particularly interesting to examine the relationship
between MTFs market share and their contribution to price discovery. Studies of ad-
ditional countries and market segments may therefore offer broader insights into the
nature of market quality across Europe.
The market environment and intraday dynamics
Studying regulated markets and MTFs in different market environments may offer fur-
ther insights into trading venue competition under MiFID. For example, a platform’s
contribution to market quality may differ between ‘normal’ and ‘uncertain’ market
conditions. Therefore, investors may use one platform as a ‘market of last resort’.
Most likely associated changes in investor behavior vary for different time periods over
the trading day. Further studies may therefore also examine the intraday dynamics of
trading intensity, liquidity, and price discovery measures.
An optimal level of market fragmentation
Research that would be interesting for regulators and practitioners alike may tend to
determine whether overall market quality is maximized for a specific level of market
fragmentation. The associated level may combine benefits of intermarket competition
and order flow consolidation on a single platform. To evaluate associated research
questions, a theoretical approach seems to be more suitable than empirical research.
The model may incorporate varying levels of arbitrage activity and SOR system use
by investors.
The role of algorithmic and high-frequency traders
It is generally believed that algorithmic and high-frequency traders submit between
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40.0-60.0% of trading volume in European high volume stocks.1 Due to a lack of trad-
ing venue data that clearly identify these types of traders, their role in a fragmented
European trading landscape has not yet been studied in detail. Broker level data would
further allow to research the role of algorithmic and high-frequency traders in market-
making and cross-market arbitrage.
1See, for example, http://hft.thomsonreuters.com/.
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Appendix B
Sample Firms
130 Sample Firms
Table B.1: Sample firms - April/May 2009. This table reports sample firms for the observation
period April/May 2009 including LSE ticker symbols, average daily market capitalization in
million GBP, and average daily trading volume in thousand GBP.
Firm Ticker MCAP Trading Volume
[mGBP] [kGBP]
HSBC HOLDINGS HSBA 89,706 290,973
BP BP 92,676 219,338
VODAFONE GROUP VOD 64,226 207,958
BHP BILLITON BLT 87,152 199,162
RIO TINTO RIO 41,400 186,825
BARCLAYS BARC 22,202 178,338
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 54,092 144,314
ASTRAZENECA AZN 36,052 136,819
ANGLO AMERICAN AAL 19,915 134,475
XSTRATA XTA 18,370 129,580
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL ‘B’ RDSB 98,844 109,885
STANDARD CHARTER STAN 21,671 96,588
TESCO TSCO 27,792 90,435
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BATS 33,043 86,797
BG GROUP BG 36,492 82,601
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL ‘A’ RDSA 98,844 75,460
UNILEVER ULVR 42,930 69,703
DIAGEO DGE 20,897 64,166
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP IMT 16,033 60,306
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP RBS 22,071 58,912
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP RB 19,020 57,225
BAE SYSTEMS BAES 12,643 55,106
AVIVA AV 8,467 45,741
SABMILLER SAB 17,903 42,190
WPP WPP 5,721 40,251
CENTRICA CNA 12,203 39,262
COMPASS GROUP CPG 6,339 36,030
KINGFISHER KGF 4,234 35,937
VEDANTA RESOURCES VED 3,459 34,298
REED ELSEVIER REL 5,677 33,786
BT GROUP BT 6,962 30,323
KAZAKHMYS KAZ 3,272 29,323
SCOTTISH AND SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 10,303 27,906
ANTOFAGASTA ANTO 5,732 27,269
CADBURY CBRY 7,211 26,718
TULLOW OIL TLW 7,083 25,350
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GROUP BSY 8,069 25,089
CARNIVAL CCL 14,594 25,021
RANDGOLD RESOURCES RRS 2,848 24,302
SAINSBURY (J) SBRY 5,786 24,075
BRITISH LAND COMPANY BLND 3,554 23,433
MAN GROUP EMG 4,101 23,009
THOMSON REUTERS TRIL 15,408 22,525
CABLE & WIRELESS CW 3,802 21,692
BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 1,849 21,316
EXPERIAN EXPN 4,718 21,085
AUTONOMY CORPORATION AUTN 3,388 20,115
SHIRE SHP 4,891 18,632
HOME RETAIL GROUP HOME 2,190 18,239
SMITH & NEPHEW SN 4,067 18,195
INTERNATIONAL POWER IPR 3,971 17,751
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP IHG 1,859 17,666
EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES ENRC 7,809 16,699
CAIRN ENERGY CNE 3,153 16,495
CAPITA GROUP CPI 4,316 15,879
continued on the next page. . .
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. . . continued from Table B.1
Firm Ticker MCAP Trading Volume
[mGBP] [kGBP]
RSA INSRANCE GROUP RSA 4,304 14,379
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP UU 3,571 13,896
SMITHS GROUP SMIN 2,848 13,716
WHITBREAD WTB 1,532 13,120
HAMMERSON HMSO 2,105 12,645
THOMAS COOK GROUP TCG 2,177 12,184
ICAP IAP 2,468 12,025
DRAX GROUP DRX 1,693 11,885
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS ABF 5,779 11,547
BUNZL BNZL 1,691 11,513
JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 2,607 11,330
TUI TRAVEL TT 2,890 11,234
INVENSYS ISYS 1,653 11,223
SEVERN TRENT SVT 2,570 11,158
SAGE GROUP SGE 2,445 10,261
REXAM REX 1,942 10,149
SERCO GROUP SRP 1,848 9,481
INMARSAT ISA 2,339 9,413
STANDARD LIFE SL 4,190 9,349
132 Sample Firms
Table B.2: Sample firms - April/May 2010. This table reports sample firms for the observation
period April/May 2010 including LSE ticker symbols, average daily market capitalization in
million GBP, and average daily trading volume in thousand GBP.
Firm Ticker MCAP Trading Volume
[mGBP] [kGBP]
BP BP 105,663 477,807
RIO TINTO RIO 75,532 434,376
HSBC HOLDINGS HSBA 114,162 374,792
BHP BILLITON BLT 121,875 372,968
BARCLAYS BARC 39,229 313,998
XSTRATA XTA 30,966 277,829
VODAFONE GROUP VOD 73,377 254,027
ANGLO AMERICAN AAL 35,332 239,908
LLOYDS BANKING GROUP LLOY 40,748 204,118
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL ‘B’ RDSB 116,881 159,076
GLAXOSMITHKLINE GSK 61,920 152,854
ASTRAZENECA AZN 41,613 150,532
STANDARD CHARTER STAN 34,526 146,108
PRUDENTIAL PRU 13,831 142,791
BG GROUP BG 35,999 142,052
ROYAL DUTCH SHELL ‘A’ RDSA 112,658 135,342
BRITISH AMERICAN TOBACCO BATS 41,404 123,491
ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND GROUP RBS 28,860 117,950
TESCO TSCO 33,738 105,456
IMPERIAL TOBACCO GROUP IMT 18,854 96,667
UNILEVER ULVR 57,568 90,810
SABMILLER SAB 31,389 90,643
DIAGEO DGE 27,381 87,880
RECKITT BENCKISER GROUP RB 24,452 81,551
WPP WPP 8,497 79,128
BT GROUP BT 9,742 67,048
AVIVA AV 9,330 65,015
VEDANTA RESOURCES VED 6,668 62,606
TULLOW OIL TLW 10,025 61,876
KAZAKHMYS KAZ 6,871 61,772
CENTRICA CNA 14,835 60,142
BAE SYSTEMS BAES 11,851 56,635
ROLLS ROYCE GROUP RR 10,798 51,907
WOLSELEY WOS 4,520 51,754
ANTOFAGASTA ANTO 9,152 51,568
CARNIVAL CCL 21,912 47,337
BRITISH SKY BROADCASTING GROUP BSY 10,404 45,879
NEXT NXT 4,066 43,897
SHIRE SHP 8,017 42,903
COMPASS GROUP CPG 9,994 41,641
MARKS AND SPENCER GROUP MKS 5,580 41,592
PEARSON PSON 8,031 41,556
KINGFISHER KGF 5,444 41,352
EURASIAN NATURAL RESOURCES ENRC 14,069 41,189
SCOTTISH AND SOUTHERN ENERGY SSE 9,983 40,620
REED ELSEVIER REL 6,091 40,149
RANDGOLD RESOURCES RRS 5,071 39,806
CAIRN ENERGY CNE 5,540 38,037
ARM HOLDINGS ARM 3,231 37,955
MORRISON (WM) SUPERMARKETS MRW 7,353 35,160
MAN GROUP EMG 3,986 33,645
CAPITA GROUP CPI 4,984 31,724
SMITH & NEPHEW SN 5,819 31,494
BRITISH AIRWAYS BAY 2,424 30,740
EXPERIAN EXPN 6,176 29,040
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. . . continued from Table B.2
Firm Ticker MCAP Trading Volume
[mGBP] [kGBP]
LAND SECURITIES GROUP LAND 4,776 27,702
LEGAL & GENERAL GROUP LGEN 4,800 27,531
SAINSBURY (J) SBRY 6,172 25,112
INTERNATIONAL POWER IPR 4,797 24,906
INTERCONTINENTAL HOTELS GROUP IHG 3,155 24,848
AUTONOMY CORPORATION AUTN 4,237 24,377
OLD MUTUAL OML 6,237 24,135
AGGREKO AGGK 3,347 23,709
BRITISH LAND COMPANY BLND 3,941 23,285
HOME RETAIL GROUP HOME 2,356 23,087
G4S GFS 3,750 23,079
LONMIN LMI 3,535 22,921
PETROFAC PFC 3,849 21,188
BURBERRY GROUP BRBY 2,953 20,668
REXAM REX 2,759 20,248
ASSOCIATED BRITISH FOODS ABF 7,735 20,117
JOHNSON MATTHEY JMAT 3,560 19,123
RSA INSRANCE GROUP RSA 4,137 17,927
UNITED UTILITIES GROUP UU 3,648 17,703
ICAP IAP 2,468 17,618
SAGE GROUP SGE 3,172 17,359
AMEC AMEC 2,727 16,989
SMITHS GROUP SMIN 4,256 16,722
WHITBREAD WTB 2,561 15,847
SEVERN TRENT SVT 2,735 15,097
HAMMERSON HMSO 2,586 14,472
TUI TRAVEL TT 2,899 14,470
COBHAM COB 2,873 14,258
INVENSYS ISYS 2,502 14,130
THOMAS COOK GROUP TCG 1,977 13,866
SERCO GROUP SRP 3,080 13,699
3I GROUP III 2,661 12,244
INVESTEC INVP 3,786 11,580
BUNZL BNZL 2,436 11,267
STANDARD LIFE SL 4,291 11,174
SEGRO SGRO 2,166 10,851
INTERTEK GROUP ITRK 2,293 9,134
INMARSAT ISA 3,487 9,104
FRESNILLO FRES 6,007 8,811
ADMIRAL GROUP ADML 3,464 8,706
SCHRODERS SDR 3,755 8,403
LONDOND STOCK EXCHANGE LSE 1,816 7,378
CABLE & WIRELESS CWP 2,190 6,740
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